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This research on relational aggression among early adolescent girls in school settings 
investigated the role of language production in moral judgments.  I examined whether 
adolescent girls’ use of language to discuss these moral conflicts reflected intuition or 
rationality, and whether this relationship changed over three years of their development.    
 
Literatures in linguistics, moral development and psychology have never utilized language to 
help identify the use of intuitive and rational processes in moral decision-making. Building 
from several literatures and the dual processing theories of reasoning, I developed a new 
methodology for analyzing adolescent girls’ use of intuitive and rational language in discussing 
moral conflicts and dilemmas surrounding relational aggression.     
 
The data was derived from interviews with 15 girls in grades five, six, and seven in their 
schools from Schrader’s (2006-2009) Adolescent Girls Relational Aggression Longitudinal 
Study.  I analyzed data from a relational aggression interview, Moral Judgment Interview 
(Kohlberg, 1981), Real Life Dilemma Interview, and Metacognitive Interview (Schrader, 
1988), which had been administered as part of Schrader’s study.  The LIWC text analysis 
program (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2001) supplemented by a Dual Processing Theoretical 
Framework and qualitative semantic analyses generated what I refer to as “the Moral Language 
  
 
Use Evaluation Tool” to evaluate intuitive and rational properties of the girls’ language.  
Significant differences were hypothesized to exist in the lexical, syntactic productivity, 
semantic, and general performance language indicators, reflecting differences in the use of 
intuitive and rational language in discussing moral judgments.     
 
Both quantitative and qualitative content analysis revealed that, as hypothesized, adolescent 
girls measurably shifted from more intuitive to more rational descriptions of their moral 
judgment processes between the fifth and seventh grades, and used more intuitive language in 
discussing real than hypothetical scenarios. A qualitative content analysis of the girls’ moral 
justifications indicated that girls discussing their role-playing as bystanders provided more 
rational justifications and fewer intuitive justifications than when they discussed a hypothetical 
scenario. These results provide initial evidence for the value of applying the new moral 
language methodology to better understand the process by which girls use language in 
relational aggression conflicts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Problem 
Female adolescent bullies, victims, and bystanders experience devastating consequences 
and negative outcomes from verbal or psychological attacks, as exemplified by the prevalence 
of social-psychological maladjustment problems (e.g. social anxiety, depression, and 
delinquency) that frequently accompany experiences of relational aggression (Crick & 
Grotpeter, 1995).  A recent and well known example occurred on January 14, 2010 when 
Phoebe Prince, a 15 year-old living in South Hadley, Massachusetts who had recently 
emigrated from Ireland, committed suicide after being subjected to nearly three months of 
verbal and electronic attacks by six female students.  Phoebe endured threats of physical harm, 
abusive taunts, stalking, name-calling, and exclusion in-person at school, and after school 
through text messages and the social networking sites, Twitter and Facebook.  The girls 
followed Phoebe around, subjecting her to verbal harassment, calling her names such as ‘Irish 
slut’ and ‘whore’ (Bennett, 2010; Szaniszlo & Crimaldi, 2010).  
This behavior is usually referred to as relational aggression, defined as non-physical 
aggression where the goal is to inflict harm on others through deliberate manipulation or 
damage through social relationships (Crick, 1996; Crick and Grotpeter, 1995; Underwood, 
Galen, & Paquette, 2001).  Relational aggression can be manifested either as direct aggression 
that is easily observed and confrontational (e.g., name-calling, taunting, threats), or as 
surreptitious and less confrontational indirect aggression (e.g. ignoring, exclusion, gossip) 
(Archer, 2001; Smith, Rose, & Schwartz-Mette, 2010; Leff, Waasdorp & Crick, 2010).  
Relational aggression can also be nonverbal, but many relationally aggressive strategies rely on 
verbal expression through teasing, cruel jokes, and rumors (Bonica, Yershova, Arnold, Fisher 
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& Zeljo, 2003). 
Relational aggression has become a significant issue in most schools, particularly for 
female students in elementary and middle school (Nishioka, Coe, Burke, Hanita, & Sprague, 
2011).  In a study on relational aggression of over 11,000 students in rural and urban schools in 
grades 3-8, Nishioka, Coe, Burke, Hanita, & Sprague (2011) found more than almost half of 
girls (41.4-48.1%) and one-third of boys (31-42%) in grades 3–8 reported victimization of 
relational aggression at least once during a month-long period.  Boys and girls reported being 
lied about so others would dislike them as the most common type of relational victimization 
(Nishioka, Coe, Burke, Hanita, & Sprague, 2011).  
Adolescent girls face many challenges in the context of school due to the processing 
and interpretation of their everyday experiences of moral conflicts.  Relational aggression is a 
commonly confronted problem for adolescent girls, and often triggers extensive reflection and 
verbal exchange amongst bullies, victims, and bystanders.  Language is an important factor in 
group identification, conflict, and solidarity (Trudgill, 1974) as linguistic, extralinguistic, and 
paralinguistic dimensions of communication transmit moral information between girls.  Female 
conversations are often structured around verbal expressions indicating control, responsibility, 
emotionality, and rationality (Eckert, 2003).  For example, adolescents frequently use language 
as a means of rationalizing their decisions to conceal what they are thinking or feeling 
(Coloroso, 2003).  These verbal expressions are used to label and communicate categories that 
impose structure on moral concepts.  In fact, the emotions, intuitions, and thoughts that 
adolescents express in response to aggressive situations are often conveyed through the 
manipulation of single words.  The linguistic choices girls make in handling conflicts can 
convey moral meaning through their use of syntax, lexicon, semantic, and general processing.  
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Moral meanings transmitted through pronouns, filler words, affective words, and other 
language indicators could contain a wealth of information about how girls construct their 
understanding of morality, including information about the semantic or lexical makeup of an 
utterance, and the girl’s emotional state or cognitive processes.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Despite the increasing attention that relational aggression has received in recent years 
(e.g. Leff, Waasdorp, & Crick, 2010; Nishioka et al., 2011), the language that adolescent 
females use in relational aggression situations has remained understudied by scholars in the 
fields of psychology, education, and sociolinguistics.  There is scarcely a literature on 
adolescent girls’ language use and relational aggression, the exceptions being a few qualitative 
studies that analyzed language data through ethnographic methods (e.g. Goodwin, 2002).  Most 
researchers have examined participants’ language data for evidence of their moral or cognitive 
processes without utilizing the formal properties or functions of language production.  Another 
literature has explored the relationship between language and moral judgment through the work 
on Moral Grammar (e.g. Hauser, 2006; Dupoux and Jacob, 2010), but only the generative 
properties of language are utilized.  Research in adolescent language has not yet examined a 
broad range of semantic, syntactic, general performance issues. 
No research has addressed the interaction between moral judgment and language to 
distinguish what constitutes a reflective, rational judgment from an emotional, intuitive 
judgment in solving moral conflicts.  Dual processing models have begun to identify conditions 
and problems that are more likely to generate or require rapid, intuitive thinking, or more 
deliberate and conscious processes of reasoning.  However, neither the dual processing 
literature nor sociolinguistics have systematically studied the language terms and uses 
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associated with these processes to determine which is used in different experiences of relational 
aggression.  Dual processing models of cognition still need methodologies that could be 
adapted to studying the relationships between moral judgment and language use.  
These are large and important issues which, to date, have few answers.  The study of 
language use can help to resolve this ambiguity in the literature by providing a means for 
distinguishing intuitive from rational language.  To fill in this missing gap, a close examination 
of the formal aspects of language production in situations of moral conflict is required.  
Adolescent girls’ verbal responses to relational aggression conflicts provide an 
especially advantageous opportunity for exploring the use of language in moral judgment.  
How females construct language could play a fundamental role in their moral choices and help 
us measure how they use intuition and rationality make these choices.  A more consistent and 
developed understanding of the roles of intuition and rational moral language, and their 
interplay in situations of relational aggression, calls for an integrated view of the domains of 
language.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The questions addressed in this analysis are, what is the nature of adolescent girls' 
language use in their discussions of moral and relational aggression situations, particularly in 
regard to intuitive and rational thinking, and does that language use change in its expression 
from fifth through seventh grades.  I examine these questions by exploring the language used 
by a sample of 15 adolescent girls in hypothetical and real-life situations of relational 
aggression and moral conflict from the Girls Relational Aggression Longitudinal Study 
(GRLS) (Schrader, 2006-2009).  Grounding this work in a ‘dual processing framework of 
morality’ (e.g. Evans, 2003; Osman, 2004), I propose a system for analyzing the language 
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production found in adolescent girls’ discussions of moral conflicts, primarily involving 
relational aggression.  Building upon the LIWC analytic tool (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 
2007) and suggestions emerging in the sociolinguistic, education, and moral psychology 
literatures, I propose a set of lexical, syntactic, semantic, and general processing language 
production categories that one would expect to be associated with ‘intuitive’ uses of language 
and a contrasting ‘rational’ set on each of these language dimensions.  
1.4 Summary 
In sum, then, this present research seeks to build upon and extend the current work 
examining adolescents’ language and morality (e.g. Eckert, 2003).  Operationalization of 
language production measures will be useful for the future characterization and evaluation of 
moral reasoning.  This undertaking has broad importance because the literature on the 
relationship between language use and morality is largely undeveloped, and understandings of 
relational aggression have yet to be built in the study of moral and language development.  
Establishing a stronger relationship between these two topics will help lay the groundwork for 
being able to evaluate whether girls’ use of language correlates with their moral judgments.  
Combining the dual processing approach and a proposed moral language use methodology can 
provide an initial framework for studying moral decision-making and some of its 
developmental trajectories in adolescent girls.  This study can provide a foundation for future 
studies to determine how representations of language play a constitutive role within System 1 
and 2 processing, and whether language might shape one’s moral thinking, or merely reflects 
the moral decision-making of the individual.  Language does not map perfectly onto our 
experience of reality or correspond to a distinct internal mental state or experience.  
   6 
To understand more about the language used by adolescent girls in various contexts of 
relational aggression and moral conflict, I begin by reviewing the role of intuition and 
rationality in girls’ discussions of moral judgments.  Next, I discuss literature that is relevant to 
understanding adolescent girls’ relational aggression, language use, and morality.  My review 
of theoretical works focuses on summarizing and integrating theories, models, and empirical 
studies that have emerged from research in these areas from the psychology, education, and 
sociolinguistic literatures.  The methods for data collection and the present analysis of the data 
are presented in Chapter 3.  I then take a dual process theory approach to suggest a new method 
to analyze female adolescents’ accounts of aggression events, and better understand the 
language they use when they are confronted with relational aggression.  The study examines 
age-related changes in language production, measured in terms of lexicon (e.g. conjunctions), 
semantics (e.g. use of justifications) syntax (e.g. mean length of words), and general processing 
(e.g. filler words).  After reviewing the results of the study in Chapter 4, I turn in the final 
chapter to discuss the findings and implications for future research.   
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
 
This chapter reviews three literatures from linguistics, neuroscience, psychology, and 
education that inform the current study: the research on intuition and rational moral reasoning, 
moral judgment and language, and relational aggression and language.  First, the different 
definitions of rationality and intuition are reviewed and discussed along with measurement 
issues, leading to a conclusion that both processes should be operationalized based on dual 
process models.  The next section critically evaluates the current state of scientific knowledge 
concerning female adolescent language, and examines how language is linked to moral 
judgments.  Finally, a few studies are discussed that outline, in considerable detail, how 
language is situated in contexts of relational aggression.  
2.1 Intuition and Rationality in Moral Judgment 
2.1.1 The Role of Rationality in Moral Judgment  
Cognitive developmentalists (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1998; Rest, 
1986) have focused their attention on the how moral reasoning develops through children’s 
active exploration of the environment, formal reasoning, and abstract thought.  Kohlberg 
(1969) and Piaget (1932) have proposed that how people make moral judgments is governed by 
their developing understanding of justice and reciprocity.  Piaget and Kohlberg have found that 
as children mature and interact more frequently with peers, their moral orientation changes 
from a ‘morality of constraint’ to a more egalitarian morality of cooperation and instrumental 
exchange (Krebs & Janicki, 2004).  
According to Piaget, development occurs through cognitive reorganization, resulting in 
an increasingly powerful logical, formal operational system (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Lapsley, 
1996).  To investigate moral development, Piaget (1932) observed children playing games such 
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as marbles, and then interviewed them using short scenarios involving moral issues such as 
lying, obedience, responsibility, and punishment.  Piaget emphasized that children share 
common developmental characteristics and moral trajectories.  Specifically, Piaget (1932) 
argued that the young children tend to conceptualize morality through internalization of the 
moral rules conveyed by parents and other authorities.  This is followed by increasing 
autonomy from those rules in late childhood and adolescence as older children more frequently 
engage in egalitarian peer interactions, in which they negotiate and reconstruct moral rules 
(Krebs & Janicki, 2004; Jensen, 2008).                    
Moral Justice (Kohlberg) and Moral Caring (Gilligan) Frameworks   
 Kohlberg (1971, 1981, 1984), influenced by Piaget, explained the development of moral 
reasoning in terms of the acquisition of justice, duties, and welfare as well as preventing 
violation of rules and principles for resolving competing moral claims.  Narvaez & Lapsley 
(2005) recounted how Kohlberg defined morality to which he asserts, “in the absence of 
explicit judgments, in the absence of rational deliberation, there can be no distinctly moral 
phenomena in the first place” (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005, p. 141).  Thus, Kohlberg (1981) says, 
“moral principles reduce all moral obligations to the interests and claims of concrete 
individuals in concrete situations.  It is clear that only principles of justice have an ultimate 
claim to being adequate, universal, prescriptive principles” (p. 175).    
 Kohlberg (1971, 1981, 1984) extended Piaget’s ideas by formulating a prescriptive 
theory for conceptualizing and measuring moral development as a form of rational cognitive 
development.  Kohlberg argued that moral development – defined, specifically, as thinking and 
reasoning about justice and fairness – proceeds through six stages that mark distinct changes in 
the underlying structure of moral thought.  Developmental stages represent structured wholes 
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that develop in an invariant sequence, with old ones displaced and transformed by new stages 
that provide better cognitive tools for grasping moral problems.  Kohlberg described this 
sequence of qualitative reorganizations as a developmental progression from pre-conventional 
to conventional and then post-conventional levels of moral judgment.  Kohlberg's six stages of 
moral development trace this three-level progression from an egocentric understanding of 
fairness based on individual need (stages one and two), to a conception of fairness anchored in 
the shared conventions of societal agreement (stages three and four), and finally to a principled 
understanding of fairness that rests on the free-standing logic of equality and reciprocity (stages 
five and six).  His six stages portray forms of moral reasoning, not the content of moral 
convictions.  As these patterns of thinking develop, they become more complex, differentiated, 
and adaptive (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).       
 Kohlberg considered the child to be a ‘naïve philosopher,’ whose thinking develops 
with experience towards greater philosophical and psychological sophistication (Kohlberg, 
1981, 1984).  The higher the child’s stage of moral development, the better able he or she is to 
make moral judgments that accommodate and balance others’ perspectives impartially (Krebs 
& Denton, 2005).  Individuals who reach stage six are able to justify moral decisions on the 
basis of a central Kantian principle: individuals must be treated as ends and never merely as 
means.  His highest moral stage entails individuals assuming the ''veil of ignorance," an ideal 
reciprocal role-taking stance that "involves temporarily separating the actual identities of 
persons from their claims and interests in order to assess the relative merits of those claims and 
interests from the point of view of any person implicated in the dilemma" (Kohlberg, Boyd, & 
Levine, 1990, p. 167).          
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Gilligan (1982) questioned the generalizability of Piaget and Kohlberg’s previous 
studies, arguing that the ethic of justice was an inadequate explanation females’ moral 
reasoning.  She noted that Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s research had a masculine bias with its 
emphasis on autonomy, rights, and duty.  Gilligan (1982) claimed that women are more likely 
to score lower than boys on Kohlberg’s stages because Kohlberg's stage sequence relegated 
women's moral reasoning to a lower level of moral development (Puka, 1994).    
 Gilligan (1982, 1988) argued that there is a second orientation, a “care” aspect of 
morality in which the focus is on conflicts in relationships and on one’s self in relation to 
others.  Gilligan (1988) describes the languages of justice and care metaphorically as different 
kinds of “moral voices” or “moral orientations”, representing alternative views of what 
constitutes a moral dilemma, and how one resolves a moral problem.  Voice is described as 
being relational “in language,” connecting “psyche and body”.  Gilligan (1988) acknowledged 
that men and women both use care considerations when resolving a moral problem, but did 
introduce a developmental progression representative of female morality based on the ethic of 
care.  Development would entail successive levels: 1.) care for the self to the exclusion of 
others, 2.) seeking to ensure care for others, 3.) balanced caring for both self and others 
focusing on the dynamics of relationships and connection between self and other.            
Domain Specificity: Emphasizing Distinctions in Judgments    
 Important research conducted by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Gilligan has demonstrated that 
young children make moral judgments about harm, welfare, justice, and rights.  However, 
domain theorists (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 1983) challenged and expanded these ideas by arguing 
that children conceptualize the world in moral, social-conventional, and personal domains 
(Nucci, 2001).  The domains differ on the criteria, reasoning, and issues involved in judgments.  
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Moral justifications are reasoned using principles of justice, fairness, avoiding harm, and 
protecting rights.  In contrast, social-conventional justifications are dependent upon rules, 
authority, and the coordination of social interactions.  The criteria for social-conventional and 
personal rules apply only to one’s group or oneself, while moral rules are broadly or universally 
applicable.  Most children and adults generally judge moral transgressions to be more serious 
than conventional transgressions (Nucci, 2001).             
2.1.2 The Role of Intuition in Moral Judgments     
 Research on intuition was mostly dormant for the much of the mid-20th century due to 
the focus on rational processes, probably due the dominance of Piaget’s theories of cognitive 
development (Piaget, 1932) and Kohlberg's (1971, 1981, 1984) moral development theories.  
Researchers in the field of psychology have been historically reluctant to acknowledge intuition 
as a viable construct, associating it with mystic or paranormal experiences (King & Appleton, 
1997), and relegating it to the fields of parapsychology and 'New Age' thinking (Boucouvalas, 
1997; Claxton, 2000).  Because it involved unconscious processing, intuition often seemed 
inaccessible to scientific study and therefore, empirically unverifiable.  Osbeck (1999) cites 
historical definitions conceptions as “impressions of a certain indefinable quality,” and 
“implicit apperception,” which were contrasted with “higher” mental functions such as abstract 
thinking and language (McDougall, 1923, p.389).  Osbeck noted that intuition was seen as 
exhibited by those unable to think abstractly and who operate on a “lower plane of 
intellectuality”, most notably women, young children, and dogs (McDougall, 1923, p.391). 
 One notable exception was the work of Jung (1923, 1968), who viewed intuition as a 
type of perception existing outside of reason that goes through our unconscious, but is not 
recognized in consciousness.  Jung (1923) defined intuition as “a perception of realities which 
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are not known to the conscious, and which goes via the unconscious.  The intuitive function is 
represented by a certain attitude of expectation, a perceptive and penetrating vision” (p.462). 
 A few early psychological studies identified intuition as a particular kind of 
interpersonal judgment or social perception, distinguished by individual differences in 
personality characteristics (e.g. Valentine, 1929; Westcott, 1968).  Westcott (1968) was among 
the first to systematically study intuition, defining intuitive thinking as, “the event which occurs 
when an individual reaches a conclusion on the basis of less explicit information than is 
ordinarily required to reach that conclusion” (p.100).     
 Research on the role of intuition and affect in moral judgment resurgence of interest 
began in the last two decades after a focus on deliberate, conscious moral reasoning  (e.g. 
Kohlberg, 1981).  A rapidly growing literature began to distinguish the products of moral 
judgment as either emotional-intuitive and non-rational (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 
1993; Haidt, 2008), or deliberate, explicit cognitive processes (Kohlberg, 1971; Piaget, 1932; 
Turiel, 1983).            
 Recent advances in cognitive science even began to suggest that intuitive processes are 
not mystical, paranormal, random, or irrational (Khatri & Ng, 2000).  Several developments 
signal that intuition is a concept that can be empirically verified, and is important in a variety of 
cognitive processes, from the use of heuristics in decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983; Sunstein, 2005), to its role in learning (Hogarth, 2001).    
 An extensive body of research has emerged emphasizing the role of emotional and 
intuitive processes in decision-making (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, 
& van Baaren, R.B., 2006; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Siegler, 2000).  The 
dramatically increased concern with unconscious or implicit phenomena has commensurately 
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increased experimental interest in intuitive sources of judgment.  Lieberman (2000), for 
example, has argued that a similarity exists between intuition and implicit learning, and 
suggests that it may be fruitful to combine these two constructs to give intuition some 
credibility.  Intuition is described by Lieberman (2000) as “the subjective experience of a 
mostly non-conscious process that is fast, a-logical, and inaccessible to consciousness that, 
dependent on exposure to the domain or problem space, is capable of accurately extracting 
probabilistic contingencies” (Lieberman, 2000, p.111).  In other words, intuition is a subjective 
experience equated with unconscious information processing, and is presented as an inferential 
reasoning process that operates below the threshold of awareness through implicit learning. 
Intuition and the Brain         
 Neuroscience research has made it increasingly evident that there are inter-connections 
between moral reasoning and the physical brain.  The focus is shifting from an emphasis on 
cognitive processes to the important role of the physical brain on moral reasoning (Tancredi, 
2005).  Functional neuroimaging studies have identified a network of brain regions involved in 
moral processing, implicating a fairly consistent but diverse network of brain regions involved 
in moral processing: the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior medial prefrontal and orbital frontal 
cortex, anterior prefrontal cortex, anterior temporal lobes, medial and lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex, dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, insula, precuneus, superior temporal 
sulcus, and posterior cingulate cortex, posterior superior temporal sulcus, and limbic regions 
(e.g., amygdala) (Damasio, 2000; 2003; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001; Mikhail, 2007; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Narvaez & 
Vaydich, 2008).           
 A review by Moll et al. (2005) found converging results across functional imaging 
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studies of the brain areas involved in moral cognition.  Examining processes of moral 
judgment, Moll et al. (2005) found activation in the frontopolar cortex, medial frontal gyrus, 
right anterior temporal cortex, lenticular nucleus and the cerebellum, demonstrating an 
evolutionary correlation between older and younger parts of the brain.  Casebeer & Churchland 
(2003) found agreement across lesions and neuro-imaging studies, which revealed that 
ventromedial prefrontal damage is consistently associated with impairments in moral decision-
making, non-moral decision-making, and emotion (Damasio, 1994; Anderson, Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999).        
 There is a growing consensus that moral judgments are based largely on intuition about 
what, in particular cases, is right or wrong.  Evidence from neuroscience indicates that moral 
judgment is often an intuitive, emotional matter.  Greene and colleagues (Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Greene et al., 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004) have argued that 
some moral judgments, which we consider personal, are driven largely by emotions such as 
empathy, anger, and intuitive-emotional responses, while impersonal, moral judgments are 
driven more by deliberate, cognitive moral reasoning.  In the first neuroimaging study of moral 
reasoning, Greene et al. (2001) suggested that reasoning can play an important role in the 
production of impersonal moral judgments, and in personal moral judgments where reasoned 
considerations and emotional intuitions conflict.  Greene et al. (2001) compared reasoning 
about ethical dilemmas that are emotionally engaging (the footbridge dilemma, dilemmas in 
which physical harm is caused to another person directly by the agent) with less emotionally 
engaging dilemmas (the trolley dilemma, and dilemmas in which physical harm is caused to 
another person only indirectly).         
 Greene et al. (2001) showed that ‘‘personal’’ moral violations, which were those likely 
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to cause serious bodily harm to a particular person, activated the medial prefrontal cortex, 
posterior cingulate cortex, and angular gyrus bilaterally more strongly than ‘‘impersonal’’ 
moral violations, where no serious harm was likely to occur.  They attributed the activation 
pattern to the emotional component of the task, and concluded that affect plays an important 
role in personal moral judgment.  Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger (2003) found similar results 
that when subjects made moral, as opposed to factual, judgments, areas of the brain that are 
associated with emotional response were active.      
 Bauman and Kuhl (2002) argue that extended associated networks are activated 
automatically on exposure to a stimulus (e.g. word triads), and that parallel processing of 
information is initiated, which is holistic and implicit, and may give rise to an intuitive 'sense' 
of coherence (Anderson, 1983).  Related work has implicated the median orbito-frontal cortex 
(OFC), the right lateral portion of the amygdala and the ventral-occipito-temporal (VOT) 
regions as areas in which intuitive judgments of visual coherence are generated, prior to 
problem solution (Volz & von Cramon, 2006).  Volz & von Cramon (2008) proposed that 
without conscious attention, people continuously recognize patterns in the stream of sensations, 
based on only a few aspects of the input.  Similarly, Radin and Schlitz (2005, p.85) define “gut 
feelings” as “commonly reported visceral sensations that are virtually synonymous with 
intuitive hunches,” and hypothesize that these hunches involve the use of non-sensory 
information by the recipient.  The authors note, however, that what is measured as an “intuitive 
hunch” in many studies can actually be attributed to forgotten expertise, subliminal cues, and 
unconscious somatic influences (Damasio, 1994; Torff & Sternberg, 2001).   
 Intuitions are part of the larger set of social intuitions that become increasingly 
differentiated as they guide people through complex, highly uncertain, and rapidly changing 
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social interactions (Woodward & Allman, 2007).  The neurobiological substrate for these 
intuitions includes the insular, cingulate, and orbito-frontal cortices, and associated subcortical 
structures such as basal ganglia and amygdala which have been implicated in intuitive 
processing by many functional imaging and brain lesion studies (Damasio, 1994; Rilling et al., 
2002; Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004).  Brain lesion studies have also revealed 
a very interesting feature of the neurobiological development of moral intuition (Woodward & 
Allman, 2007).  Damage to the orbito-frontal cortex in infancy has a significant impact on adult 
moral intuition and judgment (Anderson et al., 1999).      
 Lieberman (2000) established a link between implicit learning, intuition, and the “non-
conscious predictive sequencing” performed by the basal ganglia.  If intuition and implicit 
learning are both largely dependent on the basal ganglia, Lieberman (2000) argues that this 
would constitute strong evidence that the two are related, overlapping processes.  It may then 
be fruitful to consider intuition as the subjective experience associated with the use of 
knowledge gained through implicit learning.  Implicit learning and knowledge contribute to the 
knowledge structures from which individuals draw when making intuitive judgments.  
However, although they may underpin the processes that lead to an intuitive judgment, they are 
not equivalent to intuitions.          
Evolutionary Theories         
  Haidt & Joseph (2004) suggest that we have evolved to find certain issues 
morally relevant because of our ancestors’ physical and social experiences.  Haidt & Joseph 
(2004) identified four structures individuals are innately designed to be responsive to the 
presence of certain social cues: 1) suffering/compassion 2) transgressions against group 
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hierarchy/respect 3) reciprocity/fairness and 4) purity.  Individuals usually automatically and 
reliably react with feelings linked to moral intuitions (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). 
Haidt (2001) proposes that morality “is a major evolutionary adaptation for an intensely 
social species, built into multiple regions of the brain and body, that is better described as 
emergent than as learned, yet that requires input and shaping from a particular culture” (Haidt, 
2001, p.826).  Haidt (2001; 2004) argues that intuitions are innate, enculturated, cognitive-
emotive structures that are shaped by the physical, cultural, and social processes of evolution.  
Cappon (1993) conception of intuition also leans in this direction, defining the construct as “the 
product of all the processed ancestral instincts of the species, through which unconditioned 
reflexes become conditioned and organized into patterns of adaptive behavior” (p. 41). 
Hauser (2006) argues that humans are endowed with a universal moral grammar or 
moral organ.  Hauser claims that: "we evolved a moral instinct, a capacity that naturally grows 
within each child, designed to generate rapid judgments about what is morally right or wrong 
based on an unconscious grammar of action" (p. xvii).  Humans have an innate capacity to 
develop a moral sense, much in the way we have now come to view the capacity to acquire 
language. 
Hauser illustrated how and why moral intuitions have evolved in the context of moral 
conflict and often serve as a source of moral decisions.  For example, Hauser (2006) argues that 
moral judgments are mediated by an instinctual, unconscious process that evaluates our own 
and others' actions.  Hauser (2006) describes these moral intuitions as an “evolved capacity of 
all human minds that unconsciously and automatically generates judgments of right and wrong” 
(p. 2).  He notes that these intuitions do not make moral judgments “inescapable”. “Rather, they 
color our perceptions, constrain our moral options, and leave us dumbfounded because the 
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guiding principles are inaccessible, tucked away in the mind’s library of unconscious 
knowledge” (Hauser, 2006, p. 2).  We can thus make moral decisions based on unconscious 
and inaccessible principles within a “domain of evolved parameters” that guide our moral 
thought and behavior.  
However, critics (de Waal, 2001; Wright, in press) of the evolutionary approach suggest 
that the notion of intuition being genetically “hardwired” into our brains is too simplistic.  This 
argument raises important issues that have yet to be answered.  Even though theories of 
innateness and evolution are useful in studying intuition in morality, they do not explain how 
intuition develops.  In general, research on intuition suffers from the absence of models of how 
intuitions develop.  It is important, therefore, to consider how to develop a conceptual 
framework capable of clarifying these issues.  A clearer theoretical framework is needed than 
those that have thus far guided the research in this area.  The question for cognitive-
developmental psychologists and educators then, is how is intuition acquired and developed? 
Developmental Frameworks of Intuition 
Baylor (2001) proposed a non-linear u-shaped model of intuition development 
influenced by an individual's level of expertise within a given subject area.  Intuition can start 
at a relatively high level and then decrease or increase depending on the level of expertise in a 
subject area.  In this model, two ends of the "U" developmental curve represent two 
qualitatively different types of intuition: immature and mature intuition.  Immature intuition is 
most common where the analytical knowledge of a novice does not interfere with the ability to 
make novel insights.  Mature intuition is more rare, and is most available when an individual 
has obtained expertise with well-developed relevant knowledge structures.  Baylor (2001) 
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proposes that a person is able to construct higher connections and understandings with an 
increase in expertise. 
 Welling (2005) constructed phases of intuitive knowledge representing different modes 
of knowledge representation.  Welling (2005) models intuition as a constructive process of 
early knowledge representations based on pattern recognition.  An individual would start in a 
detection phase, in which a clue of something arises in consciousness, and move to a 
dichotomic awareness phase, in which the intuition comes to awareness, and important factors 
are identified.  Then in the metaphorical solution phase, one recognizes how the elements are 
important.  Finally, at the explicit verbal understanding phase, intuition is completely clear.   
Whereas rational approaches to morality provide explicit accounts of how moral 
development occurs, virtually no studies (with the exception of Baylor, 2001 and Welling, 2005 
above) have provided an adequate account of intuitive moral development.  However, 
researchers have explored how intuitive understanding emerges as children use intuitive 
thinking to interact with the environment (Noddings & Shore, 1984).  
Several researchers (Carey, 1985; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002) 
argue for the importance of intuitive theories in children’s lives, framing the major transitions 
of cognitive development as instances of how children’s intuitive theories develop and change.  
Studies of natural variation demonstrate that children’s intuitive theories develop and change in 
response to evidence (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004).  Flavell (1999) has shown that even infants 
seem to possess intuitive theories of the physical, biological, and psychological world.  Young 
children in preschool use these intuitive theories to make causal predictions, provide causal 
explanations, and reason about causation counterfactually.  Children’s moral intuitions involve 
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strong dualistic “with me or against me” feelings, while adults will experience more a wider 
range of moral intuitions that are more subtle (Woodward & Allman, 2007).  
Educational research (Baylor, 2001; Ben-Zeev & Star, 2001) has revealed students’ pre-
existing knowledge in order to make connections between students’ school-taught, formal 
knowledge, and their informal intuitions.  Strauss (1982) cites empirical research showing that 
younger children intuitively comprehend problems about temperature correctly (e.g., that cold 
water + cold water = “same cold" and not "twice as cold"), but that later, under the influence of 
formal education in arithmetic operations, children become confused and give incorrect 
answers.  Ben-Zeev & Star (2001) suggest that preschoolers not only possess general abilities 
to sense and learn, but that they are also able to create and manipulate domain-specific 
representations.  Gelman and colleagues (Gelman, 1979, 1990; Gelman & Meck, 1983) propose 
that preschoolers have implicit counting principles before they are able to verbalize these 
principles explicitly.   
Researchers have argued that intuitive processes can evolve from implicit learning and 
experiences that are flexible and context sensitive (Isenberg, 1984; Simon, 1987; Agor, 1990; 
Kleinmuntz, 1990; Ray & Myers, 1990; Parikh, 1994).  Furthermore, young children, who have 
less exposure to linear, logical thought processes, are more naturally inclined to intuition, and 
can thus be more easily trained to be intuitive than older children (Noddings & Shore, 1984). 
2.1.3 Summary for Intuitive and Rational Reasoning  
The chapter has reviewed how the rationalist approach to moral judgments formed 
primarily through a two divergent modes of moral reasoning.  Moral choices and judgment can 
involve both orientations of justice and care.  Issues of care center on attachment, empathy and 
a focus on relationships, connection, care for others, whereas justice involves competing rights 
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and responsibilities, and ideals of equality, reciprocity, fairness, individualism, and autonomy.  
This section of the literature review has also attempted to understand the nature and 
development of intuitionist approaches to morality.  Intuition has been studied across several 
fields, including philosophy, cognitive science, developmental psychology, moral psychology, 
and more recently neuroscience, and the lack of consistent or clear definitions within or across 
fields has been a major impediment to empirical research on intuition.  The term ‘intuition’ is 
defined in numerous and conflicting ways, often because relevant work is scattered and poorly 
integrated throughout these different bodies of literature (Turiel, 1998).  There is considerable 
disagreement about the nature of the processes that underlie or generate intuitions, and about 
their role in moral functioning.  The conceptual development of intuition remains problematic, 
suffering from vague and inconsistent uses (Osbeck, 1999).  
Intuitions are typically holistically experienced without thought or conscious 
processing.  However, recent research suggests instead that they are based upon rapid 
inferences, pattern recognition, and cognitive processing that does not rise to the level of 
consciousness, and are often founded upon learning so implicit or deeply embedded as to seem 
“automatic”.  Important new research on automaticity and in neuro-science has begun to study 
conditions under which decisions and solutions can be reached instantly through intuitive 
processing, and has linked these processes to specific areas of the brain.  Neuro-scientific 
research has also established clear links between intuitive processing and emotions, for highly 
valenced conditions can often call for automatic or intuitive processing, and the decisions or 
conclusions reached are often accompanied by strong affect.  Although there are many 
complexities and caveats, these highly diverse perspectives and disciplines seem in important 
ways to be converging towards agreements that although moral judgments often strike the 
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subject as intuitive, “gut” reactions, they seem instead to be learned responses so deeply 
“wired” into our neuro-cognitive systems through eons of evolutionary biology and years of 
cultural socialization that they exhibit features highly similar to the automaticity characteristic 
of affect-laden responses and of experts across wide spectrums of performance and problem 
solving.   
Most explanations of moral psychology now acknowledge both intuitive and rational 
factors, but the lack of common or clear conceptualizations within or across fields has been a 
major obstacle to empirical research on intuition.  Researchers have also failed to explore how 
the intuitive and rational processes interact (Turiel, 1998).  The current findings suggest that, 
regardless of where the division between intuition and rationality is placed, a multifaceted, 
dynamic model of moral judgment is needed.  This would contrast with to Kohlberg’s  (1969) 
perspective, which assumes that all moral reasoning is the product of conscious reasoning. 
In the light of the advances outlined above, it is now possible to offer a better-integrated 
and more coherent account of the nature and role of moral intuition and rationality.  For this 
purpose, I turn to dual-process theories in cognitive psychology for a more integrated and 
coherent account of intuitive and rational processing.  Dual-process theories can help clarify the 
definitions of rationality and intuition and how they differ from one another in the formation of 
moral judgments. 
2.1.4 Dual Process Theories  
Many psychologists and cognitive scientists have proposed dual-process accounts of 
cognitive processing (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2003; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Rai, & Heier, 1996; Simmons & Nelson, 2006; Sloman, 1996; Sun, 
2004; Stanovich & West, 2000) in which two distinct forms of processing are performed by 
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two distinct, parallel, but interactive systems: one process that is intuitive and subconscious, 
and one process that is rational and conscious. 
Evans (2003) described System 1 (intuitive processes) as “rapid, instinctive, and 
automatic in nature: only their final product is posted in consciousness”(p.454).  System 1 is 
characterized as implicit, unconscious, holistic, primarily nonverbal, and emotionally driven.  
System 1 is a relatively effortless system that relies on prior knowledge, heuristics, immediate 
experience, suggesting that implicit processing occurs incidentally and without awareness of 
cognitive processes.  System 1’s rapid cognitive processes can be either unintentional and 
effortless or intentional but effortless. 
The rational system (System 2), on the other hand, is thought to have evolved more 
recently than System 1, is unique to humans, rule-based, and was developed to operate in the 
medium of language (Osman, 2004).  System 2 is explicit, sequential, and its explicit 
processing is deliberate and always accompanied by awareness.  Compared with System 1, 
System 2 (rational) cognitive processing is slower, more controlled, and requires greater effort.  
The rational system operates primarily at the conscious level and is primarily verbal and 
relatively affect free.  It functions using a person’s abstract hypothetical reasoning (e.g. 
constructing mental models, logic) that cannot be achieved by System 1.  Alter, Oppenheimer, 
Epley, & Eyre (2007) also noted that System 2 could override or undo intuitive System 1 
responses.  
Haidt (2001) argues that moral judgment is the result of quick, automatic evaluations or 
intuitions and not the conscious, deliberative outcome of a reasoning process.  More 
specifically, Haidt (2001) proposes a Social Intuitionist Model to demonstrate that moral 
intuitions, arising from cultural forces and evolutionary adaptations, cause moral judgments.  
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Moral intuitions, according to the model, lead directly to moral judgments, which Haidt defines 
as “evaluations (good versus bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with 
respect to a set of virtues held to be obligatory by a culture or subculture” (Haidt 2001, p. 817).	  	  
Similar to Evans’ (2003) discussion of System 1 processing, Haidt (2001) defines intuition as 
“the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence 
(e.g. good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of 
searching, weighing evidence, of inferring a conclusion” (p. 818).  Haidt (2001) characterizes 
intuition as fast, automatic processing that that produces reactions (e.g. moral-emotional 
responses) so rapidly and unconsciously that the processes are not available to introspection.  
One's own reasoning thus usually only acts indirectly via the intuitions, judgment, and 
reasoning of other individuals, and typically only justifies the moral judgment determined by 
the individual's intuitions.   
Haidt’s social intuitionist model has been subjected to numerous criticisms.  Pizarro & 
Bloom (2003) argued for a more significant and explicit role of moral reasoning processes than 
Haidt’s (2001) Social Intuitionist Model allowed, suggesting that fast and automatic intuitions 
can actually be shaped, controlled, and informed by prior reasoning.  Fine (2006) claimed that 
intuitive moral judgments may reflect the automatization of goals based on prior knowledge 
and reasoning.  
In Haidt’s (2001) dual-process model of moral cognition, reason justifies intuitive moral 
judgments, as reasoning typically only acts indirectly through the intuitions.  Haidt  (2001) 
explains that as a consequence “moral reasoning is biased and post hoc: moral reasoning is not 
left free to search for truth, but is hired out like a lawyer by various motives, employed only to 
seek confirmation of preordained conclusions” (p. 822).  Moral reasoning justifies the moral 
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judgment reached by the individual's intuitions, and is a post hoc construction with little or no 
influence on the outcome. 
Recent research has also begun to find neuro-scientific support for dual processing.  
Based on their fMRI study, Greene et al. (2004) proposed a dual process model for moral 
judgment based on an affective system and cognitive system.  Similarly, Lieberman, Jarcho, & 
Satpute (2004) conducted an fMRI study that identified two processing systems, each serving 
distinctive aspects of social cognitive functioning about self-knowledge: the intuitive system 
and the analytic system.  The phylogenetically older X-system, using parallel processing and 
non-reflective consciousness, is fast operating, slow learning, and spontaneous.  The 
phylogenetically younger C-system, in contrast, uses reflective consciousness based on serial 
processing, and is slow operating, albeit fast learning and intentional (Lieberman, 2007).  The 
X-system is a network of neural structures consisting of the basal ganglia, ventro-medial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPC), nucleus accumbens, amygdala, and lateral temporal cortex.  In 
keeping with the predictions of the various dual-process theories summarized above, the X-
system's intuitively based knowledge is located in neural substrates that are slow to form and 
change, while relatively insensitive to explicit feedback from others (Lieberman, 2000).  
Lieberman discovered that intuition-based self-knowledge system was associated with 
judgments in high-experience domains, and produced activations in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, basal ganglia, and amygdala.   
While this dual-processing paradigm has produced major advances in the literature, it 
also suffers from two limitations.  First, as Gilligan has shown, decision-making in the context 
of real world moral conflicts can differ substantially from decisions in response to real-life 
dilemmas.  Second, the literature does not yet have well-developed understandings of the 
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interaction between intuitive or rational processing on one hand, and the language a subject or 
respondent will use to discuss the dilemmas and their decisions on the other. Several issues 
have yet to be resolved, including the question of how the two systems might be applied to the 
study of language production in moral judgments.  
Research on dual processing models has begun to identify conditions and problems that 
are more likely to generate or require rapid, intuitive thinking, or more deliberate and conscious 
processes of reasoning.  However, the language terms and uses associated with these processes  
have not been studied systematically enough in either the dual processing literature or 
sociolinguistics to permit inferences about these decision making processes from subjects’ 
discussions of their moral judgments.  Dual processing models of cognition still need 
methodologies that could be adapted to examine the relationships between moral judgment and 
language use.  Addressing this gap presents a large and important challenge that this thesis 
seeks to meet by examining how adolescent females use language to construct moral 
judgments.  Building on the strengths and weaknesses identified in my analysis of the literature 
on intuition, I next proceed to discuss how to most effectively test and measure the 
development of intuition. 
2.2 Review of Methodological Issues: Intuitive Reasoning 
 Efforts to operationalize and measure intuition long suffered from the lack of clear or 
common conceptualizations and definitions of the term, resulting in work of questionable 
scientific value.  However, studies in widely different fields have now produced several 
approaches to conceptualizing, defining, and measuring the concept.   
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I review here some of these measures and their limitations, outline some alternatives to extant 
empirical indicators of the concept, and consider some theoretical implications of different 
methods of assessing intuition, including: 
1. Qualitative self-report techniques, including philosophical analysis, introspection, anecdotal 
evidence, and armchair speculations, have been used to measure the quality of intuition as it 
is experienced.   
2. Several scales measuring intuition as a self-reported personality construct, such as the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), usually obtained by probing respondents’ general 
preferences, rather than from context-specific use.  
3. Moral dilemmas involving, for example, sacrificing one individual to save five, or 
disgusting but harmless taboos.   
4. Neuro-psychological studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron 
emission tomography (PET), electroencephalography (EEG), and other techniques to 
identify areas of the brain stimulated in solving moral problems or dilemmas, and using 
variations in the tasks or dilemmas to help distinguish moral reasoning from other types of 
decision making and the role of affect.           
2.2.1 Qualitative Self-Report Methods       
 Since it involved unconscious processing, intuition often seemed inaccessible to 
scientific study.  Early behaviorists, such as Skinner (1953), viewed inner processes or states 
not worthy of serious study.  Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005) observed that intuition had been 
“restricted to the realm of philosophy” because it was too elusive to define and measure for so 
many years.  Philosophical analysis relied heavily on the traditional tools of philosophical 
   28 
analysis, along with introspection, anecdotal evidence, and armchair speculation (Casebeer & 
Churchland, 2003).  Over the past fifty years, philosophers often used intuitions in their 
philosophical arguments.  The first qualitative traditions for measuring intuitive moral 
judgments originated in the thought experiments conducted by moral philosophers to develop 
their arguments.  For example, philosophers employed hypothetical “thought experiments” 
meant to trigger certain intuitions, typically in order to assess the degree to which thought 
experiments seem plausible or implausible, or as possible or necessary.  Dennett (1991) coined 
the term “intuition pump” for a philosophical thought experiment designed to elicit intuitive 
responses about a problem in which an event described in some imaginary scenario were 
actual.  Dennett (1984) states the following about these ‘intuition pumps’, "Such thought 
experiments are not supposed to clothe strict arguments that prove conclusions from premises.  
Rather their point is to entrain a family of imaginative reflections that ultimately yields not a 
formal conclusion but a dictate of intuition" (p. 12).      
 The first qualitative traditions for measuring moral judgments originated in 
philosophical thought experiments, which had little, if any, empirical substantiation.  Research 
also shows, however, that people often do not have introspective access to how or why they 
made an intuitive judgment, and these might more appropriately be seen as measures of how 
people justify or reason about moral decisions.  Self-report measure may not tap into 
individuals’ actual use of intuition, because they only assess one’s perception of their use of 
intuition.  The application of qualitative self-report techniques to people’s reflections on their 
judgments, especially judgments on scenarios or dilemmas in laboratory settings, may therefore 
not provide the most valid methods for identifying how these judgments were reached.  The 
literature then shifted from approaches based on philosophical self-report techniques, self-
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introspection, journal content analysis, and in-depth interviews to efforts to construct 
personality scales and inventories.             
2.2.2 Personality Measurement Scales and Inventories     
 Personality scales and inventories have often been used to measure intuition as a 
predisposition, preference, an ability, or self-reported personality construct (e.g., Epstein et al., 
1996).  One of the first researchers to systematically study intuition, Westcott (1961, 1968) 
measured patterns of personality differences in intuitive thinking.  Participants were asked to 
solve an intuitive problem-solving task composed of four different types of problems: 
numerical series problems, verbal series problems, verbal analogy, and numerical analogy.  
Westcott (1968) eventually created a Test of Intuitive Ability to measure intuition responses in 
which individuals were asked to give correct answers based on limited information.  
 Similarly, problem-solving tasks have also been used where intuitive processing is often 
inferred from reaction times, or self-reports.  Measures such as the Accumulated Clues Task  
(Bowers et al., 1990), the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999) and 
the Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task (Bowers et al., 1990) all consist of items to which 
participants were required to generate a hunch or solution with incomplete information or 
insufficient time.  Problem solving tasks either force rapid decision-making associated with 
intuition, or in conditions that are introduced that should favor intuitive or rational processes.  
For instance, the Accumulated Clues Task was developed by Bowers et al. (1990) to measure 
the amount of information required by a participant to produce a correct solution in a limited 
time frame.  An individual is rated as more intuitive if limited information is required. 
 More recently, scales began to tap the holistic and affective characteristics of intuition.  
Cappon (1993) developed the IQ2: Intuition Quotient Test (Cappon, 1994), a visual laser-video 
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test of information processing, to measure intuitive processing separately from rational thinking 
by assessing holistic and knowledge-based pattern recognition.  The Personal Style Inventory 
(PSI) (Taggart, 1993) arranges six scales on a spectrum from the most rational (planning) to the 
most intuitive (insight).  The Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID) scale assesses 
individual preferences for intuitive and deliberate decision-making (Betsch, 2004).  The Human 
Information Processing Survey (Taggart and Torrance, 1984) assesses preferences in rational-
intuitive terms, and locates individuals within a four-fold typology.The Myers Briggs Type 
Indicator (MBTI) can be used to assess the extent to which participants intuitively make sense 
of their perceptions.  This scale measures an individual’s preference for imagination, 
possibility, and abstract relationships over reality and concrete facts.  The Intuitive/Sensate 
scale of the MBTI (Myers, McCaulley, Quenk, & Hammer, 1998) is based on the work of Jung 
(1968), and is incorporated into the MBTI and associated research as one of the four basic 
mental functions that Jung identifies (Myers et al., 1998).  The Thinking/Feeling subscale 
measures an individual’s preference for thinking as opposed to feeling in making decisions.  
Theoretically, the Intuitive/Sensate scale may tap the holistic nature of intuition, while the 
Thinking/Feeling scale reflects the affective nature of intuition.     
 The Cognitive Style Index (CSI; Allinson and Hayes, 1996) has been designed to locate 
individuals along a uni-dimensional continuum, with high scores reflecting preferences for 
analytical decision-making styles, and low scores preferences for intuitive preferences.  The 
Remote Associates Test measures the coherent, holistic nature of intuition (Bowers, Regehr, 
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990).  The test presents dyads of three words each.  The words in only 
one of the triads are all related, and can thus be considered coherent.  Respondents are 
interrupted after a few seconds and are asked which pair is coherent and can be solved.  This 
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elicits perception of coherence (pattern, meaning, structure) that unconsciously guides one’s 
thought toward a hunch or hypothesis (Bowers et al., 1990).     
 Epstein introduced the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) a measure of preference 
for rational versus intuitive thinking that assesses intuition through experiential processing 
based on affective, heuristic, and holistic aspects of intuition (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  The 
REI consists of rational and experiential subscales, which are each divided into ability and 
favorability subscales.  Ability subscales estimate a person’s belief in his or her own ability to 
use rational or experiential thinking whereas favorability subscales reflect preferences to 
engage in that type of processing (e.g. logical and complex thinking about difficult problems).
 Personality measurement scales and inventories, such as the REI and CSI, are promising 
because they simultaneously tap both intuition and rationality processes.  However, these 
instruments assume that intuitive types share distinct personality characteristics and traits. This 
could limit their usefulness for measuring moral language; there may not even be a strong 
relationship between static personality traits and the more fluid processes of decision-making.  
Findings of studies investigating the relationship between personality and cognition have not 
always been consistent (Soubelet & Salthouse, 2011).  Intuition and rationality, as measured by 
personality tests, are probably not utilized consistently in decision-making, especially across 
real life and hypothetical contexts.  The two qualitatively different forms of processing, which 
we all engage in under different conditions, are not well conceptualized as personality traits.  
Processes of decision-making have become much more more accessible to observation, 
however, given important advancements in neuro-science.   
 
 
   32 
2.2.3 Neuro-imaging Methods 
Researchers in neuroscience have used a variety of methods to track how the brain 
makes moral decisions.  These have included neuro-imaging techniques such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography (PET), 
electroencephalography (EEG), and neuronal recordings in non-human species.  All of the 
measures assume a relationship between proximity and emotional processing and intuition.  
Neuro-imaging studies using fMRI have identified a network of brain regions involved in 
moral processing in a variety of paradigms, ranging from picture viewing (Moll, Oliveira-
Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002) to dilemmas depicting moral violations (Greene et al., 
2001; 2004).  For instance, fMRI has been used to differentiate moral from non-moral judgment 
processes, to link moral judgment to emotional processing, and to explain the role of proximity 
in moral dilemmas.  FMRI studies testing moral judgment in normal adults (Greene et al. 2001, 
Greene & Haidt, 2002, Greene et al. 2004) and in individuals exhibiting atypical moral 
behavior (Blair, 2004) all suggest that emotion and intuition is a significant driving force in 
moral judgment.  For example, the neural areas activated when subjects have moral intuitions in 
response to moral decision tasks (Moll et al., 2002) seem to be areas involved in social 
cognition that involves relatively quick and affective processing.  
In two fMRI experiments, Greene et al. (2001) investigated the neural substrates of 
moral judgments about hypothetical personal versus impersonal dilemmas.  Greene et al. 
(2001) administered fMRI scans in each of two experiments to nine participants, who were 
given a total of 60 dilemmas of a moral-personal, moral impersonal, and non-moral nature.  
Dilemmas were presented on a visual display projected into the fMRI scanner.  In personal 
dilemmas, participants contemplated causing serious bodily harm or death to another person in 
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a way that did not simply deflect harm onto someone else.  Personal dilemmas thus involved 
‘‘up close and personal’’ harmful acts the subjects directly initiated whereas impersonal 
dilemmas did not meet these three criteria.  They were then asked to judge if the action was 
permissible.  The fMRI data from the dilemmas showed distinct brain mechanisms underlying 
each type of reaction.  Brain areas associated with emotion were much more active in fMRI 
scans during contemplation of the personal moral dilemmas, and the actions in these dilemmas 
were more frequently judged to be less permissible.  Greene et al. (2001) demonstrated that 
personal dilemmas engage brain regions involved in emotion (e.g. posterior cingulated gyrus, 
medial frontal gyrus), whereas impersonal dilemmas activate areas involved in deliberative 
reasoning (e.g., middle frontal gyrus) and working memory (e.g., parietal lobe, bilateral).  
There was no significant difference between the moral-impersonal and the non-moral 
condition.  
There was great ambiguity in how Greene et al. (2001) attempted to distinguish the 
intuitive, more emotional  “up close and personal” violation exhibited by the footbridge 
dilemma from the more impersonal, less emotional violation exhibited by the trolley dilemma.  
Questions about whether or not participants’ lives were in danger were varied unsystematically 
across the dilemmas.  More personal than impersonal dilemmas involved killing someone or 
threats of death (e.g. cases of infanticide, lifeboat scenario), and more impersonal than personal 
dilemmas involved less serious harm such as lying (e.g. lying on a tax return, putting false 
information on a resume).  Dilemmas involving whether to make charitable donations or 
encourage the use of a vaccine were included in the impersonal dilemmas along with those 
involving deflecting threats of death (e.g., trolley dilemma).  As a result, dilemmas differed not 
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only in their degree to which they were personal or impersonal, but also in the seriousness of 
the harm or threat involved.   
Understanding of the role of affect in intuitive judgments has also benefited 
significantly from research that has explored the somatic aspects through various tasks.  
Researchers (McCraty, Atkinson, & Bradley, 2004; Radin & Schlitz, 2005) have argued for the 
importance of somatic markers (e.g. anticipatory skin conductance responses) for measuring 
intuition.  Cutaneous electrogastrography (EGG) has been used frequently as a noninvasive 
way to monitor the gut’s myoelectrical behavior (McCraty, Atkinson, & Bradley, 2004; Radin 
& Schlitz, 2005).  
 The use of fMRI and other imaging technologies to identify areas of the brain active 
during different tasks or scenarios has represented a breakthrough in several areas of cognitive 
science, and Greene et al.’s (2001) application of it to the study of intuition part of an important 
advance.  Especially strong was their successful use of moral-personal, moral-impersonal, and 
non-moral to stimulate different areas of the brain associated with emotions and with more 
contemplative deliberation.  The high concurrent validity between the content of the dilemmas 
and the brain areas stimulated seems to represent a signal advance in the measurement of affect 
in moral decision making. 
  However, the study did not really measure intuition, but instead the verbal report of 
affect.  The brain scan methods infer the presence of moral intuition from observations on 
emotions, whose arousal the scans very convincingly measure.  However, the fMRI scans did 
not establish whether intuitions follow emotions in moral judgments, which would be necessary 
to establish that the emotions detected match or predict moral intuitions, and hence provide 
valid indicators of the intuition.  The fMRI methodology assumes that the arousal of emotions 
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validly reflects the construct of intuitive judgments (construct validity), and that the lower 
emotional arousals and response times in moral-impersonal and non-moral dilemmas are 
consistent with the affect responses, and perhaps intuitions, to correlate with or generate 
(criterion validity, concurrent and predictive).  However, these measures are all also consistent 
with subjects reasoning (perhaps rapid and nearly unconscious) that principles and rules of 
greater import or salience (based upon perceived harms and/or personal proximity and 
responsibility) had been violated.  The fMRI measures could thus instead be providing valid 
measures of a different construct (moral reasoning) with its own relationship to the affective 
correlates as criteria.  The question of the salience of a decision has become central in the 
literature’s reliance upon hypothetical dilemmas for studying moral decision-making.  The next 
section discusses that literature.  
2.2.4 Moral Dilemmas 
Hypothetical Dilemmas 
The fields of philosophy and psychology have long used moral dilemmas to examine 
which moral judgments of particular actions qualify as right or wrong, and are seen as instances 
of justice or kindness (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Kohlberg, 1981, Thompson, 1986).  
Intuitive judgment is often inferred from the speed of judgments across respondents, their 
inability to provide rational justifications for the judgments they reached, and respondents’ firm 
conviction that the judgments were correct even when they cannot rationally justify them.  
Greene et al. (2001) suggest that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which 
they engage intuitive, emotional processing and reasoned considerations in moral judgment.  
They hypothesized that the brain areas associated with emotion would be more active during 
contemplation of “up close and personal” dilemmas than during more detached dilemmas.  The 
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emotional intuitive reaction is to actions that are “up close and personal,” and that give us an 
automatic sense of right or wrong.  In contrast, impersonal actions elicit a slower, more 
deliberate, reflective and reasoned response. 
Common dilemmas include the popular trolley and footbridge scenarios (e.g. Hauser, 
2006; Naylor, 1988).  In the trolley case, a runaway trolley will kill five people unless one hits 
a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks, where it will kill one person 
instead of five.  Should one divert the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one?  
In the Footbridge case, one is standing next to an exceptionally large stranger on a footbridge 
that spans the tracks, where a runaway trolley will again kill five people if it proceeds on its 
present course.  It is clear that they can’t get out of the way in time to keep from being hit.  
Pushing the stranger down onto the tracks will stop the train before it reaches the five people, 
and save their lives, but the stranger will die.  Should one save the five people by pushing the 
stranger onto the tracks or not?        
 Even though five people live and one dies in both scenarios, most participants express 
their willingness to push the lever in the trolley case, and judge this as the right thing to do.  
However, they often resist pushing the man onto the tracks, and see it as morally wrong 
(Greene et al., 2004; 2001).  Both philosophical (Naylor, 1988; Thompson, 1986) and 
psychological (Greene, et al., 2001, 2004) explanations have been given for why people treat 
these two cases differently.          
 Haidt's argument is that the choices made on these dilemmas are automatic outcomes of 
moral intuitions, and not the deliberated result of some reasoning process.  They are intuitive in 
that they appear in consciousness without any awareness of a deliberative process.  Haidt 
(2001) uses the following dilemma to explore the nature of moral intuitions (p. 814): 
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Julie and Mark are brother and sister.  They are traveling together in France on summer 
vacation from college.  One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach.  
They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love.  At the very 
least it would be a new experience for each of them.  Julie was already taking birth 
control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe.  They both enjoy making 
love, but they decide not to do it again.  They keep that night as a special secret, which 
makes them feel even closer to each other.  What do you think about that? Is it OK for 
them to make love? 
 
Haidt (1993; 2000) also developed four disgust dilemmas describing disgusting, but 
harmless, taboos involving either unusual sex or eating unusual objects.  Haidt found that most 
people were disgusted by these situations, and judged the actions as wrong, even though they 
could give no reasons when prompted.  This experiment demonstrated that when moral 
intuitions and reasoning are disassociated, participants make judgments based on their 
intuitions, not their reasoning.  
Haidt & Hersh (2001) studied moral worldviews of conservatives and liberals on issues 
of sexuality.  The study asked political liberals and conservatives to judge a series of sexual 
behaviors deemed harmless to others, including various forms of masturbation, homosexuality, 
and consensual incest.  The responses exhibited “dumbfounding,” that is, the voicing of strong 
opinions without the ability to explain one's position, indicating a strong emotional reaction 
without much cognitive underpinning. “Moral dumbfounding” was primarily exhibited by 
political conservatives, and in both groups, dumbfounding was evidenced primarily on the issue 
of homosexuality.  
Moral dilemmas have long been used in philosophy and psychology to probe moral 
judgments (Thompson, 1986), but not to measure moral justifications.  To study justification, 
Hauser (2006) hypothesized that an innate moral grammar encodes a rule to the effect that 
using someone as a means to an end is wrong.  To test this hypothesis, Hauser (2006) presented 
participants with two variations on the footbridge case.  In one, Ned can flip a switch to divert a 
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trolley from a track with five hikers to a looping side track containing one man, who is heavy 
enough to stop the trolley from looping back to the initial track and killing the five.  The 
overweight man is thus a means to saving the five.  The second case is identical, except that the 
looping sidetrack contains a single slim hiker who is not heavy enough to stop the trolley, and a 
weight that is.  Here the weight will stop the trolley, and the hiker’s death will only be a side 
effect of (rather than a means to) saving the five.  Respondents were much more likely to judge 
the action as permissible when the resulting death was a side effect of saving the five, and not a 
means for doing so (Hauser, 2006).   
Questions about whether or not participants’ lives were in danger were varied 
unsystematically across the dilemmas (e.g. Greene, 2002).  More personal than impersonal 
dilemmas involved killing someone or threats of death (e.g. is it appropriate to push your boss 
off the building in order to get him out of your life?).  In contrast, more impersonal than 
personal dilemmas involved less serious harm such as lying (e.g. is it appropriate for you to 
pretend that certain personal expenses are business expenses in order to lower your taxes?)  
Dilemmas involving whether to make charitable donations or encourage the use of a vaccine 
were included in the impersonal dilemmas, along with those involving deflecting threats of 
death (e.g., trolley dilemma).  As a result, dilemmas differed not only in their degree to which 
they were personal or impersonal, but also in the seriousness of the harm or threat involved.  
Varying the degree to which a hypothetical dilemma is more personal or impersonal does not 
alter the fact that it is hypothetical, however, and therefore of possibly less salience than the 
decisions we might confront in our own lives.  The next section explores important critiques of 
the traditional moral development literature based on this hypothetical vs. real-life distinction.  
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Real-Life Dilemmas 
Gilligan (1982; Brown & Gilligan, 1992) criticized the exclusive reliance upon 
hypothetical dilemmas in the paradigms developed by Kohlberg and his colleagues (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987).  She argued that real life dilemmas were more personally relevant, 
emotionally engaging, open-ended, particular, and contextually rich (Walker, 2006).  Genuine 
dialogue allowed adolescent girls to speak about their struggles in their own voices.  To analyze 
how these voices mediate women’s responses to real life scenarios, Brown, Tappan, Gilligan, 
Miller & Argyris (1989) and Brown & Gilligan (1992) developed A Listener’s Guide, a 
systematic voice-centered relational method for hearing and understanding the structure of a 
person’s meaning that express notions of the self in the relationships.  The guide to listening 
assesses language or women’s “articulation of relational voices” in the context of relationships, 
rather than in a fixed framework for interpretation.  Brown & Gilligan (1992) attend to 
recurring words and images, metaphors, emotional resonances, presence of the first-person 
pronoun “I”, inconsistencies in style, shifts in the use of first, second, third person narration. 
Brown & Gilligan (1992) listened to audiotapes and read interview transcripts at least 4 
times to sort out the different voices and listening for the “polyphony of voice”.  The first two 
listenings involved listening for the voice of the first person pronoun “I” and the plot and “I,” 
while the third and fourth listenings involved attending to the way women speak about 
relationships.  Brown & Gilligan (1992) argued that listening to women’s voices enabled them 
to determine that as girls age, they become less egocentric, more autonomous, and are better 
able to distinguish their emotions and thoughts from those of other people.  
Hypothetical moral dilemmas provide a somewhat useful method for probing the nature 
of intuitions.  It is difficult to accurately report one's intuition (Schooler & Melcher, 1995), and 
   40 
participants cannot merely be asked why they responded to moral dilemma in a certain way. 
Compared to real world scenarios, hypothetical dilemmas have the advantage of guaranteeing 
subjects will have no familiarity with or personal attachment, and no in-group versus out-group 
biases because the hypothetical subjects are anonymous.  The dilemmas seem to have 
concurrent validity in that they reliably evoke moral responses consistent with the constructs as 
defined conceptually.  However, the experiments may not reflect the way people actually make 
moral judgments in the real world.  Real-world dilemmas often involve real costs and benefits, 
real consequences, and much uncertainty.  In contrast, artificial dilemma judgments could 
change with subjects’ relationships to the hypothetical subjects.  Therefore, hypothetical 
dilemmas may not produce valid measures of real-world decision-making processes.  Some 
participants may not actually perform the actions that they said they would in the experiment.  
In real life situations, emotions may also play a larger role.   
The Listener’s Guide surfaced as the more promising instrument for measuring moral 
language robe how people make moral judgments in complicated, real world situations.  The 
dilemmas seem to have face and construct validity in that they evoke the construct of emotion 
as defined conceptually.  One might also argue that this inferential measure of moral intuition 
has criterion validity, in that the judgment is accompanied, as the theory suggests, by strong 
emotional reactions and an inability to support the judgment with moral reasoning.  The 
validity of inferring intuition from reactions to dilemmas can thus be questioned.  Emotional 
reactions to the dilemmas might not provide a valid indication that a moral judgment was 
intuitive.  
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2.2.5 Summary 
 Measures of intuition have been presented across disciplines to demonstrate the 
relevance of methods to the current empirical analysis of intuition.  The studies I reported are 
concerned with measuring intuition using qualitative self-report techniques, problem solving 
tasks, moral dilemmas, and neuro-physiological studies employing fMRI, PET, EEG, and other 
techniques.  The literature includes qualitative and quantitative empirical work, theoretical 
work, case studies, evaluative research, and descriptive approaches.  Research has used a mix 
of psychological, neuropsychological, and physiological methods to test intuition.  However, 
these measurement methods all have serious limitations. 
The study of intuition has advanced from its exclusion from scientific research and 
measurement by non-rigorous philosophical methods that led to misinterpretation of data or 
unsubstantiated conclusions.  There has been a surprising amount of disagreement arising in 
different contexts and from different theoretical perspectives among researchers across 
disciplines over a long time span.  While continuous lines of research exist within philosophy 
and psychology, there seems to never have been any single tradition in which researchers have 
come together with a similar approach.  
 Qualitative techniques, including self-report, have not been extensively used to study 
the interactions and reflections of people engaged in real-world decisions about actual events 
and behaviors.  Both the processes of arriving at moral judgments might differ substantially in 
the real world, both because subjects may feel personally responsible for the outcomes of their 
decisions and because family, peers, and other actors are often involved in the decisions and/or 
reflect upon them.  The dominant methodologies for studying moral judgments are not well 
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suited to empirical studies of real world moral dilemmas and decisions, and qualitative 
approaches might provide very helpful alternatives for such studies. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the measurement of intuition is moving beyond 
the current treatment of affect or emotions as equivalent to intuition.  Dilemma, fMRI, and 
other physiological measurement approaches all typically use measures of affect or emotion to 
represent intuitions or intuitive processing.  As noted, this is link is open to serious question.  
An emotion is not an intuition.  The traditions discussed assume that judgments are made 
intuitively on the basis of the emotion evoked or experienced, but it is also possible that the 
judgment is made despite the affect or emotion, or through a process involving reasoning from 
the affect or emotion, and possibly additional factors.  The strong evidence of moral 
confounding suggests that at least some moral judgments are made consistent with the emotion 
or affect, and not despite it.  This is far, however, from establishing that the judgment reflected 
the emotion and not rapid reasoning from ingrained cultural norms or prejudices which subjects 
are embarrassed to explicitly invoke.   
The review of selected intuition measures identified no appropriate instrument that 
could comprehensively and accurately evaluate intuition. These findings suggest the need for a 
new theoretical and methodological perspective.   An inter-disciplinary, mixed-method 
approach may therefore be needed to measure moral intuition (Davis-Floyd & Arvidson, 1997). 
2.3 Moral Judgment and Language 
2.3.1 Adolescent Girls’ Language Development  
 Adolescence is a surprisingly understudied developmental period in sociolinguistics and 
psycholinguistics, with more attention directed to young children.  Research has shown that 
syntactic language development continues into adolescence and adulthood (Nippold, Hesketh, 
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Duthie, & Mansfield, 2005; Verhoeven et al., 2002), but at a slower pace than in childhood.  
Whereas early syntactic growth is marked by the acquisition of new structures such as 
categorization of words and referential relations between words (Lust, 2008), later syntactic 
development is more cognitively sophisticated, characterized by growth in mean length of T-
unit and clausal density (Nippold, 2007).  A study by Nippon, Mansfield, & Billow (2007) 
examined syntactic complexity age-related patterns in expository discourse.  With participants 
drawn from three age groups—11, 17, and 25 years-the findings indicated that older 
participants produced more multi- embedded utterances with longer T-units and greater 
amounts of subordination, primarily through the use of nominal and relative clauses.  
In contrast to the large literature on intuition processes in morality, most sociolinguistic 
and psycholinguistic research has ignored the role of intuition and instead focused on emotive 
language.  Psycholinguistic approaches differentiate between two categories of words – 
concrete or abstract and emotional (Pavlenko, 2008).  Emotion words may differ significantly 
from abstract and concrete words in a number of ways, including representation, processing, 
polarity, and valence (Altarriba & Bauer, 2004; Pavlenko, 2008; Takamura, Inui, & Okumura, 
2005).             
 There is, however a large body of research conducted on dichotomous characterizations 
of gender specific language in the study of emotional language, particularly in the areas of 
lexicon and semantics.  These findings suggest that studies of girls may be more likely to 
provide rich examples of the use of emotive language in describing moral judgments and 
dilemmas. 
A seminal work by Lakoff (1975) demonstrated that women use less assertive speech 
and more polite speech than men.  Lakoff (1975) asserts that women’s language use is marked 
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by their subordinate status in society that manifests itself in polite speech, including more 
euphemisms such as “gosh” or “darn” or instead of swear words more frequent tag questions 
(e.g., “It is the right thing to do, isn’t it?”), hedges (e.g. kinda, sort of) more intensifiers (e.g., 
really, so), and more hedges (e.g., perhaps, maybe).  Similarly, Leaper & Smith (2004) 
performed a meta-analysis indicating that girls to use affiliative speech (e.g. praise and 
agreement) to a greater extent than boys in order to establish or sustain relationships.  Boys 
tended to favor self-assertive speech acts such as directives, negative speech, and disagreement.  
More recent evidence suggests that young men and women significantly differ in the 
number of affect words they used, and in the ways they discussed emotions (Eckert & 
McConnell-Ginet, 2003).  For instance, females more frequently report or express emotion 
terms referring to more intense positive and negative feelings.  However, O’Kearney & Dadds 
(2004) contradicts this finding that women to use more interpersonal and affective words than 
men in emotion talk, showing that women focused more on the communicative aspects of 
discourse (Dewaele, 2004; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002).  Important developments in the 
emotion lexicon occur in the beginning of early adolescence.  These transitions include an 
enhanced ability to deal with complex emotional experiences (O'Kearney & Dadds, 2004; 
Saarni, Mumme, & Campos, 1997) and abstract concepts (Nippold, 2007) as well as the 
addition of variety and nuances to their use of emotion words (Saarni, Mumme, & Campos, 
1997).  This research is line with the claim that emotions are more prevalent in adolescent 
speech whereas descriptions and arguments are more commonly used by adults (Romaine & 
Lange, 1991).  Adolescent speech has also been described as largely egocentric, with greater 
use of emotional language used to promote adolescents’ own interests (Eckert, 2003). 
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O’Kearney & Dadds (2004) examined semantic and referential structures of emotion 
language.  More specifically, language production for emotions in anger and fear contexts was 
explored in 303 adolescents between 12 and 18 years old.  O’Kearney & Dadds (2004) 
concluded that adolescents shift towards broader, more differentiated and complex linguistic 
representations of emotion with age and towards using emotion terms across a wide range of 
semantic domains.  The results show that adolescents frequently use situational, behavioral, and 
cognitive references to their emotions.  However, as affective responses to sad and anger 
vignettes dominate in the emotion language, they decreased with age.  Girls are also more 
likely than boys to be indirect in their talk about emotional responses in situations provoking 
anger.  
 There have been several studies documenting linguistic changes in adolescents (e.g. 
Goodwin, 2002; Kerswill, 1996) with the bulk of the work conducted by Eckert & McConnell-
Ginet  (Eckert, 2000, 2003, 2004; Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1995; Eckert & McConnell-
Ginet, 2003).  Work on phonological and grammatical variation has shown that adolescents use 
vernacular language more than other age group that reflect the communicative style of their 
peer groups. “Mainstream” Caucasian adolescents, for example, use features of Latino and 
African American Vernacular English to indicate being cool or tough (Eckert, 2003).  In 
Eckert’s (2000) ethnographic study of a Detroit suburban high school, adolescent girls 
exhibited high levels of linguistic variability across social categories: the jock girls are the most 
standard speakers; and the burnout girls are the most vernacular.  The jock girls most frequently 
use like as a discourse marker, while the burnout boys are the most infrequent users. 
There are several distinguishing characteristics of the language styles used by 
adolescents as they are continually creating new words for social types as evaluations of their 
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peers’ behavior (e.g. nerd) (Eckert, 2004).  There is also heavy reliance on paralinguistic 
elements in adolescent girls’ speech (Romaine & Lange, 1991) with the use of discourse 
markers such as the use of like, you know and to the use of rising intonation on declaratives 
(e.g. okay with a rising intonation)  (Eckert, 2000).  Statements such as “I’m all like- what?!” 
or “she's all like-yeah right” Both are interpreted as quotatives or hedges (Romaine & Lange, 
1991), and signal adolescents' lack of concern with precision, or unwillingness to take 
responsibility for their statements (Eckert, 2000).  The use of "like" is used most frequently by 
females due to their highly engaged conversational style (Romaine & Lange, 1991).  When 
used by adolescent girls, these discourse markers are taken as evidence of inarticulateness, 
insecurity, sloppiness, and an unwillingness to assert a opinion (Eckert, 2000).  Preadolescents 
are highly engaged in narration, and as they move towards adolescence, discourse markers and 
rising intonation, become an important part of constructing and negotiating identity, beliefs, 
and the social order (Eckert, 2004).  
2.3.2 Socio-Cultural Approaches to Moral Development and Language 
Many researchers have argued that moral reasoning is the result of development that 
can be verbally expressed (Bhatia, 2000; Tappan, 1991, 1997; Walker, 2000; Vygotsky, 
1934/1997).  Meaning making involves language and an understanding of the cultural context 
in which language is used (Bruner, 1997).  The interaction between individuals and their social, 
cultural, historical and institutional contexts was central to Vygotsky’s (1934/1997) theory that 
understanding how knowledge develops in socially meaningful ways requires an understanding 
of its social and historical origins, and of how that knowledge changes.  To Vygotsky, speech 
and thought developed along separate lines.  Speech is nonverbal at first, and only later does 
verbal thought emerge as the child gradually internalizes the language (Bruner, 1997).  Thus, to 
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Vygotsky, thinking develops from the social level to the individual level.  Vygotsky 
emphasized that language is not just a means of expression, but also has an important function 
as an “instrument of thought” and a tool to solve problems (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 19-20).  He 
writes: 
“Thus our schema of development - first social, then egocentric, then inner speech - 
contrast both with the traditional behaviorist schema - vocal speech, whisper, inner 
speech - and with Piaget’s sequence - from nonverbal autistic thought through egocentric 
thought and speech to socialized speech and logical thinking.  In our conception, the true 
direction of the development of thinking is not from the individual to the socialized, but 
from the social to the individual.” 
A fundamental difference in Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s theories was the direction of 
development.  According to Vygotsky, Piaget sees the development of thought as “gradual 
socialization of deeply intimate, personal, autistic mental states.  Even social speech is 
represented as following, not preceding, egocentric speech” (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 18).  
Egocentric speech diminishes with the disappearance of egocentrism and onset of social 
speech.  
More recent work (Bosacki, Zopito, & Dane, 2006; Goodwin, 2002, Tappan, 1991) has 
examined how morality is represented and expressed through language.  Tappan (1997) posed 
several empirical questions about the syntactic and semantic characteristics of inner speech.  
Tappan suggested that a sociocultural perspective on moral developmental would assume that 
1) moral functioning is mediated by language, 2) such mediation occurs in private or inner 
speech, 3) processes of social communication give rise to moral functioning, and 4) moral 
development is shaped by social, cultural, and historical context.  
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Bhatia (2000) argued that most researchers analyze children’s verbal reports only as a 
means to understand what the data can tell us about cognition and morality, without looking 
into how language itself might be playing an important role in children’s moral development.  
According to Bhatia (2000), language in moral development is considered through its 
representation of children’s underlying cognition and rarely through its meaning making 
functions.           
 There are, however, a few exceptions.  Wright & Bartsch (2008) and Snow (1987) 
examined children’s naturally occurring use of moral language.  Wright & Bartsch (2008) 
conducted preliminary investigations on transcripts of child-adult moral discussions of how two 
young children (ages 2.5 to 5 years) used 33 moral words (e.g. right/wrong, help/hurt, 
good/bad) in moral contexts as well as what the children referred to (e.g. rules/standards) in an 
active or passive role.  Wright & Bartsch (2008) found that children were active participants in 
discussions of moral issues with the adults.  The children also demonstrated an early moral 
sensitivity to moral issues regarding disapproval and reward/punishment and a basic 
understanding of normativity.  
 Another literature on universal moral grammar is building upon an analogy between 
language and moral judgment, describing the nature and origin of morality by using concepts 
and frameworks similar to those used in the study of generative linguistics (Dupoux and Jacob, 
2007; Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007).  Hauser (2006) argues that humans are endowed with a 
moral faculty, analogous to the language faculty, which delivers intuitive judgments of right 
and wrong based on unconsciously operative and inaccessible principles.  Moral judgments are 
delivered on the basis of a conscious, deliberate, rational cognitive process of accessing 
principles to justify our actions.  Universal moral grammar is organized around five main 
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points, including distinctions between 1) competence and performance, 2) perception and 
production, and 3) descriptive and explanatory adequacy (Mikhail, 2007).  Dupoux and Jacob 
(2007) criticized the analogy arguing that moral decision-making is an evaluative process, 
rather than the generative process that language is.  
2.4 Relational Aggression and Language 
Relational aggression represents an excellent example of how girls use language in 
moral conflicts where gender is pronounced (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1992).  It is, 
however, cautioned that social aggression is not the “exclusive province of girls.” Girls may 
engage in more relational than physical aggression than boys (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995), but it 
may not be true that they engage in more social aggression or that it is less hurtful (Underwood, 
2003).  
As verbal activity heightens, both sincere and sarcastic compliments grow more 
frequent between girls in adolescence (Eckert, 2003).  The practice of offering sincere 
compliments “adds value to the receiver as evidence of her quality, and to the giver as evidence 
of her possession and exercise of cultural knowledge” (Eckert, 2003; p.386).  Sarcastic 
compliments are means of flagging others’ transgressions, while enforcing social hierarchies 
and boundaries.  Girls’ verbal teasing is a form of social control that arises in childhood and 
continues through high school (Eder, 1993; Garbarino & deLara, 2002; Mills & Carwile, 2009).   
 Mixed findings have emerged concerning the associations between verbal reasoning and 
indirect or relational aggression.  Several studies have shown negative correlations between 
indirect aggression and language skills or verbal reasoning (e.g. Estrem, 2005).  Estrem (2005) 
argues that the interaction of language and gender negatively impacts relational aggression.  
Preschool children with higher expressive language skills demonstrate greater relational 
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aggression because they possess the verbal and cognitive skills to manipulate and influence 
their peers.  Children exhibited greater relational aggression as expressive language (the ability 
to respond efficiently and appropriately) decreased, and girls’ physical aggression increased as 
receptive language (the ability to understand language and social cues) decreased.  Guralnick, 
Connor, Hammond, Gottman & Kinnish (1996) provided additional evidence that children with 
inadequate language skills may become more aggressive or isolate themselves. 
 Other studies have demonstrated positive relations between relational aggression and 
language (Bonica et al., 2003; Kaukiainen et al., 1999).  Research has found that verbal 
sophistication may facilitate relationally aggressive strategies (Bonica et al., 2003; Crick et al. 
1997; McNeilly-Choque, Hart, Robinson, Nelson, & Olsen, 1996).  Bonica et al. (2003) was 
the first study to examine whether language development was associated with relational 
aggression in preschoolers, and whether gender moderates this relation.  They concluded that 
the relationship between relational aggression and language was robust across gender, even 
when controlling for age (Kikas, Peets, Tropp & Hinn, 2009).  Participants with higher levels 
of abstract verbal reasoning are able to more effectively manipulate relationships through 
skillful planning, consideration of long-term consequences, and comparing alternatives.  As a 
result, they are able to select more appropriate ways of handling the conflicts (Crick & Dodge, 
1994; Kikas et al., 2009).  Positive relations between indirect aggression and verbal skills could 
indicate that adolescents with sophisticated verbal reasoning skills may choose a more covert 
form of aggression.  However, there is some evidence that indirect aggression can also be 
associated with impulsive and hyperactive behaviors, rather than with behavior requiring 
deliberation (Brown, 1998; Zalecki & Hinshaw, 2004). 
 Several researchers explicated the relationship between the development of relational 
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aggression and language.  Crick et al. (1999) contend that the emergence of relational 
aggression may be related to language development.  Kikas et al. (2009) notes that overt 
aggression is gradually replaced by more covert forms, attributed to the development of verbal 
reasoning and social skills (e.g., Björkqvist, Osterman, & Kaukiainen, 1992). 
Brown (1998) found that girls, 8, and 9 years of age generally impulsively respond with 
strong feelings when they are hurt or treated unfairly.  Brown (1998) does argue that these 
findings reflect “hallmarks of healthy anger” as “ girls’ anger often quickly dissipates quickly; 
relationships have a few-flowing quality-girls move together and apart, between harmony and 
conflict, almost daily (p. 12).  Brown (1999) also points out that these strong feelings of anger 
and frustration often lead to aggression that is likely to gradually become more indirect through 
childhood.  Direct aggression seems to markedly increase at the age of 11, however, when older 
girls report this behavior more than younger girls.  A similar pattern occurred for girls’ 
expressions of sadness and acts of masking emotions, particularly anger.  One might interpret 
increased directness and masking of anger as indicating a gradual increase in their capacity to 
control irrational impulses and mitigate early aggressive behavior.  
 Results highlight the importance of investigating factors associated with relational 
aggression.  Because relational aggression requires an understanding of what would socially 
and emotionally harm a child, relational aggression may be facilitated by accuracy in judging 
emotion.  In support of this argument, Cole, Usher, and Cargo (1993) demonstrated that strong 
verbal skills were predictive of emotional accuracy in preschoolers.  
The literature on language use and relational aggression is sparse, with the exception of 
a few qualitative studies that collected language data through ethnographic conversation 
analyses (Goodwin, 2002).  For example, Goodwin (2002) provided an ethnographic 
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examination of the naturally occurring speech girls use in their everyday conversations.  More 
specifically, Goodwin (2002) considering how girls practice forms of social exclusion and 
ridicule in their spontaneous play, focusing on following a group of girls from fourth through 
sixth grade.  By examining actual instances of negotiated interaction, she concluded that acts of 
relational aggression among girls are built through both overt (insults and humiliation to the 
victim) as well as covert (e.g. exclusion, looks, byplay) verbal means. 
Similarly, Stowe, Arnold, & Ortiz (1999) explored whether there are differences in how 
language development is related to disruptive behavior and peer rejection in both girls and 
boys.  They found that the relationship between the quality of peer relationships and language 
skills (e.g. verbal fluency, vocabulary) was weaker for girls than for boys.  
Research has found it difficult to determine variability in adolescent girls’ use of 
linguistic variables development occurs in situations of relational aggression because most 
studies, to date, have been cross-sectional and limited in duration or age-range.  Longitudinal 
studies of language use in adolescence are rare, but a few longitudinal studies are appearing 
that have either examined language development over a relatively long period of time in 
adolescence.  
    Sunwolf & Leets (2003) explored why the voices of group members are “paralyzed”, 
preventing adolescents from enacting their own social moral reasoning.  Sunwolf & Leets 
(2003) examined the social dynamics that result when an adolescent peer group member 
disagrees with the social exclusion of others, but decides to remain silent.  Most of the 
participants (79.8%) did report withholding disagreement during peer-group exclusion.  Group 
dynamics (32%) and the participants’ social fears (29%) were reported significantly more often 
than all the other reasons adolescents shared for feeling paralyzed in communicating 
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disagreement.  The reasons were rarely based on qualities or behaviors of the rejected child 
(8%).  Other participants offered accounts that demonstrated a perception that the negative 
social stigma associated with certain group outsiders might also become attached to someone 
who protested group exclusion (defending a rejected outsider).  Participants described choices 
grounded in the fear of being ridiculed or losing positive social reputations.  Participants 
explained that they remained silent so they would not be perceived as “different” or “uncool.” 
 Kikas et al. (2009) examined age and gender differences in the frequency of verbal and 
indirect aggression in fifth, seventh, and ninth grade students.  They analyzed the relationships 
between different forms of aggression, verbal reasoning (deduction skills and an ability to form 
abstract relations among concepts), and normative beliefs, and whether these relations would be 
moderated by grade.  They found that normative beliefs and verbal reasoning had independent 
effects on direct and indirect aggression, and that some effects differed by grade.  The 
associations between verbal reasoning and indirect aggression were negative in grades five and 
nine, and non-significant in grade seven.  The negative effect of verbal reasoning was highest 
for physical aggression, and lowest for indirect aggression. 
These studies discussed above, point to an interesting area where the relationship 
between rational and intuitive language in relational aggression could be productively 
investigated. 
2.5 Summary of the Literature 
This chapter briefly touched on research from a wide range of literatures, including 
studies of moral intuition and rationality in moral judgment, adolescent language, and relational 
aggression.  I discussed the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, and argue that several 
literatures seem to be converging on seeing a wide range of cognitive processes, including 
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moral judgment, as dual processes, involving both intuitive judgments especially when 
proximity and affect are involved, and reasoned judgment, especially when moral intuitions or 
moral principles conflict.   
There is nevertheless much to build on.  Sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic studies 
have ignored the role of intuition and instead focused on gender specific emotional language.  
However, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet  (Eckert, 2000, 2003, 2004; Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 
1995; Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2003) have discovered pronounced phonological and 
grammatical variation in adolescents’ language use.  
Research on adolescents’ language use in situations of relational aggression has also 
begun to emerge (Goodwin, 2002; Kikas et al., 2009; Stowe, Arnold, & Ortiz, 1999) with 
mixed findings concerning the associations between language skills and relational aggression.  
However, a corresponding literature on language production and morality has not yet been 
developed, much less within situations of relational aggression.  Theoretical approaches have 
been taken to explore how morality is represented and expressed through language, but there is 
little empirical documentation about the nature of moral language.  
We have no adequate theoretical framework or methodology examining whether 
specific language variables are linked to judgments of morality, although there clearly are 
moral problems in relational aggression to which they would be relevant.  The literature does 
not yet have well-developed understandings of the relationships and interaction between 
intuitive or rational processing or the language a subject or respondent will use to discuss their 
decisions.  
The interplay among intuitive and rational processes in morality is becoming 
increasingly tractable, particularly with dual process theories.  Dual process theories have 
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provided clear definitions and descriptions of intuitive and rational decision-making processes.  
This topic is now being fruitfully studied, drawing upon theories and methodologies that 
require collaboration among psychologists, educators, linguists, and neuroscientists.  The 
LIWC provides a well-developed methodology for identifying and quantifying features of 
language usage.  This thesis will integrate these components into a methodology for identifying 
rational and intuitive language use among adolescent girls discussing real life and hypothetical 
dilemmas involving relational aggression.  It will then test hypotheses on differences in the 
expected use of rational and intuitive language in real versus hypothetical dilemmas, and on 
changes in usage as girls progress from the fifth to the seventh grades. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
 This chapter describes 1) Schrader’s GRLS longitudinal study and four of the 
instruments used to collect the data; 2) the present study’s research questions and hypotheses; 
3) the methods used to transcribe the data and prepare it for analysis using LIWC2007 
(Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) software; 4) the procedures used to classify language 
output from the LICW analysis for analysis using the proposed Moral Language Use 
Evaluation Tool (MLUET); and 5) the assumptions identifying language uses derived from 
dual processing models that will constitute rational and intuitive language use in using the 
MLUET to test the hypotheses.  
3.1 Data from the Schrader GRLS Project 
 
Schrader’s GRLS project explored how girls view relational aggression, structuring the 
issue as a moral one.  It examined aspects of relational aggression, including definitions of 
aggression, roles, school context, peer groups, social influences, and friendships/peer 
relationships.  It also examined psychological development: the sense of self, moral 
development, metacognitive development, and emotional development of young females.   
3.1.1 Participants  
The data analyzed for this study was collected from the transcribed interviews of girls 
who volunteered to participate in Schrader's GRLS project.  The participants in this study 
consisted of a cohort of female students who were in fifth grade the first year of the study 
(2006), and who were followed longitudinally.  This analysis will span from their last year of 
elementary school (grade five) to their last year of middle school (grade seven).  The students 
were interviewed 3 times in the first year, and 4 times subsequently, each spring.  The 
participants’ approximate ages ranged between 10 and 13 years old at the time of data 
   57 
collection.  Data from year 4 were not analyzed because the transcripts had not been completed 
at the time of this analysis.  
 The sample was self-selected, after extensive recruitment efforts of the entire population 
of girls in one school district in upstate New York.  The final recruited sample consisted 
predominantly of white, non-Hispanic and middle class pre-adolescent girls, despite efforts to 
recruit diverse girls from the entire population of the school.  All participants spoke English as 
their first language. 
School Context 
The adolescent female participants were a convenience sample, recruited from a public 
elementary school located in a small city in the Northeastern United States, with a population 
of approximately 30,000.  The district covers an area of 155 square miles and has eight 
elementary schools, two middle schools, one high school, and one alternative school (grades 6-
12).  There were approximately 5,500 students in 2010, of which 69% were White/non-
Hispanic, 13% Asian, 12% African American, and 5% Hispanic.  The school district serves 4% 
English Language Learners, and 19% of students are eligible for special needs services.  Only 
29% of students are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch programs compared with the state 
average of 44%.  Approximately 500 teachers work in the district.  The student-teacher ratio in 
the district is 12 students for every full-time teacher, compared to a state average of 13 students 
per full-time teacher.  
3.1.2 Instruments 
The data for this secondary analysis were select components from a longer interview 
protocol for Schrader's Girls Relational-Aggression Longitudinal Study (GRLS) that was 
designed to evaluate both abstract, distal and close, personal moral, and relational aggression 
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situations.  Girls' responses to the following four instruments within Schrader’s protocol were 
examined: Judy's dilemma from the Moral Judgment Interview (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), a 
Metacognitive Interview (Schrader, 1988), a Real Life Interview (RLI), and a Hypothetical 
Relational Aggression Scenario Interview (RAI).  See Appendix A for the entire Interview 
Protocol. 
Interview I: Part A.  Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) 
Form B, Dilemma II: Judy, was used from the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) (Colby 
& Kohlberg, 1987) to explore the language used in girls’ moral reasoning.  (see Appendix A).  
Consisting of 21 questions, the MJI elicits a participant’s stage of moral reasoning in 
Kohlberg’s moral development stage theory, his or her interpretation of the reasoning and 
socio-moral perspective and documents how these are used to make and justify moral decisions 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).   
 The MJI (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987) has been widely used in moral judgment research.  
It consists of a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas that focus on a variety of moral conflicts.  
The reliability and validity of the MJI as a measure of moral development have been well 
established (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  Reasonable internal consistency (Dawson, 2002) and 
high inter-rater and test-retest agreement rates (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987) have been reported 
for the MJI.  The use of one dilemma only for stage scoring has not been validated; the MJI is 
to be used for stage scoring using all three dilemmas, however stage scoring is not the purpose 
of the present analysis. 
  In the hypothetical situation used for this research, the conflict revolved around Judy, a 
12 year-old who had to decide whether to tell her mother that her sister lied, or keep a promise 
to her sister.  Participants are asked what they thought was the right thing that Judy ought to do 
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in this situation, and to provide justifications for their responses.  Participants are asked to 
respond to probing, open ended questions such as: Should Louise tell their mother that Judy 
had lied about the money or should she keep quiet?  Why or why not? Is it important to keep a 
promise to someone that you don’t know well and might never see again?  Why/why not?  This 
probing of participants’ thinking was designed to generate adequate material for scoring by 
eliciting participants’ the moral issues, norms and elements used in her moral thinking that 
would assist the scorer in assessing cognitive stages of moral reasoning. 
Interview I: Part B. Metacognitive Interview (MCI) 
 The Metacognitive Interview was adapted from Schrader (1988), which explores how 
one thinks about one’s thinking about moral decisions.  Comprised of nine questions, with 
follow-up probes, the participants are asked to reflect on their thinking that they engaged in 
while answering one hypothetical dilemma of the MJI; in this case, Judy's dilemma.  It then 
asks similar questions asking for reflection on thinking processes when answering the questions 
from the Moral Judgment Interview (described above).  Examples of interview questions 
include: Thinking back over the dilemma I just read about Judy and Louise, how did you know 
how to approach the problem or how to think about it?  How did you know to do that?  Were 
you aware of what you were doing at that time?  How did you know what to consider?  What 
were the best things to consider?  How did you know when the dilemma was resolved, or when 
you reached an adequate solution?         
Interview II: Real Life Interview (RLI)       
 The RLI is comprised of 23 questions, which were adapted from Gilligan’s Real Life 
Interview (Gilligan, 1982), and to which Schrader added questions to probe for Rest’s Four 
Component Model of moral functioning (Rest, 1983)--which includes: moral sensitivity, moral 
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judgment, moral motivation, moral character--and the metacognitive questions, as above.  
Participants are asked to describe a real-life dilemma they have experienced, and their response 
to this dilemma.  The Real Life Interview also includes questions reflecting on metacognitive 
awareness of thinking during the real life situation.  The interviews then ask a series of 
questions that vary and extend the moral and metacognitive parameters of the dilemma.  An 
example of such questions include: Describe a situation of girls being mean to each other that 
you know about? What kinds of things did you think about in dealing with the situation? Was 
there something that you could see as being right or wrong to do in that situation?  What was 
it?                    
Interview III, Part A: Hypothetical Relational Aggression Interview (RAI) 
 Schrader (2005) developed a hypothetical relational aggression dilemma to examine 
investigate girls' definitions, perceptions, and experiences of relational aggression from a 
moral, emotional, and self-developmental point of view.  Part A presents a hypothetical 
scenario of relational aggression (21 questions) involving a situation of exclusion between four 
female adolescent friends.  In this hypothetical dilemma, participants are asked the following 
questions: Do you think this [scenario] is relational aggression?  Why/why not?  Was this the 
right thing or a good thing to do?  Why/why not?  What should have and could have been done 
differently here?  This dilemma is a hypothetical dilemma only in so far as it is not one that the 
girls generate; the dilemma itself is based upon a compilation of real life experiences that girls 
have faced, but is presented in an abstract way to see if there is a difference in thinking, 
judgment, and cognitive processing in self-reported versus other-presented (abstract, for them) 
situations.   
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Interview III, Part B: Roles         
 In this part of the interview protocol, participants are asked to identify and discuss their 
experiences with different real-life roles where there is aggression among girls.  Participants 
discuss their experiences as a bystander (15 questions), victim/target (18 questions), and an 
aggressor (14 questions) in an encounter they recall of an actual experience in their lives.  A 
participant describing her experience as a bystander is asked the following questions: What 
happened?  Why did you do that?  What were you hoping would come out of what you did?  
How did you respond?  Would you do something that again--why/why not?   
 In summary, the data sources for this analysis were parts of a longer interview protocol 
that Schrader designed to evaluate both abstract, distal moral and relational aggression 
situations as well as close, personal moral and relational aggression situations.  Given these two 
types of problems, it would be important to discern if people produced and used moral 
language differently in the different moral situations (real versus abstract), and if that was 
related to intuitive versus rational language, and if that language changed based upon what role 
a girl discussed (bully, victim, bystander).         
3.1.3 Procedures          
 Permission to conduct the study was obtained from the Institutional Review Board at 
Cornell University prior to any data collection, the School District Offices, the principals, and 
the teachers.  Parent consent and child assent forms were utilized (See Appendix B). 
 Participants were recruited in the spring 2006 from one elementary school in the above-
described school district.  All female students in the designated school were invited to 
participate in the study.  Recruitment speeches were given in assembly presentations held in 
classrooms during homeroom time.  The girls were given general information about the study, 
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and opportunities to discuss it and ask questions.       
 Study summaries, participation forms, child assent forms, and parent consent forms 
were then distributed (See Appendix B).  The girls were asked to fill out their participation and 
assent forms indicating whether or not they wished to participate, fold them in half, and place 
them in a box as they left the room.  This would promote confidentiality if the girls so desired, 
since all girls completed a form and submitted it.  All girls were given the parent consent 
forms, and were asked to return them the next day to the guidance office or their homeroom 
teacher.  If the forms were not returned after the child signed an assent form, the child was 
discretely asked to bring in the parental form.        
 Before collecting interview data, graduate and undergraduate research assistants were 
familiarized with the questionnaires and instructed in the data collection and interview 
procedures.  Data collection began immediately after both the forms were returned from a 
parent and girl.  The data collection process for interviewing participants, designed to be a 
combination of classroom observations and semi-structured interviews, began with the first 
round of student interviews.  Judy's dilemma from the Moral Judgment Interview (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987), Metacognitive Interview (Schrader, 1988), a hypothetical relational 
aggression interview (RAI), and Real Life Interview (RLI) were administered individually to 
each participant, audiotaped with permission, and transcribed verbatim by someone who did 
not interview the girl (Appendix A).  The interview duration was about a total of one hour for 
elementary school participants, divided into three time segments for the first year of the study, 
and four segments for each subsequent year.  Each interview segment, which was administered 
by the researcher or the researcher’s assistants, took from 20-45 minutes, with the average 
interview lasting 20 minutes for the younger grade, and 35 minutes for the older grades.  
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Interviews were conducted in private rooms or on school grounds, depending on available 
space and the participants’ preferences.  Participants received a snack and beverage during the 
interviews.  Students were also given small, age appropriate gifts, such as decorative 
notebooks, beauty products, and hair accessories, for their participation.   
 Table 1 below indicates the participants' completed and transcribed interview data.  
Missing interviews resulted either from technological issues (e.g. recorder malfunction) or 
scheduling issues.  All participant data was included in individual analyses where available.  
No participant was excluded from one analysis if their data were missing some other portion of 
the complete interview protocol (see, for example as is Participant 2 in the chart below).  
Table 1: Analyzed Portion of Interviews by Participant and Year Participants	   Year	  1	   Year	  2	   Year	  3	  
Participant	  Number	   MJI	   McI	   RLI	   RAI	  A	   RAI	  B	   MJI	   McI	   RLI	   RAI	  A	   RAI	  B	   MJI	   McI	   RLI	  2	   X	   X	   	   	   	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  3	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  4	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   X	  5	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   X	   X	   	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  6	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  7	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   X	   X	   X	  8	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  9	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  10	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   X	   X	   X	  11	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  12	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  13	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	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14	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  15	   	   	   	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   	   	   X	  16	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  Total	   14	   14	   13	   12	   11	   15	   15	   13	   14	   13	   13	   13	   15	  
 
 
3.2 Methodology for the Current Study: Moral Language Use in Adolescent Girls 
 
3.2.1 Research Objectives  
 
 The overall aim of this research project is to analyze girls’ moral language about 
relational aggression, focusing on 1) the use of rational and intuitive language, 2) girls' speech 
production patterns in the way they verbally express their moral decisions when resolving 
relational aggression conflicts, 3) developmental changes in these two components of language 
over time, and 4) building a methodological approach that will enable researchers to 
empirically distinguish rational and intuitive language in moral decision-making.  
 
3.2.2 Definition of Concepts and Terms  
 
 Several terms will be used throughout this analysis.  Since I am developing a new 
analytical methodology for employing moral language production and use to examine intuitive 
and rational language, key terms and concepts must be defined. 
Moral Language 
Moral language is language that is used within the moral domain, and may include 
judgments of goodness or rightness of a proposition or action, or may be a reference to the 
character of or motivation for action.  It can suggest prescription or proscription.  In this 
context, moral language is any language applied to relational aggression situations, and the 
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moral dilemmas, discussed in the data source for this analysis.  Thus, all language analyzed 
here is considered moral language. 
Intuitive and Rational Language Use 
 Based upon dual-process models of moral reasoning that propose one process that is 
automatic, subconscious, and intuitive, and another that is conscious, deliberative, and rational, 
I will devise a measure of the degree of non-conscious, intuitive language and of conscious, 
reflective rational language that can be used to examine adolescent girls’ responses to moral 
dilemmas.  I will define language categories accordingly.  Specifically, ‘intuitive’ reasoning 
will be defined as an affectively driven implicit, tacit, rapid, effortless instinctive, and 
automatic process based on prior beliefs and experiences involving little or no conscious 
deliberation or awareness. ‘Rational’ reasoning will be defined as: a slow, sequential, 
analytical, deliberate, explicit, affect-free, and primarily conscious process that requires effort 
and can be controlled. 
3.2.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 This analysis of the GRLS dataset for grades five, six, and seven (collected in 2006-
2009) centers on one primary question:  Does language change in its expression of moral 
reasoning from fifth through seventh grades when adolescents discuss situations of relational 
aggression? If it does change, then how does it do so?  
This question will be addressed in a series of sub-questions to examine how, more 
precisely, girls' moral language changes.  These sub-questions and my hypothesized speculated 
results presented below: 
1.  What types of language do girls use, and what is the extent of that usage? 
I hypothesize that adolescent girls use both intuitive and rational language when 
discussing moral situations of relational aggression.  I hypothesize that they use more 
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intuitive language than rational language when discussing relational aggression and the 
moral situations under study.   
2.  Are there differences in the extent of use of intuitive and rational language as adolescent 
girls move from fifth, to sixth, to seventh grades? 
I hypothesize that adolescent girls' use of intuitive language 1) either decreases or stays 
the same with each successive grade in school, and 2) rational language increases with 
each successive grade in school.  In essence, either the girls are adding rational 
language tools to their repertoire of language and thought, or they are replacing intuitive 
language use with these more logical-reflective processes.  
3.  Which types of moral language do they use in the various roles of relational aggression, 
specifically, the bully, victim, and bystander roles?  
 Victims will be using more intuitive language than aggressors.  Aggressors and 
 bystanders will be using more rational language than victims.   
4.  Which types of moral language do they use in the various types of relational aggression 
scenarios--real life versus hypothetical dilemmas? 
I hypothesize that intuitive and rational language vary across real life and hypothetical 
dilemmas.  I expect that intuitive language will be more strongly correlated with real 
life dilemmas.  Rational language will be more strongly correlated with hypothetical 
dilemmas. 
The underlying assumption in these hypotheses is that rational language is more 
developed, or more sophisticated, than intuitive language, so it develops later with other 
presumed developmental correlates.  Adolescent speech has been described as largely 
egocentric, implicit, and emotional (Eckert, 2003), while adults more commonly use 
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descriptions and arguments (Nordberg, 1984).  The developmental question of whether or not 
intuitive and rational language correlates with moral stage development is another question 
worthy of investigation that is not examined here.  We know from extant literature (See 
Chapter 2) that moral reasoning does develop during this period; therefore if there are no 
changes in language, then language cannot be a reflection of moral reasoning.  If, indeed, if 
language changes from more intuitive to more rational, and if that change is correlated to moral 
stage change or other form of social-cognitive or cognitive development, there could be 
implications for developing educational programs that focus on the development of moral 
language as perhaps a precursor for moral stage development; or vice versa.  However first we 
need to explore if, and how, moral language changes over time.  To disconfirm my hypotheses, 
there would either have to be no advancement in any of the language production areas, or there 
would have to be an increase in intuitive language and a decrease in rational language over 
development.  
It is also expected that victims will use more intuitive language because they perceive 
the aggression to be more damaging.  Victims will have directly experienced direct effects of 
aggression with stronger affective reactions and emotions (e.g. self-blame, anger) due to 
perceived negative intentions from the bystander and bully.  In order to reduce the moral 
culpability of their actions and deny responsibility, bystanders and aggressors would use more 
rational language to minimize or normalize the effects of aggression with self-serving 
justifications or excuses.  Aggressors and bystanders may also avoid or experience difficulty 
expressing pro-social emotions, particularly empathy or compassion for the victim. 
More intuitive language will be used in real-life dilemmas because they are more 
personally relevant for participants, requiring less deliberation and evoking stronger emotions.  
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Hypothetical dilemmas are more likely to engage rationality because they are impersonal 
situations and thus could result in lower level of moral conflict.  These claims are in line with 
work by Greene et al.’s (2001) finding that personal moral dilemmas produced increased 
activity in brain areas associated with emotional processing when compared with impersonal 
and non-moral dilemmas that produced increased activity in areas associated with working 
memory. 
Table 2: Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Analyses 
Research 
Question 
Hypothesis 
 
 
Interview 
Segments 
Used in 
Analysis 
 
Language 
Production  
Level 
Analyzed 
Analysis 
Tool Used 
 
1. What types 
of language do 
girls use, and 
what is the 
extent of that 
usage? 
 
 
 
 
 
Adolescent girls 
use both intuitive 
and rational 
language when 
discussing moral 
situations of 
relational 
aggression.  I 
hypothesize that 
they use more 
intuitive language 
than rational 
language in their 
verbal expressions. 
1.A. MJI-
Judy 
1.B. MCI 
2. RLI 
3.A. RAI: 
Cassie  
3.B. RAI: 
Roles 
 
 
 
 
Lexicon 
 
Syntax  
Productivity 
 
Semantics 
 
General  
performance 
 
 
LIWC 
MLUET 
SPSS 
 
 
 
2. Are there 
differences in 
the extent of 
use of 
intuitive and 
rational 
language as 
adolescent 
girls move 
from fifth, to 
sixth, to 
seventh 
grades? 
Intuitive language 
use either 
decreases or stays 
at the same level 
with each 
successive grade in 
school, and rational 
language increases 
with each 
successive grade in 
school. 
 
1.A. MJI-
Judy 
1.B. MCI 
2. RLI 
3.A.RAI: 
Cassie  
3.B.RAI: 
Roles 
Lexicon 
 
Syntax 
Productivity 
 
Semantics 
 
General  
performance 
 
LIWC 
MLUET 
SPSS 
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3. Which 
types of moral 
language do 
they use in the 
various roles 
of relational 
aggression, 
specifically, 
the bully, 
victim, and 
bystander 
roles? 
Victims use more 
intuitive language 
than aggressors and 
bystanders; 
Aggressors and 
bystanders will be 
using more rational 
language than 
victims. 
 
3.B. RAI:  
Roles 
Syntax 
Productivity 
 
LIWC 
MLUET 
SPSS 
4. Which 
types of moral 
language do 
they use in the 
various types 
of relational 
aggression 
scenarios--real 
life versus 
hypothetical 
dilemmas? 
Intuitive language 
is strongly 
correlated with real 
life dilemmas and 
the victim role.  
 
Rational language 
is strongly 
correlated with 
hypothetical 
dilemmas and the 
aggressor role. 
Hypothetical 
3.A. RAI: 
Cassie 
 
Real Life 
3.B. RAI: 
Roles 
 
Lexicon 
 
Syntax 
 
Semantics 
 
General 
performance 
Qualitative 
Content 
Analysis-- 
MLUET 
 
  
3.2.4 Research Design 
 This present study is primarily a quantitative analysis, using a newly developed 
methodology I designed for this dissertation that incorporates a strong theoretical description of 
intutive and rational language and a strong quantitative linguistic analyses.  It is then used to 
examine how girls construct language to conceptualize their thoughts, roles, and behaviors 
when talking about relational aggression situations--defined here as a moral issue.  The 
independent, predictor variables are age (fifth, sixth and seventh grade)--which implicates 
developmental language level, the type of interview (hypothetical or real-life scenario), and 
role (bully, victim, bystander).  The dependent variable is participants’ language outcome 
defined in terms of four language production areas: lexicon, syntax productivity, semantics, and 
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general processing or performance.  These language outcomes were assessed through use of the 
MLUET (developed for this analysis, based on the LIWC, as well as a qualitative content 
analysis of language as coded using an adaptation of Selman & Feigenberg’s (2010) coding 
system and other relevant research (e.g. Haidt & Hersh, 2001).  
3.2.5 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC2007) 
  The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC2007) (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 
2007) text analysis software program calculates the differences in the categories of words (e.g. 
emotional, cognitive, self-references) in individuals’ written or transcribed verbal text in over 
80 language categories (Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007).  The LIWC 
program has a processing component and the dictionary of 45,000 words and word stems.  
Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis (2007) refers to word categories as dictionary words arranged 
into groups that refer a particular category (e.g., first person pronouns).  The processing 
component examines each word in a given text file and then compares it with the LIWC2007 
dictionary file.  For example, if LIWC is analyzing the text for a participant, the program would 
search for the word “her” and check to see if it was in the dictionary.  The word “her” would 
then be coded as part of associated categories (e.g. function word, pronoun, and third-person 
singular pronoun).  The LIWC increments all LIWC categories and the percentage of that each 
category was used by the participant.  For example, the findings could indicate that 6.54% of 
all the words in a transcript were pronouns and 2.33% were third-person singular pronouns.  
The LIWC is described in detail here, since outputs from the LIWC are essential for the 
MLUET. 
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LIWC2007 Internal Reliability and External Validity 
 The LIWC text analysis program was initially validated for content and construct 
validity (Pennebaker & Francis, 1992; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) across 80 word 
categories, suggesting that LIWC does successfully measure a number of positive and negative 
emotions, cognitive strategies, and other various language elements (Tasczik & Pennebaker, 
2010).  Judges evaluated which words were suited for which categories.  Groups of three 
judges independently rated whether each word candidate was appropriate to the overall word 
category.  Inter-rater reliability discrimination of category word has ranged from 86% to 100%, 
depending on the dimension being assessed (Pennebaker et al., 2001), suggesting content 
validity.   
 Pennebaker and Francis (1996) conducted one of the first LIWC validity tests in which 
freshmen college students wrote about their first-year college experience or superficial topics.  
People were randomly assigned to write either about deeply emotional topics emotions and 
thoughts about emotional writing or about non-emotional writing.  Four judges rated the 
participants’ essays on various emotional, cognitive, content, and composition dimensions 
designed to correspond to selected LIWC Dictionary scales.  
 To assess construct validity, four judges rated 210 essays on several LIWC dimensions 
(Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997).  Using LIWC output and judges’ ratings, Pearson 
correlational analyses were performed to test LIWC’s external validity.  Moderate to strong 
correlations (0.22–0.75) between LIWC and judges’ global ratings of written essays were found 
for most emotion categories (Pennebaker et al., 2007).     
 Pennebaker et al. (2007) determined the degree to which people use words across a 
select group of text files and then calculated the intercorrelations of the word use.  The internal 
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reliability statistics are based on the correlation between the frequency of each word in a 
particular category with the sum of the other words in the same category (Pennebaker et al., 
2007).  All alphas were computed on a randomly selected sample of 2800 text files (Tausczik 
& Pennebaker, 2010).          
 Table 4 shows the high correlation between the LIWC word count scales and judges’ 
ratings.  For example, the LIWC affective processes category, is composed of 915 words.  for 
Internal reliability statistics indicate that alpha reliability ranges between .97 (binary) and .36 
(raw).  For a summary of all reliability statistics, see Pennebaker et al. (2007). 
 
Table 4: LIWC2007 Output Variable Information (Pennebaker et al., 2007) 
 
Category Abbrev 
 
Examples 
Words 
in 
category 
Validity 
(judges) 
Alpha: 
Binary/
raw 
Linguistic Processes  
    
Word count Wc   
  
Words/sentence Wps     
Dictionary words Dic     
Total function words Funct  464  .97/.40 
   Total pronouns Pronoun I, them, itself 116  .91/.38 
      Personal pronouns Ppron I, them, her 70  .88/.20 
         1st pers singular I I, me, mine 12 .52 .62/.44 
         1st pers plural We We, us, our 12  .66/.47 
         2nd person You You, your, thou 20  .73/.34 
         3rd pers singular Shehe She, her, him 17  .75/.52 
         3rd pers plural They They, their, they’d 10  .50/.36 
      Impersonal 
pronouns Ipron 
It, it’s, those 46  .78/.46 
   Articles Article A, an, the 3  .14/.14 
[Common verbs]a Verb Walk, went, see 383  .97/.42 
   Auxiliary verbs Auxverb Am, will, have 144  .91/.23 
   Past tense a Past Went, ran, had 145 .79 .94/.75 
   Present tense a Present Is, does, hear 169  .91/.74 
   Future tense a Future Will, gonna 48  .75/.02 
   Adverbs Adverb 
Very, really, 
quickly 
69  .84/.48 
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   Prepositions Prep To, with, above 60  .88/.35 
   Conjunctions Conj And, but, whereas 28  .70/.21 
   Negations Negate No, not, never 57  .80/.28 
   Quantifiers Quant Few, many, much 89  .88/.12 
Swear words Swear Damn, piss, fuck 53  .65/.48 
 
Psychological 
Processes  
    
Affective processes Affect 
Happy, cried, 
abandon 
915 
 
.97/.36 
   Positive emotion Posemo Love, nice, sweet 406 .41 .97/.40 
   Negative emotion Negemo Hurt, ugly, nasty 499 .31 .97/.61 
      Anxiety Anx 
Worried, fearful, 
nervous 
91 .38 .89/.33 
      Anger Anger 
Hate, kill, 
annoyed 
184 .22 .92/.55 
      Sadness Sad Crying, grief, sad 101 .07 .91/.45 
Cognitive processes Cogmech 
cause, know, 
ought 
730  .97/.37 
   Insight Insight 
Think, know, 
consider 
195  .94/.51 
   Causation Cause 
because, effect, 
hence 
108 .44 .88/.26 
   Discrepancy Discrep 
should, would, 
could 
76 .21 .80/.28 
   Tentative Tentat 
maybe, perhaps, 
guess 
155  .87/.13 
   Certainty Certain always, never 83  .85/.29 
   Inhibition Inhib 
block, constrain, 
stop 
111  .91/.20 
   Inclusive Incl And, with, include 18  .66/.32 
Category Abbrev 
 
Examples 
Words 
in 
category 
Validity 
(judges) 
Alpha: 
Binary/
raw 
   Exclusive Excl 
But, without, 
exclude 
17 
 
.67/.47 
Perceptual processesc Percept 
Observing, heard, 
feeling 
273 
 
.96/.43 
   See See 
View, saw, seen 72 
 
.90/.43 
   Hear Hear 
Listen, hearing 51 
 
.89/.37 
   Feel Feel 
Feels, touch 75 
 
.88/.26 
Spoken categories      
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Nonfluencies Nonflu 
Er, hm, umm 8 
 
.28/.23 
Fillers Filler 
Blah, Imean, 
youknow 
9 
 
.63/.18 
      
Reprinted with Permission 
 
 In order to determine base rates of word usage and language variation across settings, 
Pennebaker and his colleagues collected random, diverse text samples from 72 studies in 28 
University laboratories.  Six classes of text from these studies were analyzed and compared that 
reflect 24,000 utterances and approximately 168 million words.  These text samples that 
includes a wide range of text genres, ranging from including 714,000 internet web blogs from 
20,000 individuals, observational studies, experimental essays, poetry, 209 American and 
British novels published between 1700 and 2004, 113 articles in the journal Science published 
in 1997 or 2007, and natural speech transcripts to examine the psychometrics of words.  A 
diverse group of individuals were represented in these studies ranging from elementary school 
students to psychiatric prisoners.  This makes the LIWC a valid and reliable tool upon which to 
base a moral language analysis tool. 
3.2.6 Data Transcription and Preparation for LIWC Analysis  
 The data are drawn from electronic written transcripts of the complete interview 
exchange between interviewers and 15 girls.  Audio files were available but the analyses were 
conducted on transcribed interview data.  Interviews were transcribed by independent 
contractors or research assistants paid for by Schrader's GRLS project.    
A reliability check of audio files against transcripts from the GRLS database was 
conducted by the transcriber after the data were transcribed.  Since this is natural language data 
and therefore difficult to transcribe verbatim, a research assistant listened to 10% of 15 
randomly chosen participants’ oral recordings to assess reliability of transcription.  Reliability 
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was required to be 80% or better.  Inter-rater reliability ranged between 91%-100% agreement 
for the sample across the subset of data.  
Research assistants modified the files by correcting each one for abbreviations (e.g. 
Mon instead of Monday), misspellings, and inappropriate word choice (e.g., “their” rather than 
“there”).  These data were then subjected to coding and a series of analyses, as described 
below.  For additional information on practices for transcription and management of language 
data see VCLA manual (Blume & Lust, 2011).  
In order to prepare the collected linguistic data for coding and analysis using the LIWC, 
two undergraduate research assistants reviewed the LIWC2007 language and operator’s manual 
and VCLA manual (Blume & Lust, 2011).  After conducting a preliminary reading of the 
transcripts, they practiced analyses on sample text files from a different database to develop 
skills.             
 Analogue and digital tapes collected in the GRLS study were prepared as text files for 
LIWC2007 analysis according to the LIWC manual (Pennebaker et al., 2007).  Responses to 
the interview protocol were within the same file, so the research assistants separated sorted 
each interview into separate files so that LIWC2007 could analyze each as a single writing 
sample data.  The language text samples were separated into separate Word document (.doc) 
files by participant number, interview year, and interview type.  The files were named in a 
systematic and anonymous way using a number to ensure confidentiality.  Data files were 
saved using the following identification strategy:  
 [PARTICIPANT#] [YEAR#] [INTERVIEW TYPE]  --   Participant1Year1MJI.doc 
Interviewer questions were subsequently eliminated from the transcript, leaving only the 
participant’s language available for analysis.  The transcripts were then segmented by interview 
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questions so they would be prepared for analysis.  This resulted in 318,629 words for analysis 
over 15 participants over all interviews of each participant and a total of 4840 words per 
sentence.  Appendix C shows the number of words and number of words per sentence derived 
for each participant.  Table 3 summarizes these variables by age group.  These data constituted 
a corpus of elicited natural speech in the specific contexts of Schrader's Relational Aggression 
Interview Protocol in the selected participants from the GRLS study described in 3.1.1. 
Table 3: Number of Words and Word Per Sentence for Grades 5, 6, and 7 	   	   Word	  Count	   Words	  Per	  Sentence	  	  Mean	   941.51	   17.86	  N	   106	   106	  Grade	  5	   Total	   99,800	   1,896	  Mean	   1,129.14	   15.58	  N	   132	   132	  Grade	  6	   Total	   149,046	   2,05	  Mean	   1,203.16	   15.40	  N	   58	   58	  Grade	  7	   Total	   1,203.16	   69,78	  Mean	   1,076.45	   16.54	  N	   296	   296	  Total	   Total	   16.35	   4,840	  
 
Note: The Words Per Sentence variable is based on end-of-sentence markers such as periods 
and question marks.  The means for the Word Count and Words per Sentence variables 
represent frequency totals averaged across the four interviews.  The sample sizes (N’s) in the 
tables represent the number of girls (participants) times the number of interviews completed.  
   77 
3.2.7 The Moral Language Use Evaluation Tool (MLUET) 
 To analyze the above hypotheses, I needed to develop a tool, since no other 
methodologies are available that measure language production in the moral domain.  I called 
this tool the MLUET--the Moral Language Use Evaluation Tool.  This tool integrates 
components of language production with the use of moral language.  This tool is designed to 
provide a means to evaluate several dimensions of language production, specifically with 
regard to its expression of intuitive and/or rational representations of moral reasoning. 
 The MLUET evaluates lexicon, syntax productivity, semantics, and general processing 
in this production, thus providing an intensive investigation of language performance.  This 
was done in other language studies using the LIWC, as described below, and I utilized the 
LIWC outputs to directly examine rational and intuitive moral language production by applying 
the intuitive and rational categorization to lexicon, syntax productivity, and general processing 
outputs from the LIWC and supplementing by qualitative content semantic analyses.  
Specifically, the MLUET incorporates descriptive categories based on theories of moral 
reasoning which involve characterization of intuitive and rational forms of language with 
language production data.           
 In sum, the tool provides a format for coding and analyses of raw spoken language data 
so that they can then be converted to numerically based data to be interpreted and used by a 
researcher to evaluate hypotheses.  This tool can be used on any oral language production data.  
On the basis of their analyses of a speaker’s utterances, a researcher can evaluate linguistic 
knowledge in the moral domain in these two categories of intuitive and rational thinking.  This 
tool can be expanded to include other moral concepts as well, but is limited here to intuitive 
and rational categories. 
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 The MLUET analysis is conducted primarily on the basis of output derived from the 
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Text Analysis Software) (Pennebaker, Booth & 
Francis, 2007).  The MLUET extends the concepts of the LIWC to the study of moral language 
production through a combination of methods.  The output variables of the LIWC were 
categorized as linguistic dimensions, psychological processes, and paralinguistic dimensions 
(See table 1).  The MLUET reinterpreted this LIWC word classification into lexicon, syntax 
productivity, and general performance categories characterized as intuitive or rational language.  
A semantic language classification of moral justifications was added to the MLUET based on 
previous research (e.g. Selman & Feigenberg, 2010). 
3.2.7.1 Rationale for the MLUET 
As discussed, in detail, in the literature review, the psychology, education, and 
sociolinguistic literatures do not provide much information on how existing methods can be 
used to assess intuitive and rational language, as discussed earlier, in detail, in the literature 
review chapter.  One of the reasons that morality and language have been treated as separately 
in research on relational aggression—even though researchers believe in their mutual 
relationship— could be connected to the methodological difficulties of identifying and testing 
experiences and values in language usage and morality.  Theories of moral judgment could also 
differ greatly in their emphasis on reason or emotion due to variations in methodology.  The 
outcomes could be largely determined by the method used (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007).  For 
example, measures such the Accumulated Clues Task  (Bowers et al., 1990) will typically elicit 
a quick, intuitive reaction while a Metacognitive Interview (Schrader, 1988) will elicit a 
participant’s slow, deliberate reasoning.   
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Therefore, for this dissertation I devised a new approach to enable researchers to 
empirically distinguish the use of rational and intuitive language in narratives about moral 
decisions.  I combined theoretical concepts of rational and intuitive processing as described by 
Haidt and others (e.g. Haidt, 2001; Selman & Feigenberg, 2010) and the LIWC, the analytic 
tool developed by Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis (2007).  The LIWC uses word counts and 
other dimensions of language.  For example, linguistic dimensions such as pronouns, articles, 
auxiliary verbs, and psychological constructs such as affect and cognition, as well as 
paralinguistic dimensions such as assents, fillers, and punctuation. The LIWC was developed 
to capture various emotional, cognitive, structural, and process dimensions in people's verbal 
and written narratives, and as such, is an important tool for understanding moral language.  
However, integrating these linguistic dimensions with a theoretically rich context of intuitive 
and rational moral thought makes it is possible to develop a deeper understanding of language 
and thought than can be achieved by looking at each dimension alone or in parallel.  In doing 
so, I attempt to bridge the language and moral cognition gap in the field of moral psychology.   
Dual Processing Theories 
Dual-processing theorists outline two systems associated with cognitive processing in 
humans.  The first, System 1, is generally described as innate, instinctive, and automatic 
instinctive behaviors that come about through implicit learning (Evans, 2003).  I used System 1 
as a means of categorizing adolescents’ unconscious, holistic, rapid intuitive reasoning, and 
refer to this as "intuitive" reasoning.  On the contrary, System 2 is characterized as a capacity 
that takes longer to develop, “permitting abstract hypothetical thinking that cannot be achieved 
by System 1” (Evans, 2003).  I used System 2 as a means of categorizing adolescent girls 
language as "rational," where thought is defined as deliberate, slow, sequential, in-depth, 
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effortful, and systematic.          
 The dual processing approach and the proposed language-use methodology (the 
MLUET, described below) can provide the foundation for an initial framework for studying 
how people talk about moral decision-making and some of its developmental trajectories.  
Understanding how and when System 1 and System 2 reasoning is likely to be used in language 
is therefore critical for understanding how the full range of moral language can be adequately 
captured.  This is a new approach to studying moral language, and therefore several issues have 
yet to be resolved, including the relative importance of each system, and the related question of 
how precisely the two processes may interact.  
Dual-process formulations offer the most promising way for developing of an integrated 
account of how the unconscious mechanisms associated with intuitive processing interact with 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying conscious awareness.  The dual processing framework 
offers a more integrated account of the nature and role of intuition than previous psychological 
literature, reviewed earlier, which has lacked a coherent conceptual framework in which to 
place intuition.  In consequence, the concept has been used in an ambiguous and fragmented 
manner.  Further, neither the psychological moral and linguistic literature has yet directly tested 
relationships between language use and moral judgment.    
The dual processing model could benefit from methodologies that could be used to 
study the relationships between moral judgment and language use in intuitive versus rational 
thinking.  Dual processing models have begun to identify conditions and problems that are 
more likely to tap into rapid, intuitive thinking, and more deliberate and conscious processes of 
reasoning.  However, neither the dual processing literature nor psycho-linguistics have studied 
the language terms and uses associated with these processes systematically enough to permit 
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inferences about these decision making processes from participants' discussions of their moral 
judgments.  Further, no studies have determined some regularity in the course of adolescent 
development language measures of syntax productivity, lexicon, semantics, and general 
performance. 
Language use needs to be examined at numerous levels because construction of moral 
decision does not only take place in isolation at a single level or in one area of language 
production.  Girls use different linguistic expressions in relational aggression situations and 
rely on multiple levels of language.  It is thus important to understand how these different 
levels of language interact when girls discuss relational aggression situations over the course of 
development.  The syntax productivity and lexicon categories are used to demonstrate the 
importance of individual words in moral language.  Syntax is necessary for understanding the 
relationship between thoughts and words.  Filler words and non-fluencies are particularly 
important for general performance, especially considering that up to half of all spontaneous 
speech utterances consist of pauses or silence (Aitchison, 2008). 
3.2.7.2 Data Coding: Intuitive and Rational Moral Language 
 The first step in coding for intuitive and rational language is reported in this section.  
The MLUET is a tool pertaining to intuitive and rational language, using both a selection of 
linguistic variables defining the language production categories as developed in the LIWC, and 
theoretical concepts from moral psychology.  A systematic and reliable coding methodology 
was developed using the following procedure.      
 We first generated a preliminary category list to identify a group of linguistic 
production variables that tapped intuitive and rational moral reasoning based on various 
definitions of the constructs existing in the literatures.  For example, this list included emotive 
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words to indicate intuition and cognitive words to demonstrate rationality.  Next, four raters 
"brainstormed" variables relevant to intuitive and rational reasoning and these were added to 
the initial category list.  The final list is show in Table 5.  These raters were undergraduate and 
graduate students who had expertise in human development, psychology, and linguistics.  
Consensus was derived on which of the categories to include in the analysis.  
 After generating the list of linguistic variables to count as potentially intuitive and 
rational language, data from the GRLS project described above were sorted into intuitive or 
rational language by two research assistants, independently, and then the two researchers 
compared their ratings to attain agreement.  The category developed was then compared, as was 
the data segment, to determine if it aligned with the definitions outlined in the dual process 
framework, as follows.          
 Once the word lists of lexicon, syntax productivity, and general performance were 
compiled, the set of words in these categories were then rated by three research assistants. Two 
of these three research assistants also coded the data above.  The research assistants conducted 
a reliability check to determine whether each variable in the language category list should be 
included in a particular language category.  For instance, they would determine whether the use 
of adverbs in speech (i.e. elaboration or clarification of information) could serve as reliable 
indicators of rational language.  Research assistants classified the number of pronouns, 
emotional words, and other particular linguistic dimensions into categories corresponding to 
words in the LIWC.  Based on the judges’ agreement, I excluded several variables—for 
example, punctuation (e.g. exclamation) hedges (e.g. "That’s kinda sad"), and boosters or 
amplifiers (e.g. "I’m so glad you’re here"). 
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3.2.7.3 Data Coding: MLUET Language Production Coding of Elicited Natural Speech  
 The second major step in developing the MLUET was to apply it in order to categorize 
the language used by the adolescent girls.  The LIWC provides an initial categorization of 
linguistic, paralinguistic, and psychological dimensions of language (Pennebaker, Booth, & 
Francis, 2007), and so a set of lexicon, syntax productivity, and general performance language 
categories were devised on which differences in intuitive and rational processes might be 
measured by the LIWC.  These categories incorporate the LIWC characterizations plus the 
intuitive and rational language categories in moral language domain, as were described above 
in the first part of the MLUET development description. 
In sum, the MLUET, then, contains the following categories, and includes the contents of these 
categories as described below in Table 5. 
Table 5: Summary of MLUET Categories 
Lexicon  
In terms of lexicon, words used by participants were categorized as: 
-Affective words (e.g. happy, sad) 
-Cognitive words (e.g. indicating insight/analysis such think or consider) 
-Perceptual words (e.g. saw, listened, felt) 
 
Syntax Productivity 
Syntax productivity was generally estimated through: 
-Number of words  
-Number of words per sentence 
-Adverbs 
-Conjunctions 
-Prepositions 
-Quantifiers 
-Pronouns (1st, 2nd, 3rd person) 
 
These estimates can be approximated through the LIWC and provide a sense of normal 
distribution for the results through the number of words and sentences. 
 
General Processing 
Instances of: 
-Filler words (e.g. you know, um) 
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-Non-fluencies (e.g. stuttering) 
 
These lexicon, syntax productivity, and general processing categories can be derived from the 
LIWC output. 
 
Semantics 
The nature of language used in moral justifications is evaluated according to the following: 
 
Sentences containing judgment with a rationale/justification (e.g. steps of searching, weighing 
evidence).   
Safety                                 -
Relational                                  
Conventional                      
Transformational           
Dumbfounding                    
Unsupported statement                                  
“I don’t know”                                            
-Incomplete sentences  
Shifts/breaks (e.g. I don't know why… and I don't know whether...) 
 
 
Intuitive and Rational Language Production Dimensions 
The linguistic, paralinguistic, and psychological dimensions of language described in 
the LIWC (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007) were categorized into intuitive and rational 
language according to criteria outlined in system 1 and 2 of the dual processing framework, as 
summarized below.  I suggest several language production dimensions on which differences in 
intuitive and rational language might be measured.  These include lexicon, syntax productivity, 
semantics, and general performance: 
Lexicon 
Participants use emotive and perceptual words to describe intuitive reasoning, and 
cognitive words are used to describe rational reasoning. 
Affective Words: Affective words indicating positive and negative emotions were categorized 
as intuitive because impulsive, emotionally driven processes are explicitly linked to System 1 
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processing.  This category of words often reflects pre-existing beliefs or experiences generated 
effortlessly in moral decision-making.  
Perceptual Words: Perceptual words are classified as intuitive because they are triggered by 
immediate, non-analytical experiences in the environment.  Perceptual words such as “view” 
and “saw” seem to indicate automatic, tacit, non-inferential processing that do not require 
explicit processing or cognitive effort.  
Cognitive Words: Cognitive words are typically affect-free and provide evidence for 
expressing conscious mental states indicative of rational processing.  Words such as “think” or 
“consider” seem to indicate explicit or systematic involving steps of searching or hypothetical 
thinking in which consciousness has an active and deliberate role.  
Syntax Productivity 
 The mean lengths of utterances as measured by total word and sentence counts are 
higher in rational language and lower in intuitive language.  More conjunctions, adverbs, 
prepositions, and quantifiers will also indicate more rational language.  Intuitive reasoning will 
be described using a higher proportion of first person personal pronouns, while rational 
reasoning will contain a higher proportion of second and third person personal pronouns.  
 Word count and words per sentence count can serve as a variability control, showing 
that girls’ word production, or talkativeness, remains somewhat stable over time.  A high mean 
word count would reveal rational language requiring deliberation, while a low mean word 
count would indicate more immediately experienced and less systematically processed intuitive 
language.  Estimates of word counts and words per sentence can be approximated through the 
LIWC, and together with the standard error of the mean generated by SPSS as part of the 
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output for t-tests, provide information on the normal distribution of responses for the results 
through the number of words and sentences. 
Adverbs and Quantifiers: Adverbs and quantifiers indicate rational language because they are 
often used to communicate additional information while clarifying details.  An adverb serves as 
an intensifier (e.g. so, really, very), providing greater expressiveness and emphasis through 
additional information about the circumstances of an activity or event (Carli, 1990).  
Quantifiers are used to specify information about the number or amount of something to 
describe how much or how many.  These all seem to reflect rational language. 
Prepositions and Conjunctions: Both prepositions and conjunctions express rational language 
by functioning as connectors between words, clauses, or phrases.  They express logical 
relationships, as one interprets how the relationship between parts of a sentence that one has 
spoken can be linked or related to each other.  This requires effortful and complex analytical 
processing. 
Pronouns: First person pronouns are consistent with intuition because they indicate highly 
egocentric thinking or perspectives - a form of centration in which one assumes that others are 
thinking in accordance with one’s own perspective (Piaget, 1932; Elkind, 1967) and may be 
unable to incorporate and coordinate multiple perspectives (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  Second 
and third person pronouns reflect rational language use because they may reflect the ability to 
take another person’s point of view.  This argument is supported by research (Caruso, Epley, & 
Bazerman, 2006) that has found that children who have difficulty with perspective-taking are 
more likely to process language egocentrically, and that egocentric perceptions of moral 
concepts are processed rapidly and unconsciously. 
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General Processing 
Filler words and non-fluencies: Intuition will contain non-fluencies and fillers.  Filler words 
and non-fluencies are categorized as disconnected, incoherent, and tentative speech.  Filler 
words and non-fluencies were categorized as disconnected and incomplete speech, and are 
indicative of intuitive processing because hesitation indicates dumbfounding.  Dumbfounding 
has been shown to occur when an intuition is unsupported by verbally expressed reasons 
(Björklund, 2004; Haidt & Hersh, 2001). 
Semantics: Descriptions of intuitive moral judgments contain fewer justifications, and rational 
moral judgments will contain more justifications.  Semantics is used to examine how 
adolescent girls combine words and utterances into sentences, and how these sentences interact 
to form more complex moral meanings as girls construct justifications to explain their moral 
judgments.   
It is especially important to understand the variety of justifications bystanders use to 
reduce the moral culpability of their actions.  The use of Selman & Feigenberg’s (2010) coding 
system allows a richer description of the quality of rational language use by adolescent girls 
discussing relational aggression.  Their system is one that categorizes moral justifications based 
on safety, conventional, relational, and transformational responses.  I consider these types of 
moral language usage to be rational because judgments involving justification are reached on 
the basis of some extended process of deliberate, systematic reasoning (e.g. weighing options 
or thinking of alternatives), in accordance with explicit criteria accompanied by awareness. 
  I developed the MLUET for this analysis (described in section 3.2.7) based upon 
assumptions from the literature (e.g. Haidt, 2001) to characterize intuitive justifications.  
Dumbfounding, unsupported statements, “I don’t know” declarations, incomplete sentences, 
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and shift/breaks are referred to as evidence of intuitive language because one is unable to 
articulate a justification for an intuition that is rapidly and effortlessly generated. 
MLUET Categorization of Intuitive and Rational Language 
As tables 6 and 7 show, categorization of responses as utilizing intuitive versus rational 
language were determined by variations across all the above dimensions: 
Table 6: Intuitive Language Production Correlates 
Levels of 
language 
production 
Intuitive Language Target Words Examples 
Perceptual, non-analytical words View, sound, scream 
See Stare, looked, view 
Hear Yelling, whisper, 
spoke 
Feel Pressed, sharp, thin 
Affective words Care, annoy, cruel  
Positive emotion Friend, forgave, trust 
Negative emotion Lied, mad, selfish 
Anxiety  Afraid, guilt, upset 
Anger  Fought, threat, hated 
Sadness Cried, isolated, 
helpless 
Lexicon 
Swear Words Heck, damn, jeez 
Syntax 
Productivity 
First person pronouns I, me 
Semantics Sentences containing  
judgments with no 
 justifications. 
Incomplete sentence 
Dumbfounding 
“I don’t know” 
Unsupported 
statement 
Low number of words 
 
Below the first 
quartile (25th 
percentile): 69,783  
Syntax 
Productivity 
Low number of words per sentence  
 
Lower quartile range 
words per sentences  
General 
processing/ 
Performance 
Fillers You know, like, I 
mean 
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Non-fluencies Ug, sigh, stuttering 
    
Table 7: Rational Language Production Correlates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels of 
Language 
Production 
Rational Language Target Words Examples 
Cognitive, analytical word Ought, understand, 
consider 
Insight Question, realize, 
Understood 
Causation Result, response, 
Solve 
Discrepancy Would, should’ve, 
Want 
Tentative Almost, doubt, 
maybe 
Certainty Totally, must, sure 
Inhibition Careful, waiting, 
reluctant 
Inclusive With, along, both 
Exclusive Except, but, rather 
Lexicon 
Sentences containing judgments 
with justifications 
Safety 
Conventional 
Transformational 
Relational 
Semantics High total number of words   Above the third 
quartile (75th 
percentile): 149,046 
High total number of words per 
sentence count  
Upper quartile range 
of words per sentence 
Syntax 
Productivity 
Adverbs However, maybe, 
whenever 
 
Conjunctions Than, unless, until 
 
Prepositions Except, against, 
besides 
 
Quantifiers Partly, neither, most 
 
Second-person pronoun You, yours, you’ve 
 
Third-person pronouns She, his, them 
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Note: All variables except word count and words per sentence represent percentages of all total 
number of words a girl spoke during the interviews.  Word count and words per sentence were 
reported as frequency totals.  Pronoun usage represents percent of pronoun type over all 
pronouns. 
In this work, I propose characterizing language as intuitive if it involves 1) low total 
word and word per sentence counts 2) affective/emotive words 3) perceptual words 4) first 
person personal pronouns 5) filler words/non-fluencies and 6) sentences without a justification.  
Rational language, in contrast, would contain: 1) high total word and words per sentence counts 
2) cognitive words 3) second and third person personal pronouns 4) adverbs 5) conjunctions 6) 
prepositions and 6) sentences containing judgment with a justification.  These characteristics 
will be measured by using the LIWC in combination with a theoretically based characterization 
of what types of language usages reflect rational and intuitive thinking.  
 In sum, I developed a methodological tool and a working definition of moral language 
use of intuitive and rational moral language in order to examine how people appear to use 
System 1 and System 2 thinking in discussing moral and relational aggression situations.  There 
is also, however, the question of how rational language empirically differs in real and 
hypothetical situations.  For this analysis, I turned to adding qualitative analyses to the MLUET 
methodology.  
Moral Justifications: Semantics  
  I explored how the girls' rational and intuitive moral justifications varied across real and 
hypothetical cases discussed in the GRLS dataset used for this study.  Selman & Feigenberg’s 
(2010) coding system was referred to as evidence of rational language.  Selman & Feigenberg 
(2010) identified four types of justifications that adolescents considered to be most important 
when selecting a strategy: safety, conventional, relational, and transformational.  I build on 
Selman & Feigenberg’s (2010) coding system to probe the nature of girls’ moral justifications 
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(see table 8) as intuitive or rational.  This is contrasted with four types of justifications that 
research (Björklund, 2004; Haidt, Björklund, & Murphy, 2000; Haidt & Hersh, 2001) has 
associated with intuitive decision-making: dumbfounding, unsupported statements, “I don’t 
know,” and incomplete sentences.   
Table 8: Semantics: Rational Justification Categories 
Adapted from Selman & Feigenberg (2010) 
Rational Justification Description Example  
Safety  Indicates protection as a 
priority. 
 
Perceives an immediate 
threat to one’s emotional or 
physical well-being. 
 
Indicates that the main goal 
is to stop the current 
situation of exclusion. 
 
Does not reference long-
term consequences or 
implications of 
recommended strategy. 
 
“I’m usually a standbyer. 
Because, sometimes I 
stand up for people but 
it’s hard because I don’t 
want to be like turned on 
by the other people” 
(Participant 13, Year 2, 
Bystander Role). 
 
“I just didn't want to get 
involved and get in 
trouble” (Participant 7, 
Year 2, Bystander Role) 
 
“Because usually you’ll 
be like following along 
and you should just say 
no I was quiet about it, I 
didn't want to hurt your 
feelings and stuff like 
that” (Participant 8, Year 
2, RAI). 
Conventional 
 
References social norms, 
conventions, or rules 
(formal or informal) 
Highlights efficiency or 
expediency of the 
recommended strategy. 
 
Does not explicate 
“I actually stay out of it 
totally, I do. Because then 
people just want to get 
sucked in and that’s not 
for the good” (Participant 
9, Year 1, Bystander 
Role. 
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reasoning beyond simple 
explanations of cost-benefit 
analyses that one action is 
“better” than another. 
“I just stood back and 
decided that this was 
none of my business.  
That I shouldn’t really 
even be here” (Participant 
3, Y1, Bystander). 
Relational Highlights the formation or 
maintenance of 
interpersonal relationships 
Articulates desire for 
belonging or connectedness 
with another person or with 
a group of people Identifies 
a connection between 
people’s experiences or 
emotions 
“Well, you kinda have to 
go through life with 
friends and you have to 
have lots of friends ‘cause 
if you don’t you’ll just be 
lonely and you won’t 
have anyone to talk to 
about something that 
happens”  (Participant 15, 
Year 1, RAI). 
 
“If, if I’m like with a 
group and they don’t 
really like someone so 
they decide to kick that 
person out of the group, 
and I’m friends with that 
person, then they don’t 
really deserve to have my 
friendship right then” 
(Participant 3, Year 2, 
RAI). 
Transformational Explains connections 
between the recommended 
action and possible future 
consequences or 
implications. 
 
Speculates about the 
possible development of or 
changes in other people’s 
thinking or beliefs. 
Articulates opportunities for 
group dynamics to shift as a 
result of the recommended 
action or implies that the 
recommended action could 
serve as a catalyst for these 
“I was feeling bad for that 
girl and then that I 
probably, it might have 
helped if I had, I mean I 
might not have changed 
the opinion of like the 
person who was starting 
all the rumors and stuff, 
but I might have changed 
the opinions of the other 
people and she might not 
have been ignored” 
(Participant 10, Year 2, 
Bystander Role). 
	  
And then say I’m still 
mad at you for this thing 
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changes. you did two months ago.  
And that really bugs me.  
It’s like it happened, you 
can never erase it, I’m 
sorry.  I will do anything 
to change what I did but 
we can't (Participant 9, 
Year 2, Bystander). 
	  
“Because the more people 
that are on either side, the 
more the fight is going to 
get morphed, so like if 
it’s just about a simple 
fight, and then it morphs 
into this huge thing about 
more things that the 
person did and so it can 
be” (Participant 9, Year 2, 
Bystander). 
 
 
Table 9: Semantics: Intuitive Justification Categories 
Intuitive Justification Description Example 
Dumbfounding  Participants have strong 
feelings or convictions 
when stating that they know 
or believe something, but 
cannot find reasons to 
support their beliefs. 
“Well, I can’t explain it.  I 
know why, because its like 
they were being mean to 
other people I guess, I don’t 
know” (10, Year 1, RAI). 
Unsupported Statement A statement is left 
unsupported by 
justifications.  Participants 
do not seek reasons to 
support their statements 
(e.g. steps of searching, 
weighing evidence). 
 
“I sometimes do something, 
but sometimes don’t” 
(Participant 13, Year 1, 
Bystander Role). 
 
“Sometimes I stand up for 
them, but usually I don’t do 
anything really” (Participant 
13, Year 1, Bystander Role). 
“I don’t know” Participants are unable to 
generate a response. 
“I’m not sure” (Participant 3, 
Year 2, Bystander Role). 
Incomplete sentence  Responses are interrupted “No, I think they just should 
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by shifts, breaks, pauses, or 
restarts.  Sentences are 
fragmented or 
ungrammatical. 
 
 
have, I don’t know, well if 
they told Karen that nobody 
was going to the movies then 
they shouldn’t have gone or 
they shouldn’t have been 
talking behind her back and 
rolling their eyes”  
(Participant 7, Year 2, RAI). 
“I’d tell them they’re being 
mean and I’d, um, I’d, I don’t 
know.  It kind of depends on 
the situation”  
(Participant 7, Year 1, RAI). 
 
I conducted a semantic content analysis of girls’ moral language, with an emphasis on 
classifying the rational and intuitive justifications girls provide when discussing a hypothetical 
scenario and their real-life experiences as bystanders.  Qualitative content analyses were 
conducted by coding the justifications using the factors specified in the MLUET (see Tables 8 
and 9).  This was done to evaluate the nature of the girls’ moral justifications in the real and 
hypothetical scenarios, and allowed subsequent coding for the factors in the MLUET.  To 
conduct a content analysis, the text was coded into justification categories based on how words, 
utterances, and sentences relate to one dominant underlying meaning.  Each interview segment 
was classified as either an ‘intuitive’ or ‘rational’ justification based upon the semantic 
relationships between the words and phrases in a given text rather than individual words or 
sentences.  Each segment was assigned to a justification category based on the justification 
category that dominated the discussion.  The percentage that each justification type represented 
the total number of interviews was calculated.  The results are then used to interpret the text(s).  
Interviews were treated as wholes in which a participant discussed her decisions in hypothetical 
and real scenarios. 
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Approximately 10% of the 11 participants’ interviews were selected for coding and 
reliability.  One researcher and I coded the data semantically independently, and then together, 
and agreed upon the classifications of each interview segment.  No reliability figures were 
calculated, since all of the coding was done using a consensus approach to shared 
understanding of the data.  These data were hand-coded using a discourse chunking method, 
and not processed using any qualitative data analysis software, such as Atlas Ti.  
3.2.7.4 Data Analysis 
 1) As described in Section 3.2.6, quantitative analyses of these transcripts were first 
conducted by coding the lexical, syntactic, and general performance raw data using the 
LIWC2007 (Pennebaker, Booth, & Francis, 2007).  After the files were processed as text in 
Word document files (.doc), the output files were saved in tab-delimited text.  The results of the 
LIWC and MLUET codings were then transferred into an Excel spreadsheet so that they could 
be exported into SPSS to conduct t-tests.  The spreadsheet contained a breakdown of students 
by grade, language level, and type of interview.  See Tables 9-12 in the results chapter.  The 
output files, Excel spreadsheet, and SPSS results were all stored in the secure password 
protected server of the Virtual Center for the Study of Language Acquisition (VCLA) 
(www.clal.cornell.edu/vcla). 
 2) Quantitative analyses were conducted using SPSS on the LIWC output of data.  T-
tests were used to determine whether differences between means were statistically significant. 
The results were compiled by calculating the percentage of words used by a participant 
in each interview speech text sample and then averaging the percentage across all four 
instruments in the interview protocol: Judy's dilemma from the Moral Judgment Interview 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), a Metacognitive Interview (Schrader, 1988), Real Life Interview 
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(RLI), and the hypothetical relational aggression interview (RAI) with two parts (A-Cassie's 
dilemma; B-roles of bully, bystander, and victim).   
3.2.8 Summary 
 Despite the centrality of works on intuitive and rational processes of moral decision 
making, the literature has yet to develop methodologies for measuring the degree to which 
participants’ discussions of their moral judgments can be characterized linguistically as 
intuitive or rational.  In this chapter, I proposed a new research method of analysis to explore 
how girls use intuitive and rational language to discuss hypothetical and real life scenarios of 
relational aggression in moral judgment interviews.  I characterize language use as intuitive if it 
involved relatively 1) low total word and word per sentence counts, and high use of 2) 
affective/emotive words 3) perceptual words 4) first person personal pronouns 5) filler 
words/non-fluencies and 6) sentences without a justification.  Rational language, in contrast, 
would contain a high number of: 1) high total words and words per sentence counts 2) 
cognitive words 3) second and third person personal pronouns, 4) adverbs 5) conjunctions; 6) 
prepositions and 6) sentences containing judgment with a justification.  These characteristics 
were formulated by combining the LIWC with a theoretical analysis of intuitive and rational 
thinking derived from the literature review in chapter 2. 	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Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter reports results from a quantitative analyses conducted on a selected subset 
of data from the GRLS dataset for grades five, six, and seven (collected in 2006-2009).  The 
aim of this analysis was primarily exploratory, so t-tests for the differences between means 
were conducted (p < 0.05) to determine if statistically significant differences occurred in 
intuitive compared to rational uses of language between fifth, sixth, seventh grades, as 
adolescent girls moved to higher grades.  Comparisons were also made to detect if the use of 
intuitive and rational language varies with roles played and across real-life and hypothetical 
dilemmas.  The quantitative results were compiled by calculating the percentage of words used 
by a participant in each interview and then averaging the percentage across all four interviews.  
All variables except word count, words per sentence, and pronouns reflect represent 
percentages of the total number of words a participant spoke during the interviews.  Pronoun 
usage represents percent of pronoun type over all pronouns.  Word count and words per 
sentence are reported as frequency totals.  The sample sizes (N’s) in the tables represent the 
number of girls multiplied by the number of interviews completed, and vary by grade level.
 I also provide a semantic content analysis of girls’ moral language, with an emphasis on 
classifying the rational and intuitive justifications girls provide when discussing a hypothetical 
scenario and their real-life experiences as bystanders.  Frequencies were hand-counted after 
classifying each interview segment as either ‘intuitive’ or ‘rational’ based upon the semantic 
relationships between the words and phrases in a given text rather than individual words or 
sentences.            
 The main question addressed in this analysis are, what is the nature of adolescent girls' 
language use in their discussions of moral and relational aggression situations, particularly in 
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regard to intuitive and rational thinking, and does that language use change in its expression 
from fifth through seventh grades. This question will be addressed in four sub-questions to 
examine more specifically how girls' moral language changes.  
1.  What types of language do girls use, and what is the extent of that usage? 
2.  Are there differences in the extent of use of intuitive and rational language as adolescent 
girls move from fifth, to sixth, to seventh grades? 
3.  Which types of moral language do they use in the various roles of relational aggression, 
specifically, the bully, victim, and bystander roles?  
4.  Which types of moral language do they use in the various types of relational aggression 
scenarios--real life versus hypothetical dilemmas? 
4.1 Research Questions 1 and 2 
The findings provide some evidence to reject the hypothesis 1) that when all grades are 
combined adolescent girls use more intuitive language than rational language in the usages that 
can be most directly contrasted, but to support the hypothesis 2) that between the fifth and 
seventh grades, adolescent girls move from intuitive towards rational styles of reaching moral 
judgments.  Appendix C shows LIWC data for each subject and interview.  Table 10 
summarizes these for all grades, and Table 11 presents the data for each grade. 
The total word number of words used was 318,629 and 4840 words used per sentence.  
The girls used far more words reflecting cognitive (8,211) than affective (1,936) or perceptual 
(596) processes (see Table 10).  They also used adverbs (2,485), prepositions (2,886), 
conjunctions (2,949) and quantifiers (658) with great frequency.  I had proposed that use of 
these terms suggested the more complex syntax in rational discourse.  On the other hand, the 
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girls were slightly less likely to use first person pronouns (2,114), thought to be associated with 
intuitive language, than second and third person pronouns taken together (2, 327).  
 
Table 10: Girls’ Language Use in All Grades: Syntax Productivity, Lexicon, and General 
Performance 
  ALL GRADES 
All 
Mean N TOTAL 
 LANGUAGE LEVELS 
      
Syntax Productivity       
Word count      1076.449 296  318,629  
Words per sentence  16.351 296  4,840  
Personal Pronouns 15.002 296  4,441  
First person 7.143 296  2,114  
Other person 7.860 296  2,327  
 2nd person 2.033 296  602  
 3rd person singular 3.547 296  1,050  
 3rd person plural   2.280 296  675  
   Adverbs 8.395 296  2,485  
   Prepositions 9.751 296  2,886  
   Conjunctions 9.961 296  2,949  
   Quantifiers 2.224 296  658  
Lexicon       
Affective processes 6.541 296  1,936  
   positive emotion 4.517 296  1,337  
   negative emotion    2.004 296  593  
  Swear words .022 296  6  
Perceptual processes 2.016 296  597  
   View, saw, .252 296  75  
   Listen, hearing .947 296  280  
   Feel                 .795 296  235  
Cognitive processes 27.740 296  8,211  
   Insight 4.837 296  1,432  
   Because, effect 2.641 296  782  
   Discrepancy 3.998 296  1,183  
   Tentative 6.148 296  1,820  
   Certainty .912 296  270  
   Inhibition .595 296  176  
   Inclusive 5.064 296  1,499  
   Exclusive 6.697 296  1,982  
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General Processing       
    Nonfluencies  1.257 296  372  
    Fillers  1.780 296  527  
 
Syntax Productivity 
The mean number of words used grew from 941.51 in fifth grade, to 1129.14 in sixth 
grade, and then to 1203.16 in seventh grade.  The mean number of words per sentence steadily 
declined from 17.86 on fifth grade, 15.56 in sixth grade, and then to 15.40 in seventh grade.   
There were no statistically significant differences in the mean percentage of words using 
prepositions, quantifiers, or swear words between grades.  The use of adverbs also grew 
significantly (p = .001) from fifth to seventh grades, from appearing in 7.94% of words to 
9.08%.  The increases from the fifth to the sixth grade (from 7.94% to 8.46%) and from sixth to 
seventh grade (from 8.46% to 9.08%) fell just short of statistical significance (p = .052 and p = 
.068, respectively).  The use of conjunctions declined significantly (p = .004) between the fifth 
and seventh grades, from appearing in 10.25% of words to 9.42%.  This was primarily 
attributable to a statistically significant (p = .044) usage from 9.97% of words in sixth grade to 
9.42% in seventh; the decline between the fifth and sixth grades (from 10.25% to 9.97%) was 
not statistically significant (p = .276).   
The findings on the use of first vs. second and third person pronouns were more 
complex and less clear-cut, however.  There was a statistically significant decrease (p = .050) in 
students' mean use of pronouns, from 25.24% of words in fifth grade to 24.06% in the seventh 
grade.  However, the increases between the fifth and sixth grades, and between the sixth and 
seventh, were not statistically significant.  The mean percentage of first person pronouns used 
increased significantly (p = .014) from 6.41% of all words in fifth grade to 7.52% in sixth 
grade, and then showed a statistically non-significant increase to 7.63% in seventh grade.  The 
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growth from fifth grade (6.41%) to seventh grade (7.64%) was also statistically significant (p = 
.007).  Conversely, the percentage of second and third person pronouns used decreased 
significantly (p = .002) from 8.66% of all words in fifth grade to 7.31% in sixth.   Despite a 
statistically insignificant (p = .382) increase in the use of second and third person pronouns 
between the sixth (7.31%) and seventh (7.65%) grades, the decline from fifth (8.66%) to 
seventh grade (7.65%) remained statistically significant (p = .020).  This is inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that the girls were moving from intuitive towards rational moral language.  
Lexicon 
The mean percentage of words reflecting affective processes fell from 6.77% in fifth 
grade to 6.15% in seventh grade (p=. 011).  Here and throughout the table, the absolute size of 
the difference may not seem large.  However, the standard error of each mean (0.199 for the 
fifth grade mean, and 0.137 for the seventh grade mean) is very small.  This suggests a high 
degree of similarity in the usage of affective language amongst adolescent girls within each 
grade, and a contrast between the fifth and seventh grade that although small is unlikely to be 
attributable to chance.  That is, for most language usages, the mean percentage of each usage 
by girls in each grade is very close to the mean for that grade, and where differences are 
significant, the means differ across grades.  Neither the decline between fifth and sixth grade 
(from 6.77% to 6.52%) nor that between sixth and seventh grade (from 6.52% to 6.15%) were 
statistically significant, however.  Conversely, the mean percentage of words reflecting 
cognitive processes grew significantly from 27.19% in fifth grade to 29.09% in seventh grade 
(p=. 000).  The growth between fifth and sixth grade (from 27.19% to 27.59%) was not 
statistically significant, but there was a statistically significant increase between sixth and 
seventh grade, from 27.59% to 29.09%.   
   102 
 Further bolstering evidence of this developmental change, the analysis found some 
significant changes between grade levels in the mean percentage of words involving the 
cognitive processes of Insight, Causation, Tentative, Certainty, Inhibition, and Inclusive and 
Exclusive thinking.  The mean percentage of words involving explanation fell significantly (p = 
.024) from a mean of 2.82% of words in fifth grade to 2.51% in sixth grade.  However, the 
mean percentage rose to 2.61% of words in seventh grade.  This increase was not statistically 
significant, but it sufficiently counterbalanced the decline between fifth and sixth grade to 
render the overall change between fifth (2.82% of words) and seventh grade (2.61%) 
statistically insignificant (p = .151).  The use of explanatory terms was thus statistically 
unchanged between the fifth and seventh grades.   
There was also no statistically significant change (p = .166) in the mean percentage of 
words with Tentative expressions between fifth (6.23%) and seventh (6.61%) grades.  
However, the percent of words with Tentative expressions did increase significantly (p = .005) 
from 5.88% in sixth grade to 6.61% in seventh grade.  This was partially counterbalanced, 
however, by the statistically insignificant (p = .207) decline from 6.23% to 5.88% in the mean 
percentage of words involving Tentative expressions.  Contrary to expectations of a shift from 
intuitive to rational moral decision-making, the percentage of words involving inclusive 
concepts fell significantly (p = .017) from 5.29% in fifth grade to 4.65% in seventh grade.  
 Findings involving Insight and Certainty were more consistent with the hypothesis that 
moral language would shift from intuitive towards rational forms of cognition.  The mean 
percentage of words involving Insight grew significantly (p = .009) from 4.31% in fifth grade 
to 4.90% in sixth grade, and then increased significantly again (p = .002) to a mean of 5.66% of 
words in grade seven.  The growth in the mean percentage of words involving Insight from 
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4.31% in fifth grade to 5.66% in seventh grade was also statistically significant (p = .000).  The 
percentage of words expressing Certainty grew significantly (p = .006) from 0.76% of in the 
fifth grade to 1.01% in the seventh grade.  This was largely attributable to a statistically 
significant (p = .029) increase between the fifth and sixth grades, from 0.76 to 0.99% of words.  
The growth between sixth and seventh grades (from .99 to 1.01% of words) was not 
statistically significant (p = .889).    
The percentage of words involving concepts of Exclusion did increase from 6.64% in 
fifth grade to 7.06% in seventh, but the change fell short of statistical significance (p = .073).  
An almost significant (p = .057) increase in the percent of words expressing exclusion, from 
6.58% in the sixth grade to 7.06% in the seventh grade, was partially counterbalanced by a 
statistically non-significant (p = .786) decline from 6.64% in the fifth grade to 6.58% in the 
sixth.   
Only Discrepancy (which only ranged between means of 3.93% and 4.03% of words) 
and Inhibition (which ranged from means of 0.58% to 0.62% of words) had no statistically 
significant changes.          
 The mean percentage of words involving perceptual processes fell from 2.20% in fifth 
grade to 1.83% in seventh grade (p=. 018), which is consistent with the growth in words 
reflecting the several cognitive processes.  Once again, however, the declines between fifth and 
sixth grades (from 2.20% to 1.95%) and between sixth and seventh grades (from 1.95% to 
1.83%) were not statistically significant, suggesting a gradual change over the period between 
the fifth and seventh grades.  
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General Performance 
The mean number of non-fluencies dropped by almost half between fifth (1.84) and 
sixth (0.99) grades (p = .000), but the further decline to 0.80% in the seventh grade fell short of 
statistical significance (p = .071).  The difference between the fifth (1.89) and seventh (.80) 
grades was also statistically significant (p = .000).  The use of fillers grew from fifth to sixth 
grades, from 1.14 to 1.96 per words (p = .000), and grew again to a mean of 2.53 in seventh 
grade (p = .008).  The growth from fifth to seventh grade was also statistically significant (p = 
.000).         
Table 11: Results for Girls’ Language Use by Grade: Syntax Productivity, Lexicon, and 
General Performance 
  GRADE 5 GRADE 6 GRADE 7 
Language 
Levels 
Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD 
Syntax 
Productivity 
         
Word count      941.509 106 789.892 1129.136 132 859.337 1203.155 58 742.012 
Words/sentence  17.858 106 8.508 15.557 132 4.643 15.402 58 4.558 
Personal 
Pronouns 
15.070 106 3.048 14.827 132 2.814 15.278 58 1.694 
     1st person 6.411 106 3.133 7.518 132 3.744 7.626 58 2.427 
     Other person 8.658 106 3.307 7.310 132 3.101 7.653 58 2.156 
     2nd person 2.466 106 1.830 1.683 132 1.283 2.041 58 1.353 
     3rd person  
     singular 
3.547 106 2.845 3.330 132 2.409 4.038 58 1.832 
     3rd person   
     plural   
2.645 106 1.631 2.297 132 1.342 1.573 58 .836 
Adverbs 7.939 106 1.983 8.461 132 2.126 9.077 58 2.113 
Prepositions 9.755 106 2.070 9.636 132 2.442 10.007 58 1.604 
Conjunctions 10.251 106 1.994 9.967 132 1.991 9.417 58 1.581 
Quantifiers 2.165 106 .897 2.303 132 1.013 2.152 58 .690 
Lexicon                   
Affective  6.771 106 2.049 6.529 132 2.282 6.149 58 1.042 
Cognitive  27.187 106 3.142 27.591 132 3.864 29.090 58 2.584 
Perceptual  .620 106 1.246 1.948 132 1.183 1.831 58 .739 
General 
Performance 
                  
Non-fluencies  1.837 106 1.282 .993 132 .893 .799 58 .558 
Fillers  1.138 106 .840 1.964 132 1.137 2.537 58 1.410 
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Note: The sample sizes (N’s) in the tables represent the number of girls times the number of 
interviews completed.  The means represent the percentages of total words in the transcripts 
averaged across the four interviews, with the exception of Word Count and Words per Sentence 
variables, which are reported as frequency totals. 
 
4.2 Research Question 3         
 The hypotheses that there would also be differences in the use of first vs. second and 
third pronouns between the roles that participants played as bullies, victims, and bystanders 
must be rejected.  Coding the RAI for syntax and through a quantitative analysis of the pronoun 
use, moral language use did not statistically differ across roles.    
4.3 Research Question 4 
 I hypothesized that intuitive language would be more strongly correlated with real life 
dilemmas and rational language would be more strongly correlated with hypothetical dilemmas.  
Specifically, it was argued that the use of first person pronouns would be higher in real-life 
than in hypothetical scenarios, reflecting a greater reliance upon intuitive decision-making 
when one is personally involved in a real-life decision.  As tables 12 and 13 indicate, the results 
are strong: the mean percentage use of first person pronouns in the role-playing interviews 
(9.68) is significantly (p =. 000) higher than in the hypothetical scenario (4.94).  Conversely, 
the mean percentage use of second and third person pronouns is significantly higher (p = .000) 
in the hypothetical scenario (10.24) than in the role-playing interviews (5.98).  
 Also consistent with this hypothesis, students discussing their role-playing as bullies, 
victims, and bystanders each used significantly more first person pronouns, and significantly 
fewer second and third person pronouns than when they discussed a hypothetical scenario.  
Students used a mean of 4.94 first person pronouns in discussing the hypothetical scenario, 
compared to 10.94 first person pronouns by those who role-played as bullies, 8.73 for those in 
victim roles, and 9.42 for those playing bystanders.  Conversely, students used a mean of 10.24 
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other person pronouns in discussing scenarios, compared to a mean of 6.10 for those playing 
bullies, 5.46 for those in victim roles, and 6.42 for those playing bystanders.  Furthermore, the 
mean words per sentence when girls discussed role-playing scenarios (15.66) did not 
statistically differ from the mean when they discussed hypothetical scenarios (17.41). 
Table 12: RAI: Part I Hypothetical Scenario (Grades 5 and 6) 
RAI: Cassie Dilemma Mean N SD 
Personal Pronouns 15.175 27 2.079 
First person 4.937 27 1.862 
Other person 10.239 27 2.062 
2nd person 1.795 27 1.246 
3rd person singular 5.211 27 1.496 
3rd person plural 3.233 27 1.269 
 
Table 13: RAI: Part II Real-Life Scenario (Grades 5 and 6) 
RAI: Bystander, Bully, 
and Victim Roles 
Mean N SD 
Personal Pronouns 15.667 73 3.907 
First person 9.683 73 3.943 
Other person 5.983 73 2.754 
2nd person 1.598 73 1.637 
3rd person singular 1.568 73 1.924 
3rd person plural 2.817 73 1.823 
 
Note: The sample sizes (N’s) in the tables represent the number of girls times the number of 
interviews completed.  The means represent the percentages of total words in the transcripts 
averaged across the four interviews.  
 
4.4 Summary of Quantitative Results  
The results indicate that overall adolescent girls in the fifth, sixth, and seventh grades 
use more rational than intuitive language, but that as they advance from the fifth through the 
seventh grades, adolescent girls move from intuitive towards rational styles of reaching moral 
judgments.  The answer to Research Question 1 is therefore that girls in the fifth to seventh 
grade age range use more rational than intuitive language.  The shift to more rational language 
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in the higher grade suggests an affirmative answer to Research Question 2: there are 
differences, and these might represent a developmental trajectory.  The findings strongly 
indicate that adolescent girls do use different types of language in discussing real life versus 
hypothetical dilemmas, and that the language more likely to be rational in the hypothetical and 
intuitive in the real life dilemmas.  There were, however, no significant differences between the 
roles (bully, victim, bystander) played. 
4.5 Moral Justifications  
A qualitative content analysis was performed on moral justifications to test the 
differences between role-playing and hypothetical scenarios.  Interviews were treated as wholes 
in which each segment was assigned to a justification category based on the justification 
category that dominated the discussion.  The percentage that each justification type represented 
in the total number of interviews was calculated. 
Overall, girls discussing their role-playing as bystanders (n=8) used 17.4% more 
rational justifications and 17% fewer intuitive justifications than when they discussed a 
hypothetical scenario (n=11).  Rational justifications were most often provided in hypothetical 
scenarios (86.4%) based on relation (64%), safety (18%), and convention (5%).  Even in real-
life scenarios, girls also gave rational justifications (69%) based on relation (44%), followed by 
convention (38%) and safety (13%).  However, transformational responses (13%) were also 
represented in real-life scenarios, but not in hypothetical.  The percentage of intuitive responses 
in the hypothetical scenario was quite small (14%), and mostly based on dumbfounding (5%) 
and incomplete sentences (9%).  A much greater percentage of girls provided intuitive 
justifications (31%) in the real-life scenario, with more variation in unsupported statements 
(13%), dumbfounding (6%), ‘I don’t know’ (6%), and incomplete sentences (6%).  
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Summarizing the results shown in tables 11 and 12 revealed a developmental shift from 
intuitive to rational moral justifications.  The number of rational justifications increased 14 
percentage points in the hypothetical scenario (36% to 50%), and only 7 percentage points in 
the real-life scenario (31% to 38%).  However, the real-life scenario showed more variation in 
growth, moving from all conventional responses (100%) in year 1 to safety (33%), relational 
(33%), and transformational (33%) responses in year 2.  In the hypothetical dilemma, girls 
consistently gave the same number of relational (4) and safety (2) justifications in both years.  
Intuitive justifications decreased 21 percentage points overall, with a decline from 16% to 13% 
in the real-life scenario, and from 16% to 0% in the hypothetical.  The hypothetical dilemma 
contained no intuitive justifications the second year, compared to 3 the previous year (9% 
dumbfounding and 18% incomplete sentences).   
 
Table 14: Intuitive and Rational Moral Justifications in Real-Life and Hypothetical Dilemmas 
 
Real-Life 
Bystander Role 
 
 
Year 1 
Real-Life 
Bystander 
Role 
 
Year 2 
Hypothetical 
RAI-Cassie 
 
 
Year 1 
Hypothetical 
RAI-Cassie 
 
 
Year 2 
A. Intuitive Language     
Unsupported 
declarations 1 1   
I-don’t-know  1   
Dumbfounding 
(I-don’t-know with 
justification) 
1  1  
Dead-ends  1  2  
Total Justifications 3 2 3 0 
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B. Rational Language  
 
Real-Life 
Bystander Role 
 
 
Year 1 
 
 
Real-Life 
Bystander 
Role 
 
Year 2 
 
Hypothetical 
RAI-Cassie 
 
 
Year 1 
 
Hypothetical 
RAI-Cassie 
 
 
Year 2 
Safety  2 2 2 
Conventional 5   1 
Relational  2 6 8 
Transformational  2   
Total Justifications 5 6 8 11 
 
 
The qualitative content analysis thus suggests that there may be important differences in 
the grounds on which adolescent girls seek to justify their decisions in real life versus 
hypothetical dilemmas.  The results suggest it might be fruitful to undertake similar analyses on 
samples large enough to support statistical analyses.  
4.6 Summary of Results 
 The findings provided considerable empirical evidence confirming the hypotheses for 
Questions 2, and 4 whereas the hypothesis for Questions 1 and 3 were disconfirmed.  Research 
1 asked what types of language do girls use and what is the extent of that usage. 
Research Question 1 asked whether girls use more intuitive or rational language.  The 
girls used far more words reflecting cognitive than affective or perceptual processes.  They also 
frequently used adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and quantifiers.  However, the girls were 
slightly less likely to use first person pronouns, thought to be associated with intuitive 
language, than second and third person pronouns taken together.  Girls thus seem to use more 
rational than intuitive language overall. 
Research Question 2 asked whether the language used by adolescent girls becomes less 
intuitive and more rational as the girls move from fifth to sixth and then to seventh grades, 
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reflecting a move from more intuitive towards more rational styles of reaching moral 
judgments.  Important evidence supporting this developmental change in moral decision-
making was found.  The use of words reflecting affective processes fell from the fifth grade to 
the seventh grade, while the use of words reflecting cognitive processes grew.  Adolescent girls 
thus seem to measurably shift from affective to cognitive descriptions of their moral judgment 
processes between the fifth and seventh grades, with most of the change occurring between the 
fifth and seventh grades.   
The use of words reflecting Insight and Certainty also grew significantly between the 
fifth and seventh grades, while words involving perceptual processes fell, consistent with the 
hypothesized shift of moral processing from intuitive towards rational forms of cognition.  
Non-fluencies dropped by almost half between the fifth and seventh grades while the use of 
fillers more than doubled.  These findings are all consistent with the hypothesis that the girls 
were moving from intuitive towards rational moral decision-making between the fifth and 
seventh grades.  Also consistent with this hypothesis were statistically significant increases in 
the use of adverbs from the fifth to seventh grade, However, there was a decline in the use of 
conjunctions over this period of time.   
Contrary to the hypothesis, however, there was a statistically significant increase in the 
use of pronouns, from the fifth to seventh grade, and the girls shifted from using second and 
third person pronouns, which declined, towards using first person pronouns, which grew.  The 
use of inclusive concepts fell between the fifth and seventh grades, and the girls used fewer 
words involving explanation in the sixth than in the fifth grade, but more in the seventh than in 
the sixth.  These changes partially counterbalanced, leaving no significant differences in the use 
of explanatory words between the fifth and seventh grades.  The results on Tentative 
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expressions and concepts of Exclusion were also inconclusive, with statistically changes 
between two grades counterbalanced by countervailing changes in the third, rendering the fifth 
to seventh grade difference statistically insignificant.  There were no statistically significant 
differences in the mean percentage of words using prepositions, quantifiers, or swear words 
between grades.  Also inconsistent with this hypothesis were statistically significant decreases 
in the use of conjunctions from the fifth to seventh grade.   
Research Question 3 asked whether intuitive and rational language varies with bully, 
victim, and bystander roles.  The results showed no statistical differences in students’ use of 
first vs. second and third person pronouns across the roles that participants played as bullies, 
victims, and bystanders.  The hypothesis that usage would differ across these roles therefore 
must be rejected.    
The fourth research question asked what type of intuitive and rational moral language is 
used in real life versus hypothetical dilemmas and whether this moral language use differs 
across the scenarios.  The results strongly supported the hypothesis that the use of first person 
pronouns would be higher in role-playing than in hypothetical scenarios.  The use of first 
person pronouns was higher (about twice as high) in real-life, role-playing than in hypothetical 
scenarios.   
The use of first person pronouns was also higher when students discussed each of the 
roles they played – as bullies, victims, and bystanders – than when they discussed a 
hypothetical scenario.  One should note that the mean number of words per sentence did not 
differ when girls discussed role-playing scenarios instead of hypothetical scenarios, and so did 
not contribute to the differences in pronoun usage across the two types of dilemmas.  
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Finally, a qualitative content analysis of the girls’ moral justifications indicated that 
girls discussing their role-playing as bystanders provided more rational justifications and fewer 
intuitive justifications than when they discussed a hypothetical scenario.  Most rational 
justifications of judgments in the hypothetical scenarios were based on relation, although a few 
employed safety and convention.  In discussing real-life scenarios, the rational justifications 
were more evenly divided between relation and convention, with a smaller number of safety 
and transformational responses.  There were no transformational responses in discussions of the 
hypothetical scenarios, and the few intuitive responses primarily reflected dumbfounding and 
incomplete sentences.  
The developmental shift from intuitive to rational moral justifications was more 
pronounced in the hypothetical scenario than in the real-life scenario.  However, justifications 
in the real-life scenario shifted from all conventional responses in year 1 to equal thirds of 
safety, relational, and transformational responses in year 2, while there was no change in the 
justifications, which were relational and safety, in the hypothetical scenario across the two 
years.  Intuitive justifications declined from year 1 to year 2 in the real-life scenario, and 
disappeared from the hypothetical dilemma in year 2.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
The present chapter discusses the main findings of the study, involving both 
quantitative and qualitative variability in adolescent girls’ conflict in the light of the research 
questions in Chapter 2, and compares the results to the findings of other studies.  Next, I 
discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of these findings for research and practice in 
moral education.  I conclude with limitations and future directions for research, and outline 
some of the many questions yet to be answered.  
5.1 Major Findings 
This dissertation explored moral language use in a sample of 15 developing adolescent 
girls as they discussed several real-life and hypothetical scenarios involving relational 
aggression conflicts.  The study asked whether the language they used to discuss these moral 
conflicts was more intuitive or rational, and whether this relationship changed over 
development.  The data was analyzed for developmental trends, examining changes that 
occurred over a three year period.  
Building upon suggestions emerging in the sociolinguistic, education, and moral 
psychology literatures, I defined a set of lexical, syntactic, semantic, and general 
processing/performance language categories associated with intuitive processing, and a 
contrasting set that should be associated with rational processing.  These respectively defined 
‘intuitive’ and ‘rational’ uses of language, and provided language production indicators that the 
study used to identify and analyze the conditions under which adolescent girls used each in 
reaching and in discussing their moral judgments in real-life and hypothetical encounters with 
relational aggression. The quantitative and qualitative analyses of the language used allow me 
to draw conclude point to five major conclusions.  
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5.1.1 Overall Intuitive and Rational Language Use 
The results provide evidence against the assumption that girls use more intuitive 
language than rational language overall.  The present findings challenges existing research on 
adolescents’ language, especially those findings that suggest adolescent girls rely on emotional 
lexicon in their language.  This finding is important because it offers a novel perspective on the 
correlation between language use and emotional language.  One particularly interesting aspect 
of the research focused on how adolescents do develop an enhanced ability to deal with 
complex emotional experiences as they shift towards broader, more differentiated linguistic 
representations of emotion, but overall, emotion language does decrease with age (O'Kearney 
& Dadds, 2004; Saarni, Mumme, & Campos, 1998).  The results from this study this does not 
mean the language used to express emotions may mostly involve emotional terms.  Speakers 
will be more likely to emphasize cognitive aspects when discussing their emotions with 
relational aggression situations, particularly when responding to impersonal, hypothetical 
scenarios about what others would do.  Reappraisal of emotion may increasingly depend on 
cognitive uses of language to explain emotions in referring to the eliciting relational aggression 
situation (Romaine & Lange, 1991).  This is supported by O’Kearney & Dadds’ (2004) 
observation that adolescents frequently use situational, behavioral, and cognitive references to 
express their emotions.  
Girls’ verbal reports of relational aggression situations depend on their perspectives as 
they reconstruct or interpret an event or speech.  It is difficult to capture emotive speech, 
because the words often expressed in the structure and not the content of an utterance (Romaine 
& Lange, 1991).  It can also be difficult to reconstruct emotionally laden events, because the 
strong feeling girls experience when they are hurt tend to disappear quickly (Brown, 1998).  
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5.1.2 Developmental Changes in Intuitive and Rational Language 
Research Question 2 asked whether the language used by adolescent girls becomes less 
intuitive and more rational as the girls move from the fifth to the sixth and seventh grades, 
reflecting a move from more intuitive towards more rational styles of reaching moral 
judgments.  The quantitative and qualitative analyses of the language indicated that adolescent 
girls do seem to shift from intuitive to rational styles of moral decision making.  Most striking 
was the finding the girls were only gradually shifting from intuitive towards rational uses of 
language, with most of the change occurring overall in the period between the fifth and seventh 
grades.  The analysis found evidence supporting this developmental change in the relative shifts 
from words reflecting affective processes to those reflecting cognitive processes; from words 
reflecting perceptual processes towards cognitive words involving Insight, Inclusion, and 
Certainty.  Non-fluencies dropped by almost half between the fifth and seventh grades, while 
the use of fillers more than doubled.  The statistically significant increase in the use of adverbs 
from the fifth to seventh grade was also consistent with this hypothesis.  
 Combining the concept of intuition and rationality leads to an enhanced picture of what 
linguistic features develop throughout adolescents.  Thus, one of the advantages of this 
longitudinal sample of girls is that it provides a much more detailed picture of linguistic 
variation in general processing, lexicon, semantics, and syntax within relational aggression 
situations.  Also, the pronounced linguistic changes across fifth to seventh grades can serve as 
an age-related linguistic developmental marker.  In contrast to the evidence for the late 
development of rationality, the results demonstrate the existence of rational language at earlier 
ages than were revealed in previous studies.  These findings are in line with Eckert’s (2003) 
argument that language is more stable during the transition from elementary school to middle 
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school, when children are typically faced with rapid social change in the form new friendships 
and emerging forms of identity.  These results are also consistent with the research that has 
shown that relational aggression is most prominent in students following middle and high 
school transitions (Cillessen & Mayeux, 2007; Pellegrini and Long, 2002).   
 The significant decline for conjunctions could be independent of moral language and 
instead be attributed to grammatical changes.  Conjunctions could act as discourse fillers by 
interrupt or facilitating transition of speech (e.g. shift in topic), suggesting that this aspect of 
language may not be a valid indicator of moral language.     
 The findings on the use of first vs. second and third person pronouns were especially 
notable.  Contrary to expectations, girls’ pronoun usage became more intuitive and less rational 
with development.  There was a statistically significant decrease in students' mean use of 
pronouns, from fifth grade to seventh grade.  From fifth grade to sixth grade, the mean 
percentage of first person pronouns used increased significantly while second and third person 
pronouns used decreased.  From fifth grade to seventh grade, the mean percentage of first 
person pronouns used increased significantly whereas second and third person pronouns 
declined.  The results challenge Brown & Gilligan (1992)’s conclusion that girls age, they 
become less egocentric, more autonomous, and are better able to differentiate their emotions 
and thinking from others.  This study suggests that girls could use first person pronouns more 
often because they are more introspective and metacognitive when discussing situations of 
relational aggression.  These findings could also indicate that the pronoun categories of the 
MLUET are not valid indicators of moral language.  Additional research is needed to 
distinguish the moral meanings for pronouns. 
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5.1.3 Pronoun Variation in Roles         
 The hypotheses that there would also be significant differences in the use of first vs. 
second and third pronouns between the roles that participants played as bullies, victims, and 
bystanders must be rejected.  Coding the RAI for syntax and through a quantitative analysis of 
the pronoun use, moral language use did not statistically differ across roles.  The standard 
deviations for the use of first person pronouns in discussions involving bullying roles was 
5.6%, representing more than half of the mean usage of first person pronouns in such roles 
(10.9%).  In contrast, the standard deviations for bystander (3.4%) and victim (2.8%) roles 
were much narrower, representing only one third, approximately, of the means (9.4 and 8.9%, 
respectively).  The higher standard deviation for the bullying role indicates that some 
respondents were much more likely to have much higher usage of the first person than the 
mean, and others much lower usage.  In contrast, the smaller standard deviations for the use of 
first person pronouns in discussion bystander and victim roles indicates that respondents were 
much closer to the means in their usage of the first person.     
 The higher standard deviations in discussing bullying roles might represent the presence 
of varying explanation or justification styles among the respondents (tendencies, perhaps, in 
explaining bullying behaviors (e.g., by relatively high use of the first person or by emphasis on 
the third person behaviors of the other parties), compared to more standardized or common 
usages of the first person in discussing bystander and victim roles.  That is, while respondents 
showed relatively little variation in the use of first person pronouns in bystander and victim 
roles, some respondents used the first person pronoun frequently in discussing bullying roles, 
while others used it sparsely.  It follows that the greater variation within bully roles suggests an 
interaction between intuition and rational language.  Aggressors could use first person 
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pronouns more to reduce their moral culpability, when boasting about themselves or displaying 
self-aggrandizing behavior.  Alternatively, aggressor may use other-person pronouns to focus 
on bystander or victim as partly responsible, which would enable aggressors to deny 
responsibility and blame (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990).  This use of second and 
third person pronouns would allow an aggressor to minimize the moral implications of their 
actions by emphasizing external or mitigating circumstances.  This interpretation of the results, 
although speculative, underscores the hypothesized associated with the aggressor role.  One 
could assume that since there were no significant differences between roles, girls may be have 
been inclined to use a wide variety of pronouns when construct a narrative.  The social nature 
of relational aggression incidents seems to necessitate a description of others’ judgments or 
actions and their interaction with others.         
5.1.4 Linguistic Variation Across Real Life and Hypothetical Scenarios   
 The results strongly supported the third hypothesis, which proposed that the use of 
intuitive and rational language would significantly differ in real life versus hypothetical 
dilemmas, reflecting a greater reliance upon intuitive language when one is personally involved 
in a real-life decision that and exhibit greater rationality in discussing role-playing than 
hypothetical scenarios.  As hypothesized, first person pronouns were used at almost twice the 
rate in students’ discussions of role-playing dilemmas as in their discussions of the hypothetical 
scenario, and conversely, the use of second and third person pronouns was more than 50 
percent higher in the hypothetical scenario than in the role-playing interviews.  The use of first 
person pronouns was also higher when students discussed each of the roles they played – as 
bullies, victims, and bystanders – than when they discussed a hypothetical scenario.  
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It was expected than real-life, role-playing scenarios would elicit a higher number of 
first person pronouns.  This finding is especially interesting in view of Monin, Pizarro & Beer’s 
(2007) suggestion that rationalists favor first-person hypothetical moral dilemmas.  According 
to Monin, Pizarro & Beer (2007), participants resolve personal dilemmas with a greater 
emphasis on first-person decision-making whereas emotionalist approaches tend to favor third 
person moral situations, reflecting “a view of morality as governed by quick intuitions and 
emotional reactions to infractions” (p.10). These approaches focus on the third-person 
perspective of the transgressions of others.   
Together with the prior results showing that there were no significant differences 
between the roles, these findings could indicate that regardless of whether girls define 
themselves as bullies, bystanders, or victims—how they construct rational and intuitive 
language to make sense of their experiences in each of those roles-pronouns vary as a function 
of hypothetical and real-life scenarios.  In evaluating these results, it is important to consider 
that pronoun usage is highly context dependent.  Pronouns are seen as embedded in a context 
where care-focused and justice-focused dilemmas are a salient part of how girls use language to 
construct, evaluate, and resolve moral problems.  These findings shed further light on the 
importance of using real-life dilemmas to capture females’ different modes of moral thinking in 
relational conflicts based on such concepts as connection, relationships, and the self in relation 
to others (Gilligan, 1988).  Real-life dilemmas more clearly distinguished females' moral 
decision processes and better predicted their moral reasoning than did reasoning regarding 
hypothetical dilemmas (Gilligan, 1988; Brown & Gilligan, 1992).  Similarly, neural systems 
associated with emotions are activated more by personal than by impersonal moral dilemmas 
(Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004). 
   120 
5.1.5 Moral Justifications 
Finally, a qualitative content analysis showed that girls were more likely to provide 
more rational and fewer intuitive justifications when they discussed their real-life, role-playing 
as bystanders than when they discussed a hypothetical scenario.  These results contrasted with 
Haidt, Björklund, & Murphy’s (2000) finding that participants were more dumbfounded by 
moral intuition stories and non-moral intuition tasks than a moral reasoning dilemma. 
The developmental shift from intuitive to rational moral justifications was more 
pronounced in the hypothetical scenario than in the real-life scenario.  However, justifications 
in the real-life scenario shifted from all conventional responses in year 1 to equal thirds of 
safety, relational, and transformational responses in year 2.  In contrast, there was no change in 
the justifications, which were relational and safety, in the hypothetical scenario across the two 
years.  Intuitive justifications declined from year 1 to year 2 in the real-life scenario, and 
disappeared from the hypothetical dilemma in year 2.  These findings were in contrast to 
Selman & Feigenberg (2010) conclusion that that adolescent girls’ decisions heavily depend on 
their perceptions and contexts because there was much more stability in the kinds of 
justifications adolescents provided. Taken together, these findings from this study have a 
number of theoretical and practical implications. 
5.2 Theoretical Significance of the Study       
 This dissertation presents the first theoretically and empirically driven longitudinal 
study on language production in morality related to relational aggression.  This thesis 
contributes to the scientific literature in moral psychology, sociolinguistics, and education by 
introducing a new level of scope, precision, and depth to the understanding of adolescent’s 
language use, and the complex relations between intuitive and rational processes reflected in 
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adolescent girls’ language.  This contribution is potentially very important, because of the 
dearth of research and inconclusive findings in these areas, and this seems to be a highly 
promising area for empirical and theoretical advances.     
 This study can provide a foundation to further examine the extent to which language is 
used to construct an understanding of moral issues (i.e. understand and interpret the socio-
moral judgments and behaviors of their peers), or merely reflects one’s moral understanding. 
Findings about the relation between language development and aggression are important in 
understanding the early stages of academic failure, internalizing and externalizing disorders 
(Bonica et al. 2003), social maladjustment (Crick, 1996), and other co-morbid problems 
relationally aggressive children are at risk for.  It seems important to use a longitudinal design 
to develop a broader understanding of the causes and development of relational aggression.  
The longitudinal design of this study provided insight into the direction of the effects by 
examining the unfolding of language use over three years, providing valuable information 
about the development and stability of relational aggression in adolescent girls.  More 
generally, the findings underscore the need to intervene in girls’ emergent stages of age-related 
social interactions.  Supporting this, Baumgartner & Strayer (2008) argue against the notion of 
a single developmental pathway leading to effective management of interpersonal conflict. 
 Perhaps more important, these supportive results strongly support the idea that the 
language used by girls to describe and discuss their moral judgments can provide a 
methodology for empirically measuring and distinguishing intuitive and rational language.  
This was the first study to extend a sociolinguistic methodology and analyses of moral 
language, making it possible to identify language that is more likely to or require rapid, 
intuitive thinking, or more deliberate and conscious processes of reasoning.  Integrating the 
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dual processing approach and my proposed moral language use methodology provided an 
initial framework for studying moral decision-making and some of its developmental 
trajectories in adolescent girls.  The primary advantage of this method lies in its potential to 
reveal the ways in which language use differs when switching from System 1 (intuitive) type 
processing to System 2 (rational) type processing.  The language production measures can 
therefore provide potentially powerful tools for characterizing and evaluating moral language 
in future research.      
The MLUET complements and strengthens existing methodologies and tools that 
document moral language (e.g. Gilligan, 1988; Brown & Gilligan, 1993).  For instance, 
Gilligan and her colleagues changed methodology in moral psychology with their use of 
narrative and hermeneutics, and their readers guide helped reveal “the complexity of voice and 
relationship” in girls’ language and “sense of themselves.” This study systematically examines 
the formal properties of language, rather than simply discussing how girls use a language of 
morality metaphorically (Gilligan, 1988) and Brown & Gilligan (1992) This study explains and 
deconstructs and disentangles how adolescents speak in a “polyphony” and “orchestration” of 
sounds (Brown & Gilligan, 1992), by providing a linguistic examination of language 
production. Computerized text analysis programs such as the LIWC are beginning to 
correlate language use to broader social and psychological processes (e.g. emotional states, 
social relationships, thinking styles).  However, the word usage approach to the study of 
naturally occurring language is still a crude representation of psychological processes is in its 
earliest stages (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  Tausczik & Pennebaker (2010) note that the 
LIWC “represents only a transitional text analysis program in the shift from traditional 
language analysis to a new era of language analysis” (p.38).  The findings from this study 
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support the idea that linguistic, psychological, and parametric dimensions in the moral domain 
can be reliability identified, to a large degree, by the LIWC.  The MLUET expands the 
constellation of word categories to provide a sense of how LIWC language categories tap both 
intuition and rationality.  In other words, the MLUET extends the LIWC word-based analysis 
by demonstrating that rational and intuitive languages are related in the moral domain. 
5.4 Practical Implications of the Study       
  Both the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the language provide evidence 
that adolescent girls do shift from intuitive to rational styles of moral language, and exhibit 
greater rationality in discussing real-life than hypothetical scenarios.  The findings of study 
may help girls change their modes of speech to help girls overcome quick, intuitive responses 
to fight back, flee, or take other actions unlikely to improve or resolve the situation.  Since the 
girls’ language may be malleable in an educational setting.  This study can hopefully provide a 
foundation from which to pursue other potentially fruitful ways for resolving relational 
aggression conflicts.         
 Requiring only thoughtful, rational thinking without intuition or affect could result in 
students suppressing the feelings they experience.  Children should be encouraged to shift not 
just from emotional to rational language, but to use their emotions.  For example, emotions can 
be useful in moral reactions when they result quick and proper conviction of a moral 
transgression (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007).       
 Coloroso (2003) gave examples for how children can share their feelings to be more 
reflective and empathetic.  Language can be changed so that girls are more likely to insist on 
being treated fairly “you can be angry at me, but you can’t hit me.”  For example using “This is 
how I felt” instead of “You made me angry” or  “I need” instead of  “You better do this, or I 
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won’t be your friend” can teach girls to handle feelings assertively, acknowledge them, and 
handle them.  However, the language terms and uses associated with moral judgments have not 
been studied systematically study across the dual processing literature or sociolinguistics to 
permit inferences about how adolescent females construct language to understand and interpret 
the socio-moral judgments and behaviors of their peers.      
 Kikas et al. (2009) acknowledge that language is an important way to control behavior 
and emotions (Cole, 2001; Vygotsky, 1934/1997).  While some approaches aim to silence 
harmful or oppressive speech (Applebaum, 2003), this study gives girls the opportunity to 
present their intuitions and thoughts about relational aggression through their own voices.  
Changing the language can help to positively impact the roles girls play in relational aggression 
and the surrounding environment or climate of a school (Coloroso, 2003).  Thus, the research 
may have implications for the practical need for pedagogical interventions and moral education 
programs that can potentially reduce relational aggression and enable adolescent girls to better 
handle conflicts and reconciliations.  This may eventually help to define, implement 
empirically supported programs for developing strategies and educational interventions to 
promote moral, and meta-cognitive reasoning, and to increase pro-social behavior and 
development in girls.   
Several cognitive-developmental educational interventions have been carried out to 
promote moral reasoning (e.g., Berkowitz & Oser, 1985; Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989; 
Rest, 1979), primarily through peer moral dilemma discussion (Berkowitz, 1985) and the Just 
Community approach (Kohlberg, 1985).  Students were challenged to articulate and reason 
through critical discussion of the dilemma as individuals and in groups until a resolution was 
achieved, with the goals of trying to figure out the best moral solution.  Berkowitz & Gibbs 
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(1983) demonstrated that moral discussions in which peers focus critically on each others' 
reasoning promote the most development.        
 One of the most prominent current approaches in moral education is Narvaez’s 
Integrated Ethical Education (IEE; Narvaez, 2006), which offers a holistic approach that 
combines traditional character education and rational moral education.  The IEE emphasizes 
gaining “ethical know-how” in Rest’s (1984) four skills: ethical sensitivity, ethical judgment, 
ethical motivation, and ethical action.  Graham, Haidt, & Rimm-Kaufman (2008) indicate that 
Narvaez (2006) does give adequate attention to emotions and intuitive responses.  However, 
school-based emotion education curricula have included teaching of emotional regulation and 
engagement (Rice, Levine, & Pizarro, 2007) to reduce maladaptive behavior (Pizarro & 
Salovey, 2002).  However, little is said about how automatic moral judgments should be 
incorporated into moral education programs (Graham, Haidt, Rimm-Kaufman, 2008).  The 
proposed thesis will fill that gap by addressing how students’ intuitive moral reactions can be 
cultivated.  Subsequent intervention programs can potentially be developed on the basis of 
these existing interventions, but could focus on strategic use of language or targeted certain 
verbal skills to promote positive interactions with others.  Perhaps students’ language use could 
be channeled towards healthy coping strategies to improve students’ abilities to manage 
interpersonal conflicts as part of these broader interventions.     
5.4 Limitations and Future Research        
 The findings from the current study provide a foundation for understanding the 
development of moral language in adolescence, but the interpretation of the results need to be 
viewed as preliminary and should therefore be treated with caution.    
 There are a few measurement issues concerning the relation of measures to the 
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outcomes.  Because this is the first study to demonstrate an association between moral 
judgment and language use, future longitudinal studies should replicate this work to determine 
the reliability and generalizability of the MLUET.  This dissertation does help lay the 
foundation for subsequent research studies to validate the MLUET categories as being more 
intuitive and rational.  This can help to determine if these constructs reflect participants’ 
discussion of their moral reasoning, or if they are using language to conceal their actual moral 
judgments.    
Future work can help determine if the language people use to describe and discuss their 
moral decisions correlates with their processes of reaching those moral judgments. By 
providing linguistic indices of intuitive and rational properties for each participant, researchers 
can correlate specific properties of language from the MLUET with specific properties of moral 
judgment from independent measures for each participant and across participants.  These scores 
would permit analyses of the relationship between language use and stages of moral 
development, and provide actual measures of the girls’ moral development, particularly in 
relation to girls’ justifications.  Important and more detailed correlational analyses can now be 
conducted if the moral stage scores from a Moral Judgment interview with the same subjects 
are correlated with the linguistic results reported here.  Future longitudinal studies are also 
needed to determine the developmental trajectories for relational aggression in both males and 
females in different developmental periods, and to gain a better understanding of the 
relationship across years of development.        
 This study relied entirely on students’ self-reports to real life and hypothetical scenarios 
of relational aggression.  This presents methodological limitations, concerning the subjective 
nature of understanding social interactions, and whether or not “people say what they mean or 
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mean what they say.”  Especially in an interview situation involving natural speech It can be 
difficult to interpret what a child intends to say because the mind’s linguistic system is tacit 
(Lust, 2006; Blume & Lust, 2011).  Some interviewers conducted more intensive probing than 
others, providing more extensive responses from the participants.  Since relational aggression 
and language use were both measured with self-reports, estimates of the relationship between 
them may be biased by method variance.  Agreement across adolescent girls suggests that this 
measure is likely capturing relational aggression to some extent, but it may miss aspects of this 
construct, as adolescents often underestimate their aggression.  Adolescent students can be 
difficult to interview because of the way in which they simply respond, using monosyllabic 
answers (“yes” or “no”) to questions (Bassett, Beagan, Ristovski, Slijepcevic & Chapman, 
2008).  On the other hand, self-reports can capture incidents of aggression that are not 
observable and known to others (Kikas et al., 2009).      
 Future studies could adopt the natural speech methodology to better assess the variation 
in numerous multi-word utterances, the discourse and pragmatic context, and the spontaneous 
reactions of the child (Blume & Lust, 2011).  Utilizing natural speech data would be 
advantageous, because it is not determined by adult language, or influenced by controlled 
experimental conditions (Blume & Lust, 2011).  Researchers should also extend assessments to 
measuring prosody and variations in supra-segmental features of speech production such as 
pitch, intonation, and rhythm (Lust, 2006), for each speech utterance at different points in time.  
Variations in voice quality, manipulated from transcripts, would provide an excellent indicator 
of emotional and intuitive states (Robinson, 1972).  Intuitive and rational language might be 
better understood through a mix of assessment methods.  Intuitive judgments may reflect 
subjects’ first, automatic responses.  If so, one promising approach could involve the use of 
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time-pressured decision tasks that measure reaction times in experimental settings, 
accompanied by a verbal language abilities assessments.  
Although the study does utilize rich speech samples with a large number of utterances, 
the sample of 15 participants is largely homogeneous and relatively small so the conclusions 
drawn must be treated as tentative.  Although this study used a convenience sample that limits 
the generalizability of the findings, it proved advantageous for this exploratory study.  It is a 
good starting point for future research to replicate the study with a more heterogeneous sample 
by examining ethnically, culturally, and economically diverse populations. 
 Another major concern is that no metadata was collected on the participants’ age, 
ethnicity, and socio-economic status (SES).  This makes it impossible to determine whether 
age, SES, or ethnicity was responsible for the differences observed.  Future studies should 
carefully examine the effects of age, culture, and SES on relational aggression to disentangle 
these results.  However, all participants were from the same school, and observation suggests 
that this was a relatively homogeneous, middle-class, predominantly white sample. 
Caution is warranted in assuming that language is always indicative of what people 
actually feel or think or is consistently predictive of behavior.  When discussing language use, 
there is a large caveat:  girls might use more intuitive terms but in a more rational way.  The 
MLUET and LIWC will only show us the moral language use, but it does not show the actual 
reasoning, but this is an area for future research.  For example, girls may say, "I feel that..." 
instead of "I think that…"  The MLUET would place the former in the intuitive category, but 
the actual meaning of the girl's statement could indicate a rational cognitive processing of the 
information.  In fact, one’s experience of emotion or intuition can often differ from the way it is 
reported.  The meaning of language is distinct from thoughts or concepts related to those 
   129 
meanings (Lust, 2006).  For example, tentative speakers could be engaged in slow, effortful 
thinking while “fluent, glib speakers” may not be generate speech without any conscious 
analysis (Aitchison, 2008).	  	  
In conclusion, this dissertation has provided a useful first step in the investigation of 
intuitive and rational language by delineating several variables for the characterization and 
evaluation of moral language production measures.  Combining the dual processing approach 
and a proposed moral language use methodology has provided an initial framework for 
studying moral language and some of its developmental trajectories in adolescent girls in the 
study of relational aggression.  
In the light of these developments, I maintain that this research can potentially reduce 
relational aggression and enable adolescent girls to better handle conflicts and reconciliations 
through their construction and control of language. By building upon and extending the work of 
researchers examining adolescents’ language and morality (e.g. Eckert, 2003), this research has 
the potential to unify lines of inquiry spanning socio-linguistics, moral psychology, and 
education. Establishing a stronger relationship between these language use and morality will 
help lay the groundwork for being able to evaluate whether girls’ use of language correlates 
with their moral judgments.   I am now looking forward to research on the multiple and 
complex ways language and morality interact in language use. 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
(From Schrader's Adolescent Girls' Relational Aggression Longitudinal Study (GRLS), 2005) 
Initial Interview 
 
The first meeting of the girls will be an interview to talk about their conceptions of relational 
aggression.  The first questions will be around the definition of the term, the roles they observe 
girls play in relationally aggressive situations, and a focus on the role of bystanders in the 
situation.  
 
Questions will include the following, but will be generated depending on what the girls want to 
talk about.  Girls will be handed a list of the questions as a piece of paper to hold and read, in 
many instances, this makes them feel more comfortable. 
General definitions:  
 
• In what ways are girls mean to each other?   
• In what ways are girls who are friends with each other mean to each other? 
• How would you define “relational aggression”?  
 
Roles and behaviors of bystanders: 
 
• What do girls do when they see aggressive/mean things happen? 
• Why do you think they do that? 
• What gets in the way of stopping the aggression? 
• What is a bully, victim, bystander? 
• I’ll explain some roles that bystanders play in relational aggression.  Tell me if you 
know of anytime that you have seen these roles (see Relational Aggression Model).  
Please do not tell me the names of girls who do these things.  Have you seen anyone 
change their role from one of these roles to another one?  Why do you think that may 
have happened? 
 
Influences: 
Do the following have anything to do why girls are mean to each other?  How? 
Do the following have anything to do why girls don’t stand up and help another?  How? 
 
• Popularity 
• Cliques  
• Media 
• Boys/romance/sexuality 
• Competition 
• Gossip  
 
Moral Atmosphere: 
Now I would like to talk to you about your ideas about your school. 
How would you describe the social atmosphere of your school? 
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(Prompt: is there respect for one another, caring, support, acceptance of differences) 
Do you feel safe emotionally? Physically? 
What helps make you feel safe? 
How do you feel when you see an incident of relational aggression/girls being mean to each 
other?  What does it make you want to do?  What do you wish you and/or others would do? 
What would be your idea of an ideal school atmosphere/culture/environment?  What would 
interfere with that? 
What would be your idea of an ideal relational atmosphere/culture/environment?   
 
Self Questions:  (adapted from Kegan, 1982) 
 
Tell me about a situation in your life where you felt (choose one):  torn, proud, sad, or happy 
with other girls.  Which one would you like to talk about? 
What did you value most (think was most important to you personally)  in the situation? 
What was your role in the situation?  Or, What did you do? 
What got in the way of, or competed with, doing what you thought was right or best, or what 
you valued most?  Was it some kind of “threat” to who you are? Tell me about that. 
Is there anything that you would do differently?  Why or why not? 
What would you change about the situation, what you did, or how you reacted?  What/Why? 
 
Interview II: 
 
Before the interview, ask: 
Was there anything that you wanted to say in the last interview you thought about later and 
wanted to add?  
 
This interview has three parts, the Moral Judgment Interview, the Metacognitive 
Interview that reflects on one’s thinking about the MJI, and a real life interview. 
 
Part A: 
MORAL JUDGMENT AND MORAL METACOGNITION 
 
Dilemma II Form B (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987) from the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) 
 
(This dilemma was selected for this study since it has to do with girls, promise keeping, a close 
relationship such as sisters might have, and authority—issues that may be most related to 
relational aggression) 
 
Judy was a 12 year old girl.  Her mother promised her that she could go to a special rock 
concert coming to their town if she saved up from babysitting and lunch money so she would 
have enough money to buy a ticket to the concert.  She managed to save up enough money for 
the ticket plus another $20.  But then her mother changed her mind and told Judy that she had 
to spend the money for new clothes for school.  Judy was disappointed and decided to go to the 
concert anyway.  She bought a ticket and told her mother that she had only been able to save 
$20.  That Saturday she went to the performance and told her mother that she was spending the 
day with a friend.  A week passed without her mother finding out.  Then Judy told her older 
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sister Louise, that she had gone to the performance and had lied to her mother about it.  Louise 
wonders whether to tell their mother what Judy did. 
 
 
1. Should Louise tell their mother that Judy had lied about the money or should she keep 
quiet? Why or why not? 
2. In wondering whether or not to tell, Louise thinks of the fact that Judy is her sister.  
Should that make a difference in Louise’s decision?  Why/why not? 
3. Does telling have anything to do with being a good daughter? Why/why not?  A good 
sister?  Why/why not? 
4. Is the fact that Judy earned the money herself important in this situation? 
5. Is the fact that the mother promised she could go to the concert if she earned the money 
the most important thing in this situation?  Why/why not? 
6. In general, why should promises be kept? 
7. Is it important to keep a promise to someone that you don’t know well and might never 
see again?  Why/why not? 
8. What is the most important thing a mother should be concerned about in relation to her 
daughter?  Why is that most important? 
9. What is the most important thing a sister should be concerned about in relation to her 
sister? 
10. In general, what should a mother’s authority be over her daughter?  Why? 
11. What is the most important thing a daughter should be concerned about in relation to 
her mother?  Why is that the most important thing? 
12. What would you say is the most responsible thing for Louise (as a bystander) to do in 
this situation? 
 
Part B: 
METACOGNITIVE INTERVIEW (MCI) 
(Adapted from Schrader, 1988) 
 
1)  Thinking back over the dilemma I just read about Judy and Louise, how did you know how 
to approach the problem or how to think about it?  How did you know to do that?  Were you 
aware of what you were doing at that time? 
 
2)  What did you consider in deciding how to solve it? 
 
3)  How did you know what to consider?  What were the best things to consider?  
  
4)  Were you aware of a strategy or some approach or way of thinking that you were using to 
solve the dilemma?  What was it?  Were there other ways of thinking about it?  What were 
they?  Why didn’t you do that instead? 
 
5)  Did you consider that strategy/approach/way of thinking to be the best one to use in order to 
solve the dilemma?  How did you know it was the best? 
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6)  Did you consider alternate strategies or ways of thinking?  If so, how did you choose the 
one you chose? 
 
6b)  Do you think other people have different strategies or ways of thinking?  What do you 
think they are?  Are they just as good as the one you used?  How do you know? 
 
7)  How did you know when the dilemma was resolved or when you reached an adequate 
solution?  
 
8)  Thinking back about how you thought about solving this dilemma, can you summarize the 
steps or the process that you used to think about the dilemma?  Looking back now, how did you 
know how to think about it that way? 
 
8)  Would you change your approach to the problem or your answers because of talking about 
it in this interview?  How/Why? 
 
9)  Were you aware of your thinking processes while you were solving the dilemma earlier, or 
were you able to reconstruct your process just because of this interview? 
 
 
PART C: 
 (Adapted from Gilligan’s Real Life Interview; Rest’s 4 component model:  Moral sensitivity, 
moral judgment, moral motivation, moral character, and the metacognitive questions above.) 
 
• Describe a situation of girls being mean to each other that you know about. 
• What was the situation?  How did you become aware of it? 
• Was there a conflict for you?  What was it? 
• Was there something that you could see as being right or wrong to do in that situation?  
What was it?  
• What kinds of things did you think about in dealing with the situation? 
• What were the most important things to consider in deciding what to do?  How did you 
know? 
• What did you do?  Why? 
 
• Now that you think back on the situation, were you aware of a strategy or some 
approach you were using to solve it?  What was it? 
• Did you consider that strategy to be the best one to use?  How did you know it was?   
• Did you consider alternative ways of thinking?  (if so), how did you choose the one you 
chose?  
• How did you know when you reached a solution?  Was that the best solution?  How did 
you know? 
• Thinking back over the situation again and how you thought about it at the time, were 
you aware of your thinking about your decision process at that time, or are you able to 
construct what you thought about as we've been talking about it? 
• Has this interview affected your thinking in any way? 
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Interview III: 
 
RELATIONAL AGGRESSION INTERVIEW (RAI) 
 
I'm going to read aloud a situation of relational aggression.  I would like to know how you 
might think about this dilemma.  (note to interviewers:  use your judgment about the flow of the 
conversation in asking the questions.  Make sure they are all asked, but the order and wording 
may differ slightly depending on interviewee.) 
 
Cassie was the leader of the group, always being the one who organized the other girls for 
things to do.  Dixie, Alana and Karen were friends too, sitting together at the lunchroom table 
every day.  One day at lunch, Cassie said that they would all go to the movies together on 
Saturday afternoon.  That afternoon Cassie told Dixie and Alana that she didn’t really want 
Karen to come to the movie even though she was in the group when they all decided to go, and 
if they didn’t agree with her, then that person could just not come, too.  Dixie agreed and said 
she didn’t think Karen fit in the group because of the clothes she wears, and Alana was silent 
because she was torn—she wanted to go with the girls but didn’t want to hurt Karen’s feelings.  
So, Cassie told Dixie to call Karen on the phone that night and say that none of the girls were 
allowed to go to the movies.  Cassie listened in on the conversation.  Karen was disappointed, 
but was devastated when she went to the movie anyway with her family, and saw all the girls 
there together.  To make matters worse, Cassie, Dixie and Alana were whispering about Karen 
behind her back, rolling their eyes at her, and then Cassie finally came over and said, “We hope 
you don’t have hurt feelings, but we just wanted to go with our BEST friends.  At the end of the 
movie, the three girls talked loudly so Karen could hear about how they were all going to have 
a sleep-over party later that evening. 
 
(In years 2 & 3 a composite of participants’ actual experiences will be presented as the 
scenario) 
 
Part A: 
Do you think this is relational aggression?  Why/why not? 
Was this the right thing or a good thing to do? Why/why not? 
What should have and could have been done differently here?   
What were the right things to do here?  What were the wrong things?  Why? 
What risks are involved (what is at stake) for Dixie and Alana if they tried to include Karen?  
What would get in the way of Alana speaking up to include Karen? 
What should Karen do?   
What would get in the way of Karen standing up to her friends and telling them that they were 
being mean? 
Who was the bully? Who was the victim? Of all the girls, who was in the position to do 
something good?   
Why would someone do something good?  Why should they?   
How/why do you think that Karen was strong enough to stand up to her friends in this 
situation?  Could you see yourself doing that?  Why/why not? What gets in the way of standing 
up for yourself or standing up for other people against someone who is being mean? 
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Moral emotions: 
How do you think Cassie, Alans, Dixie and Karen each felt in this situation? 
How would you feel in this situation (be clear about which role/roles they are discussing)? 
Would your feelings change depending on what you did in this situation?  How would they 
change, and why? 
 
Part B: 
I would like to ask you about different roles that people have identified in situations where 
there is aggression among girls.  In school, girls have been in on e or all of these roles, and I 
would like us to talk about each one and how you experienced them.  (If the time is short, I will 
ask only about Bystander Roles)  [Note:  all these questions may not be asked in turn, but they 
will be used to guide the interview] 
 
 
Interview III, part 2: 
 
Aggressor role: 
Have you ever been a bully or mean to other girls who are your friends?  What 
happened/what was the situation (include who was involved)?  Why did you do 
that? What were you hoping would come out of that?  What did other people 
(bystanders) do, or say to you?  How did you respond? What did the 
target/victim do?  How did you feel about that?  How did you feel after it was 
over?  Did that situation change the way you interact with your friends---If 
yes, how so?  Would you do something that again--why/why not?  What do you 
think other people should do when they see you act this way? Why? 
 
Bystander role: 
 
Have you ever been a bystander when something mean was happening?  what 
happened?  Why did you do that? What were you hoping would come out of what 
you did?  What did other people (bystanders) do, or say to you?  How did you 
respond? What did the target/victim do? Did they try to get your help? How did 
you feel about that?  How did you feel after it was over?  Did that situation 
change the way you interact with your friends---If yes, how so?  Would you do 
something that again--why/why not? 
Did you see yourself changing your role in the situation at any point--from 
bystander to bully; to target; to a different kind of bystander?  What do you 
think caused that change? 
 
Victim/Target Role 
 
Have you ever been a victim of relational aggression?  What happened? Who was 
involved?  How did you feel?  Did anyone help you?  What did they do? Was that 
effective?  Do you wish anyone would have helped you/done something more? What 
could someone have done to help you? Why do you think they did/didn't do that? 
What would/did get in the way of helping you? 
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Did you change your role in that situation by becoming mean or a bully 
yourself? How did that happen?  How did you feel about that? 
How has this situation affected your friendships? 
How has this situation affected how you act toward other girls?  Are you more 
likely to help or stand up for others because you have been a victim?--why or 
why not? 
 
Do you consider yourself a moral person?/a person who mostly does the right 
thing?  What is a moral person?  What would keep someone from acting morally 
or from doing what they know is the right/good thing to do? 
 
How can girls learn to be nicer to each other and treat each other with 
respect?  What can YOU do to make your friendships more kind and respectful? 
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Appendix B: Parental Consent Form 
Your child is invited to be in a research study about meanness and indirect (not physical) 
aggression among girls her age.  She was selected because she is in the age range we are 
interested in studying.  The study is conducted by Professor Dawn E. Schrader at Cornell 
University.  She can be reached at des14@cornell.edu or at 255-9258 for any questions about 
the study at any time.  Please read this form and ask any questions before agreeing to allow 
your child to take part in this study.  
The study: The purpose of this study is to better understand how girls think about meanness 
and bullying between girls their age, why girls help or don’t help others who are in that 
situation, and if that changes as they grow older.  We are asking that your child take part in one 
small group discussion with girls her age (30-40 minutes) and two individual interviews (also 
about 30-40 minutes each) each year for three years.  The total time your child will be asked to 
commit to this study is less than 2 hours each year.  Examples of questions that your daughter 
will be asked include: “In what ways are girls mean to each other?”, and “What do you think 
about and do when you see girls being mean to each other?” During these interviews your child 
will be asked to talk about a situation we give to them.  They may also talk about girls being 
mean to each other and what girls might do when that happens.   
Risks and benefits: It is possible that your daughter will remember bad things that have 
happened to her when we ask her questions about meanness among girls.  There is a risk that 
others may deduce your daughter is in the study by seeing her meet in for interviews.  A 
possible benefit of the study is that your daughter may realize that she is not alone, and that 
other girls have also experienced these things, and that they may be ways to help others. 
Compensation: Your daughter will receive a small gift to thank her for her time in each part of 
the study.  Snacks and drinks will be served at the individual interviews. 
Confidentiality: The records of this study will be kept private—false names and numbers will 
be used to identify your daughter’s responses.  Your daughter will not be identified by name or 
any other identifying characteristic in the final research reports.  The interviews will be audio-
recorded.  The recordings will not be shared with the school.  The school will not be told what 
your daughter says during the study unless your daughter or you tell them.  However, 
researchers are required by law to report child abuse, and you should understand that if we 
learn about child abuse, state law requires that we have to report it.   
Video recordings and the consent forms signed by you and your daughter will be kept securely 
along with the results of the study indefinitely.  We will keep them because we might want to 
contact your daughter in the future.  Studies that interview girls several times across years are 
rare.  If we decide to contact her in the future, we will ask your permission if she is under the 
age of 18 at that time. 
Unless you and your daughter give your permission, the audio tapes will be viewed only by the 
researchers involved in this study.  However, we would like to ask your permission to use parts 
of the audio recordings at academic conferences.  It would be useful to hear girls’ own voices 
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and words at professional conferences because bullying and meanness among girls is best 
understood from girls themselves.  However, this decision is entirely up to you and you 
daughter.  If you give us permission to use the audiotapes in presentations, your daughter’s 
name and school will not be revealed.  Please indicate your decision below: 
 If you do NOT want the audio used at a professional conference, please sign 
here___________________________. 
Voluntary nature of participation: Your decision whether or not to allow your child to be 
part of the study will not affect your current or future relations with Cornell University or with 
your child's school.  You are free to withdraw your child at any time without affecting your 
relationship with the University or your child's school.  Furthermore, your child may refuse to 
participate or discontinue participation at any time. 
If you have any questions or concerns about your child's rights as a research subject, you may 
contact the Cornell University Committee on Human Subjects (UCHS) at 607-255-5138, or 
you may access their website at 
http://www.osp.cornell.edu/Compliance/UCHS/homepageUCHS.htm.  You will be given a 
copy of this consent form for your records.  
“I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked.  I 
consent to allow my child to participate in the study.  I understand that the interviews will be 
audiotaped.  I understand that researchers will call me and my daughter at home to arrange 
interview times.” 
Parent’s name: _______________________ Child's name: ________________________ 
Signature of Parent ____________________ Date _____________    phone 
number:__________________ 
This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the 
study and was approved by the UCHS on [date]. 
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Appendix B: Child Assent Form 
We are doing a study to try to learn about meanness and bullying between girls your age.  We 
would like you to be in the study so that we can learn more about what girls think and how girls 
feel about meanness and bullying.  We also want to know if girls change their thinking about 
meanness and bullying over time.  
If you agree to be in our study, we are going to ask you to take part in 3 interviews each year 
for the next 3 years with the researchers from this study.  One interview will be in a group with 
other girls in your grade, and two interviews will be with you and a researcher.  During the 
interviews, we will ask you questions about the ways that girls are mean to each other and 
about how you feel when you see girls being mean to each other.  We will want to know if you 
think it is possible to help girls who other girls are being mean to.  We will also want you to 
answer some written questions about meanness between girls, and to watch a video clip about 
this topic and tell us what you think about it in a small group with other girls your age.   
If you agree to be in our study, the things you say to us during the interviews will be kept 
private.  Other students or teachers in your school will not know what you told us unless you 
tell them what you said.  However, if you reveal that you have hurt someone physically or been 
hurt by someone else, we must tell school authorities. 
You can ask questions that you might have about this study at any time.  Also, if you decide at 
any time not to finish, you may stop whenever you want.  Remember, these questions are only 
about what you think.  There are no right or wrong answers because this is not a test.  
If you sign this paper, it means that you have read this and that you want to be in the study.  If 
you don’t want to be in the study, don’t sign the paper.  Remember, being in the study is up to 
you, and no one will be mad if you don’t sign this paper or if you change your mind later.  
Name of Participant (Print)________________________  Grade _____ 
Signature of Participant __________________________   Date _____________  
Teacher (or Homeroom Teacher) ______________________ 
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